ARGENTINE REPUBLIC.
VESSELS BUILDING.
Name. Displacement. Where Building. Remarks.
Battleships.
Rivadavia 28,000 Fore River Shipbl’dg Co. Building.
Moreno 28,000 New York “ “
For a comparison of these ships with the latest U. S. battleships, see United States.
AUSTRIA.
VESSELS BUILDING.
Name. Displacement. Where Building. Remarks.
Battleships.
Radetsky 14,500 Trieste. Launched July 3, 1909.
Zrinyi 14,500 “ “ April 12, 1910.
Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand. 14,500 “ Under trial.
Tegetthoff 20,000 “ Building.
Kaiser Franz Joseph 20,000 “ “
Two of the new Austrian battleships will be named Tegetthoff and Kaiser Franz Joseph. There is still some uncertainty as to whether these ships are actually being built or not. There is no doubt whatever that material has been collected for them, but there are some fairly reliable reports to the effect that work has not proceeded further yet. On the other hand, equally reliable reports speak of them as fairly well advanced.
The armament will consist of twelve 12-inch and sixteen or twenty 4-inch. It is by no means certain how the big guns will be arranged. According to the Rivista Marittima there will be four triple turrets arranged as in the South Carolina and Michigan. According to another report there will be triple turrets arranged en echelon like our Invincible class, but with higher command to the two middle turrets. This, incidentally, is identical with the arrangements attributed in some quarters to the new Russian ships of the Gangoot class. Yet a third version of the new Austrian battleships is that they will have six turrets in the center line arranged as in the latest American battleships, and this, perhaps, may be the more likely arrangement of the three. Triple turrets have a habit of not materializing.—The Engineer.
According to Le Yacht, the two ships referred to above are being built at the Stabilimento Tecnico of Trieste, and two other similar ships are to be built at Pola and by the Société Danubius at Fiume, respectively.
BRAZIL.
VESSELS BUILDING.
Name. Displacement. Where Building. Remarks.
Battleships.
Rio de Janeiro 19,250 Elswick. Building.
São Paulo 19,250 Vickers. Under trial.
Rio de Janeiro 32,000 Elswick. Ordered.
Scouts.
Bahia 3,500 Elswick. Under trial.
The scout Rio Grande do Sul has completed her trials and been formally handed over to the Brazilian Government. The great floating dry dock, built by Vickers, Sons & Maxim for Brazil, has also been completed and is on its way to Rio de Janeiro.
Respecting the new battleship Rio de Janeiro, which Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co. have on hand for the Brazilian Government, several inaccurate statements have lately been published in the north-country daily papers, and reproduced broadcast. It seems desirable, therefore, to place on record the actual facts, in order to avoid further confusion. The new battleship will be 655 feet in length overall by 92 feet beam, and will have a draft of 26 feet, and a displacement of 32,000 tons. Her armament will consist of twelve 14-inch guns, fourteen 6-inch guns, fourteen 4-inch guns, three 6-pounder landing guns, six machine automatic guns and three 18-inch torpedo-tubes under water. She will not only be very much larger than the Minas Geraes and São Paulo, already built for Brazil at Elswick and Barrow, respectively, but the Rio de Janeiro will also be bigger by a good deal than any battleship in, or at present in course of construction for, our own navy. The machinery will be of the improved turbine type, to be manufactured by Vickers, Sons & Maxim, Limited, and will drive four screws and give a speed of 22½ knots. A definite commencement has recently been made at Elswick with the laying down of this new battleship, and a completion will be reached within two years from date. The approximate cost is understood to be no less than £2,900,000.—The Engineer.
TRIALS OF THE “ SÃO PAULO.”—Under the supervision of the Brazilian Naval Commission, the battleship São Paulo has just carried out her trials with the most satisfactory results.
The São Paulo and Minas Geraes are the product of the combined experience of Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., and Vickers, Sons and Maxim.
The Minas Geraes was built at Elswick and engined by the Vickers Co., who built as well as engined the São Paulo. The ships are alike, the design having been prepared by Mr. J. R. Perrett, and the two firms have succeeded in meeting the strategical and tactical needs with a large measure of success, as was clearly established during the trials just terminated. Notwithstanding that the draft was wisely limited to 25 feet, a high fighting efficiency has been achieved.
Firstly, the ships have twelve 12-inch guns so disposed that eight can be fired ahead, eight astern, or ten on either beam. In addition, there are twenty-two 4.7-inch guns and eight 3-pounders.
Secondly, the broadside is protected right fore and aft; the thickness is 9 inches in the center part for the full depth of 22 feet 4 inches, including 5 feet below the load water line. This thickness is reduced to 6-inches forward and aft, and ultimately to 4 inches at the bow and stern; 9-inch athwartship bulkheads are located forward and aft at the ends of the 9-inch armor as protection against raking fire, while at the bow there is a 3-inch bulkhead, and at the stern a 4-inch bulkhead. The heavy guns are mounted in barbettes with 12-inch and 8-inch armor, and the mechanism is covered with hoods. Fourteen of the 4.7-inch guns are on the main deck, protected by the 9-inch armor, while the eight remaining guns on the upper works have shields.
In the third place the full speed attained—21.623 knots—practically equals the average rate attained by the British Dreadnought battleships, although special care had to be exercised in the design of the machinery in order that the steaming conditions might be easily met when using such coal as is readily available in South America, since this may not always be of the high calorific value of the better anthracites, and in order also to meet any deficiency in the skill of the stokers. Thus, for instance, the proportion of heating surface to grate area is about 36 to 1, as compared with from 30 to 33 in the British service. A a consequence, the boilers of the Brazilian ships are larger and heavier for a given power, but there is gain in greater reliability under the conditions of South American service. Reciprocating engines have been adopted and have proved of high efficiency, the radius of action, according to the results of the São Paulo trials, being 29 per cent greater than that guaranteed—or 12,913 nautical miles instead of 10,000 at 10 knots. The full speed on trial—21.623 knots—was realized with 28,645 indicated horse-power, while the guarantee was for 21 knots. On a trial of about four hours’ duration, during which six runs were made over the measured mile, a speed of 21¼ knots was attained with 25,517 indicated horse-power. On an eight hours’ trial a speed of 20.99 knots was got with 22,355 indicated horse-power, the guarantee being 20 knots.
We may, in a brief table, recapitulate the main features of the São Paulo and Minas Geraes:
Length over all 543 feet.
Length between perpendiculars 500 feet.
Breadth, moulded 83 feet.
Depth, moulded 42 feet 3 inches.
Draft 25 feet.
Displacement at 25 feet draft 19,280 tons.
Speed at full power 21,623 knots.
Indicated horse-power 28,645 I. H. P.
Normal coal capacity on 25 feet draft 800 tons.
Total bunker capacity 2360 tons.
Radius of action determined on 48-hours’ trial at 10.6 knots 12,913 sea miles.
Armament—
Twelve 12-inch 45-caliber guns.
Twenty-two 4.7-inch 50-caliber guns.
Eight 3-pounder guns.
Armor—
Broadside 9-inch, 6-inch and 4-inch cemented steel.
Protective deck 2-inch.
Main bulkheads 9-inch.
Gun-barbettes 12-inch.
Forward and after athwartship bulkheads 3-inch and 4-inch.
Machinery—Engines, triple-expansion, four-cylinder type.
Diameters of cylinders: high-pressure, 39 inches; intermediate, 63 inches; and two low-pressure, 73 inches. Stroke, 3 feet 6 inches.
Total cooling surface of condensers 24,000 square feet.
Boilers, eighteen of Babcock and Wilcox type.
Heating surface 58,370 square feet.
Grate area 1,686 square feet.
The gunnery trials took place off the Clyde. The same program was gone through in this ship as in the Minas Geraes, with the addition that a complete broadside of eleven 4.7-inch guns was fired simultaneously with a broadside of ten 12-inch guns, so that a record in the way of broadsides was again established. Admiral Bacellar himself pressed the firing key which fired this tremendous broadside; every one of the 21 guns responded. To attain this result is in itself a feat of some difficulty. Excellent practice was also made during the trial at a target. Another important feature was the firing of two 12-inch guns in an upper turret, laid horizontally and fore and aft directly over a lower turret. Several Brazilian officers and two British officers remained in the lower turret during this test, and were able to state that they suffered no inconvenience.—Engineering.
In view of the expansion of the Brazilian Navy the annual report of Admiral Alexandrino de Alencar, Minister of Marine, which appears in the Revista Maritima Brazileira, is a document of considerable importance. The program of 1906, modifying that of 1904, provided for the battleships Minas Geracs and S. Paulo, the scouts Bahia and Rio Grande do Sul, and 10 destroyers, and involved an initial change of £5,206,084, leaving a sum of £1,810,810 to be paid. The gross displacement of ships of the Brazilian Navy is being increased from 14,000 tons to 93,594 tons, but this is represented by the Minister as not being enough, because the new program of Argentina is to give that state a navy displacing in all 101,000 tons, while Chile will have 27,000 tons. The program includes also the battleship Rio de Janeiro, and a movement is on foot to procure funds for the building of a fourth ship to complete a fleet unit. This has been initiated by the Brazilian Navy League, which has allotted the sum to be raised by each province and municipality. Local feeling is being appealed to, and the ship is prepared to be named Riachuelo. The names of the two principal subscribers will be engraved on the guns, and a complete roll of subscribers will be preserved on board in a coffer to be presented by the Navy League.
FRANCE.
VESSELS BUILDING.
Name. Displacement. Where Building. Remarks.
Battleships.
Danton 18,350 Brest. Launched July 4, 1909.
Mirabeau 18,350 Lorient. “ Oct. 28, 1909.
Voltaire 18,350 Bordeaux. Under trial.
Diderot 18,350 St. Nazaire. Launched Apr. 19,1909.
Condorcet 18,350 “ “ Apr. 20, 1909.
Vergniaud 18,350 La Seyne. “ Apr. 12,1910.
Courbet 23,500 Lorient. Building.
Jean Bart 23,500 Brest “
Armored Cruisers.
Edgard Quinet 13,644 Brest. Under trial.
Waldeck-Rousseau 13,644 Lorient. Launched Mar. 4, 1908.
THE NEW BATTLESHIPS.—Full particulars are now available of the battleships Jean Bart and Courbet, which are about to be laid down respectively at Brest and Lorient. The displacement of these vessels will be 23,467 metric tons, their length between the perpendiculars 541 feet 6 inches, their maximum beam 88 feet 6 inches, their mean draft 29 feet and their stern draft 29 feet 7 inches. The general features of their armament are well known. Eight 12-inch guns will fire right ahead and right astern, and ten on either broadside. The wing turrets will give the two guns in each an arc of fire of 180°, while the lower big gun turrets on the center line will range through 135°, and the upper turrets which fire over them through 140°. The design of the barbettes and turrets is such as to permit great rapidity of fire, each gun firing a round in 25 seconds. The secondary armament will consist of twenty-two 5.5-inch guns, of which 18, in groups of three, will be in a central battery protected by 7 inches of steel, while four others will be further aft in two casemates, one casemate on either quarter. The ammunition supply will be 100 rounds for each 12-inch and 275 rounds for each 5.5-inch gun. In addition to these guns will be four light pieces for boats and saluting purposes. The end to end belt will protect the bases of all the turrets and of the central battery, in association with three armored decks. The belt will be 10.6-inch thick amidships, tapering to 7 inches at the bow and stern, and the height of the belt above water will be 7 feet 8 inches, and its depth below water 5.8 feet. The conning-tower will be protected by 12 inches of steel, and the turrets by 10.6 inches. The intended speed is 20 knots with 28,000 I. H. P. The range at 10 knots, with 2700 tons of coal, will be 8412 miles; 760 miles at full speed with normal coal supply, and 2280 miles with maximum supply. The machinery will consist of two groups of Parsons’ turbines operating four screws and of water-tube boilers. Oil stoking will be provided for all boilers. The complement of the ships will be 941 officers and men. The actual construction will begin on August 1, but contracts for much of the work have been made already, and the ships are to be completed by August 1, 1913. About the middle of the second half of that year they are expected to be commissioned. These particulars are from the Moniteur de la Flotte, as are also the appended plans.
THE FRENCH MANEUVERS.—Few, if any, French writers discuss naval matters with greater competence than the officer who writes under the name of Pierreval in the Moniteur de la Flotte, whose remarks upon the recent maneuvers are well worthy of study. He says it is natural to look in these operations for a formula of strategic doctrine, though he would wish it otherwise. The scheme represented the situation that would exist if the French fleet were opposed to the fleets of Italy and Austria seeking to unite. The Blue squadron represented a French squadron in such case, and that happened which might have been expected, the concentrated fleet and the most mobile attaining its object. The Red fleet based its operations on the intention of deceiving its adversary, and did not attempt to pass the Strait of Bonifacio because of the submarines. In relation to this matter the critic says it is extremely interesting to note the persistence of a theory often manifested in previous maneuvers, which consists in assigning to an enemy a fixed plan, and basing deductions upon the resulting hypothesis. This continuity of views reveals, he thinks, the existence of a doctrine based upon the theory of penetrating the designs of the adversary, and then acting to the best advantage. Nevertheless, in war, things do not always happen as might be expected. The Blues did not hesitate to run through the Strait in spite of the submarines, and since no torpedoes were discharged and no guns were fired by the destroyers, it was not easy to know what damage would have resulted. The fleet steamed at a speed of 17 knots, running dangers which M. Pierreval thinks it would have preferred to avoid in actual warfare. He is inclined to believe that the idea of expectation and careful waiting prevails more than the offensive doctrine, not only in maneuvers but in the naval councils of the Republic. This latter conclusion is based upon the failure to include in the Navy Law ships of the Indomitable class. With reference to the second part of the maneuvers, which involved the passing of a convoy across the Mediterranean, he says that the result was the subordination of the proper objective to one that was secondary and in a manner accidental. The right procedure would have been to seek the enemy’s forces and destroy them, instead of attempting to push forward the convoy before that object had been secured, not only because of the actual dangers, but because the enemy’s fleet remained at large, having had time to unite with its friends, and thus it possessed the command of the sea. In regard to tactics, he says that movements in line have definitely taken the place of massed formations which were employed a few years ago, and adds that, though there is greater simplicity, there is still much to be learned, and maneuvers and exercises are the right school. It appears that there are two voices in the French Navy, the navigating seamen saying, “You must fire while we maneuver,” and the gunners replying. “ You must not maneuver while we are firing.” The exact significance of this controversy does not appear in the article.—Army and Navy Gazette.
An extremely interesting maneuver has recently taken place in the Mediterranean by the French fleet. It was officially known as “Le thème a double action,” and the scheme was as follows: A Blue squadron (Admiral de Jonquières) was required to assure the safe passage to France of two convoys of troops from Algeria; the first of these leaving Algiers, and the second leaving Oran. A Red squadron (Admiral Aubert), supposed to be coming from the Adriatic, was to oppose this operation. The business of Admiral de Jonquières was to reach Toulon with his convoy if he could; the business of Admiral Aubert was to sink or capture them en route. The fleet of the former admiral was the stronger and swifter, but it was hampered by the fact that after the declaration of war the suppositious transports were not allowed to move for twenty hours, during which time they were theoretically embarking troops and generally getting ready. Admiral de Jonquières had a flotilla at Toulon on the lookout for the enemy arriving from the eastward, and to them he sent a wireless message to watch Cape Corso, the northern point of Corsica, as it was fairly certain that the enemy must come north and not through the Straits of Bonifacio. The light squadron, under Admiral Pivet, had orders to cruise in the vicinity of Spartivento, the southernmost point of Sardinia, and at a fixed time, supposing the light division to have seen nothing of the enemy, it was to stand over to the southwest of the Balearics, where it would meet with the convoys; the flotillas from Algiers and Oran were stationed around the Balearics and the channels between the islands to observe the movements of the enemy. Admiral de Jonquières, with his squadron of six battleships, sailed at fifteen knots from Algiers to the Straits of Bonifacio, to block the passage of the enemy. Here he received information that his scouts had been chased by the enemy, which, in consequence, could not be far off. The admiral, therefore, quitted Bonifacio and stood over for his convoys, steering in such a manner as to intercept the enemy should be have rounded Cape Corso. He was followed by two destroyers and six torpedo-boats of the enemy, three of which were judged to have been put out of action, while the remaining three delivered an attack at midnight half-way between Corsica and the Balearics. De Jonquières had ordered the light division and the Algiers convoy to rendezvous at Minorca, and the one coming from Oran at Cape Creux, to the northward of Barcelona on the mainland. Instead of steering from thence direct to Toulon, the admiral, who argued that his opponent would certainly string out his scouts on a line between Toulon and Marseilles, steered northeast, got to the southward, and eventually was successful in placing his convoy in safety under the guns of Toulon.
But here, again, Admiral de Jonquières had all the luck. “ Le temps est toujours mauvais. Le Mistral souffle avec violence.” Those who know what the Mistral can do in the latitude of the Gulf of Lyons will, in consequence, not be surprised to hear that the sea was so bad that the destroyers of the enemy were totally unable to keep the sea, and the results were as stated. The elements certainly fought for Admiral de Jonquières; at the same time all his dispositions seem to have been ably planned and carried out with remarkable care and attention by his subordinates; also it has to be remembered that at the present day there can be no duty entrusted to an admiral of so responsible and difficult a nature as that of the convoy of troops. It is interesting to learn also that on this occasion Admiral Pivet succeeded in sending off the torpedo-craft on a fool’s errand by means of wireless telegraphy; they went off to attack a non-existent enemy.
These maneuvers, if they prove anything, only emphasize the fact that no one can dogmatize as to what is or what is not going to happen at sea, and it is probable that Admiral de Jonquières, able officer as he undoubtedly is, would be the first man to say that the most useful auxiliary he had in the task set before him was the bad weather, which prevented him from being located by the scouts of his enemy.
In the past it has been the unexpected which has so frequently disorganized the plans of the seaman of the sailing-ship era. There seems no reason to doubt that this will continue to be the case, for, even as the sailing ship could not get out of harbor in the face of the enemy if the wind were contrary, so in the present-day torpedo flotillas cannot keep the sea and perform efficient service when it is blowing a gale of wind.—Naval and Military Record.
FRENCH TARGET PRACTICE.—The second squadron of the French Mediterranean fleet has recently been making its annual target practice in a series of exercises known as the tirs d’honneur. The target was the old battleship Fulminant, and the mean range was 7000 meters. The target was stationary, while the ships firing were under way on courses indicated by the Director. The Jauréguiberry and Dupetit-Thouars were bracketed, with a percentage of 34 hits. The Marseillaise followed with 28, the Condé with 25, the Bouvet with 20, and the other ships with lesser percentages. The final classification is not, however, based upon the number of hits, but also upon the rate ot fire, or at which hits are made, and in this relation the following were the results of the five best ships: Dupetit-Thouars, 24.3; Bouvet, 22.6; Marseillaise, 22.4; Jauréguiberry, 21.8; Condé, 20.8. The practice was inferior to the maximum of 1909, both in the achievement of the champion and in the mean of all the ships, which latter fell, in the final computation, from 17.8 to 15.3, or in actual hits from 21.6 to 20. On the whole, the practice was considered satisfactory, the circumstance being taken into account that the squadron had been incessantly occupied in cruising during the year on the coasts of Algeria, Tunis, Morocco, Portugal and Spain. This was very beneficial from the point of navigation, but did not give special facilities for gunnery.—Army and Navy Gazette.
GERMANY.
VESSELS BUILDING.
Name. Displacement. Where Building. Remarks.
Battleships.
Ost Friesland 19,000 Wilhelmshaven. Launched Sept. 30, 1909.
Thuringen 19,000 Bremen (Weser Yard). “ Nov. 27, 1909.
Helgoland 19,000 Kiel (Howaldt). “ Sept. 26, 1909.
Oldenburg 20,000 Danzig (Schichau). “ June 30, 1910.
Ersatz Hildebrand 20,000 Kiel (Kaiserliche W.). Building.
“ Helmdall 20,000 Hamburg (Vulkan). “
“ Hagen 21,000? Kiel (Howaldt). “
“Aegir 21,000? Danzig (Schichau). “
“Odin 21,000? Kiel (Germania). “
Armored Cruisers.
Von Der Tann 19,000 Hamburg (Blohm and Voss). Under trial.
Moltke 21,500? Do. Launched April 7, 1910.
H 21,500? Do. Building
J 21,500? Do. “
Protected Cruisers.
Kolberg 4,300 Danzig. Under trial.
Koeln 4,350 Kiel “ “
Augsburg 4,350 “ Launched July 10, 1909.
Ersatz Bussard 4,500? Stettin (Vulkan). Building.
“ Falko 4,500? Bremen (Weser). “
“ Cormoran 4,500? Bremen (Weser). Ordered.
“ Condor 4,500? Wilhelmshaven. “
THE “ OLDENBURG.”—The latest German battleship constructed by the Schichau Shipbuilding Company of Danzig to replace the Frithjof was launched on June 30 and named Oldenburg.
The Lokalanzciger gives the measurements of the new battleship Oldenburg as follows: Length, 492 feet; beam, 91.8 feet; draft, 29.5 feet; displacement nearly 20,000 tons, or considerably more than the displacement of the first German Dreadnoughts. She will have reciprocating engines developing 23,000 horse-power, giving her a speed of 21 knots. Her heavy armament will consist of 12-inch guns, instead of 11-inch guns as carried in the earlier Dreadnoughts. She will have altogether forty large-caliber guns. Her crew will number 960.
The interval between the laying down of the keel and the launching of the vessel was about a year. This constitutes a record for a German shipyard. The Oldenburg is to be completed for sea in April, 1912.
Up to now particulars regarding the Oldenburg have been withheld.—Reuter.
The foregoing figures relative to the Oldenburg are probably correct, and, if so, are another illustration of the exaggerations current concerning German warships—their number, size, power and rate of construction.
It is probable that the Oldenburg is merely an enlarged Nassau, carrying 12-inch guns in place of the 11-inch carried by the four ships of the Nassau class.
THE GERMAN NAVAL PROGRAM, 1911.—The correspondent of the Tageblatt has been giving some details concerning the German naval program for 1911, which seems to be incomplete as reported by the telegraphic agencies, and, therefore, it may be well to state exactly what are the features of the program so far as they concern that year. Three battleships are to be laid down, including one supplementary ship under the Novelle of 1908, these being to replace the Weissenburg, Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm and Brandenburg, all of which were launched in 1891, two of them at the Vulcan yard at Stettin, and the other at the Imperial yard, Wilhelmshaven. In addition, the program includes another cruiser-battleship, to be denominated by the letter K. Thus four capital ships will again be put in hand as the work of the year; but, unless there should be another Novelle or supplement, the following year will see the laying down of two such ships only, and this will be the case up to the date of the completion of the present Navy Law. Besides the capital ships, the program includes two of the so-called small cruisers, which are every year growing bigger, and may well end by becoming armored cruisers. These will be to replace the old Seeadler and Geier. Finally, the program of the year will include 12 destroyers, being two divisions, and a number of submarines not yet indicated. In the building of vessels of the latter class the Germans long hesitated, but they have now a number of more or less experimental boats, and may be expected to pay a good deal of attention to this class of vessel in the future. The German Navy League has begun to agitate for a supplementary program, but there is some opposition to its ideas.—Army and Navy Gazette.
The battleship Ersatz Heimdall, recently laid down by the Vulcan Company at its new works at Hamburg, is to have modified A. E. G. turbines on three shafts. It is not expected that she will be launched before May next year. The sister ship, Ersatz Hildebrand, is being built at the Imperial Dockyard at Kiel.—The Engineer.
The designers of the Von der Tann have undoubtedly introduced into her some very striking features. Among these may be remarked the system of air ducts to the stokeholds which, in place of cowls or hooded ventilators, are arranged round the funnel bases in a manner that saves both weight and space. The pigeon-hole shape given to the inlet of these ducts gives a distinctly curious appearance to the vessel. Obviously the design of the Blücher has been widely used as a basis in designing the Von der Tann. The latter vessel has extremely clear decks, and Messrs. Blohm & Voss are to be congratulated on the success of the first vessel of the type of which they have three others—the Moltke, H and J—in hand.
The Posen is reported to have realized a speed of 20.5 knots in her trials, which is better than her sister ships did.
The 4300-ton Kolberg attained a speed of 27 knots.
The Koln and Augsburg will make their trials this autumn. They are sister ships of 4350 tons displacement, 426½ feet length, 46 feet greatest beam and a draft of 16½ feet. The crew of each will number 363, the speed will be over 25 knots and the coal capacity 900 tons. The trials of the two ships are being looked forward to with interest in engineering circles, as they are to be tested against the cruisers Mainz and Kolberg, in order to ascertain the merits of the different turbine systems in use in Germany. The Koln’s turbines are Zoelly, the Augsburg’s Parsons, the Mainz’s Curtis and the Kolberg’s Schichau.
During the coming winter a series of changes will be carried out in the organization of the German fleet. In the First squadron the Wittelsbach and Zahringen will be replaced by the Rheinland and Posen. The Von der Tann will replace the Gneisenau, and the latter will proceed to the Far East—though whether to relieve the Scharnhorst or to be added to the squadron there is not stated. The Berlin and Königsbcrg will be replaced in the Second and First cruiser groups respectively by the Köln and Kolberg. The Hannover will replace the Wittelsbach as second flagship in the First squadron.
The following list, based on all the available information, is an approximately correct statement of the probable completion of British and German ships of the Dreadnought type:
Great Britain. Germany.
Complete in August, 1910 Dreadnought. Nassau.
Invincible. Westfalen.
Indomitable. Rheinland.
Inflexible. Posen.
Bellerophon. Von der Tann.
Temeraire.
Superb.
St. Vincent.
Collingwood.
Vanguard.
To complete in November, 1910 Helgoland.
Thüringen.
Ostfriesland.
“ “ February, 1911 Neptune.
“ “ March, 1911 Indefatigable.
“ “ May, 1911 Moltke.
“ “ August, 1911 Hercules.
Colossus.
“ “ December, 1911 Orion. Oldenburg.
Lion. H.
“ “ May, 1912 Conqueror. Ersatz Heimdall.
Monarch. Ersatz Hildebrand.
Thunderer.
Princess Royal.
“ “ July, 1912 Ers. Aegir.
Ers. Hagen.
Ers. Odin.
J.
“ “ April, 1913 Five new ships.
—United Service Magazine.
It is stated that during the German naval maneuvers in the autumn an attempt will be made for the first time to utilize an airship in connection with the operations. It will be fitted with an installation for wireless telegraphy, and its function will be to keep one of the combatants informed as to the other’s movements. The aerial cruiser which will be used for the maneuver trials will probably be the new Gross, which has just been completed. It is considerably larger than any of its forerunners, having a capacity of over 80,000 cubic feet, a length of 305 feet, and a diameter of 42½ feet. There will be two cars, instead of only one, as in previous airships of this type, and each will contain a couple of 100-horse-power Koerting motors.—Page’s Weekly.
GREAT BRITAIN.
VESSELS BUILDING.
Name. Displacement. Where Building. Remarks
Battleships.
Neptune 20,250 Portsmouth. Launched Sept. 30, 1909.
Colossus 20,250 Scotts (Greenock). “ Apr. 9, 1910.
Hercules 20,250 Palmer’s (Jarrow). “ May 10, 1910.
Orion 22,500 Portsmouth. “ Aug. 20.1910.
Monarch 22,500 Armstrong. Building.
Conqueror 22,500 Beardmore. “
Thunderer 22,500 London (Thames Iron Works). “
Armored Cruisers.
Indefatigable 18,000 Devonport. Launched Oct. 28, 1909.
Lion 26,350 “ “ Aug. 6, 1910.
Princess Royal 26,350 Vickers. Building.
Australia 18,800 Brown & Co. “
New Zealand. 18,800 Fairfield. “
Cruisers.
Blanche 3,400 Pembroke. Launched Oct. 27, 1909.
Blonde 3,400 “ “ July 22, 1910.
Barossa 3,400 “ Building.
Barracuta 3,400 “ Ordered.
Liverpool 4,800 Vickers. Under trial.
Dartmouth 4,800 “ Building.
Bristol 4,800 Brown & Co. Launched Feb. 23, 1910.
Gloucester 4,800 Beardmore. Under trial.
Falmouth 4,800 “ Building.
Newcastle 4,800 Armstrong. Under trial.
Weymouth 4,800 “ Building.
Glasgow 4,800 Fairfield. Under trial.
Yarmouth 4,800 London & Glasgow Co. Building.
THE “ LION.”—The armored cruiser Lion was launched at Devonport on August 6. She is the fifth of the so-called Invincibles, armored cruisers of great size and speed, comparatively lightly armored, but carrying a battleship’s armament of heavy guns, and primarily intended to protect British commerce in time of war by driving off the seas the commerce destroyers of the hostile nation. The Lion is much larger than her predecessors, having a length between perpendiculars of 700 feet, a beam of 88½ feet and a displacement (normal) of 26,350 tons. It is now known that the Lion’s main battery will consist of eight 13.5-inch guns in four middle-line turrets arranged like those of the U. S. S. Michigan and South Carolina.
THE “ ORION.”—The battleship Orion, the eleventh British Dreadnought, and the first of a new class, was launched on August 20. She is of 22,500 tons displacement on normal draft, and will carry ten 13.5-inch guns in five turrets, all on the middle line, as in the U. S. S. Delaware class. Her speed is to be 21 knots and her full load fuel allowance 2700 tons of coal and 1000 tons of oil. She has three 21-inch underwater torpedo-tubes. Her main belt is 12-inches thick amidships.
The Lion is an old and honored name in the British Navy. A Lion was taken from the Scots in 1511. In 1563 another was in a squadron under Sir William Woodhouse. A Golden Lion shared in the contest with the Spanish Armada, and in 1596 was at the capture of Cadiz. In October, 1625, off the coast of India, a Lion was destroyed after a most desperate fight against large odds. Another Lion was at the battle of the North Foreland, June 2 and 3, 1653; and in May, 1655, she was at the capture of Jamaica. A Lion also shared in the British victory over the Dutch off Lowestoft, on June 3, 1665, and in 1667 she took part in a gallant and successful fight against the French at Martinique.
Thomas Foulis, captain of the Lion, was killed in the action with the Dutch on May 28, 1673. She was at the battle of Beachy Head on June 30, 1699, and also shared in the battle of Barfleur, in May, 1692.
In March, 1711, a Lion was commanded by Capt. Galfridus Walpole, who lost his arm in a gallant fight with French vessels; and on July 9, 1745, a Lion, of 58 guns, had a desperate action with a French 64, off the coast of Scotland. Two years later she was with Commodore Thomas Fox, in his successful attack on a large French convoy, and in October of the same year she was among the fleet under Hawke, off Cape Finisterre, when six Gallic war vessels were taken. Lion was also in Byron’s force, which encountered the French off Grenada on July 6, 1779, and on March 20, in the following year, Lion was one of three British which, when chased by five French, by mutually supporting each other, succeeded in beating off and escaping from their foes. Eighteen years afterwards—July 15, 1798—a Lion, 64, fought four Spanish frigates and took one of them. In March, 1800, she contributed considerably to the capture of the Guillaume Tell, French 80-gun ship, endeavoring to escape from Malta; and in 1811 she shared in the taking of Java. Our last Lion was launched at Pembroke in 1847, a sailing ship of 80 guns. Some years later she was altered and fitted with engines, but had very little sea service; in 1871 became training-ship for boys, attached to the Implacable at Devonport, and was sold out of the service in July, 1905.—Naval and Military Record.
THE “ BLONDE.”—The unarmored cruiser Blonde (of the Boadicea class) was launched at Pembroke dockyard on July 22. The keel-plate of the new vessel was laid on December 6, 1909, and her dimensions are: Length, between perpendiculars, 385 feet; breadth, 45 feet 6 inches; draft, forward 13 feet, aft 14 feet; displacement, 3350. Her engines are intended to produce 18,000 indicated horse-power, and her speed is estimated at 25 knots, but it is probable that this will be exceeded. The turbine machinery is being fitted by Messrs. Cammell, Laird & Co., of Birkenhead. Her armament will consist of ten 4-inch guns, a Maxim gun, and ten torpedotubes.—United Service Gazette.
An unarmored cruiser to be named Barossa was laid down at Pembroke on July 27. The new ship will be the fifth vessel of the Boadicea class to be built. In external form, except at the bow, and in the general feature of her structure, she will be identical with the Blonde, Blanche and Bellona, but will have six inches more beam, and 50 tons more displacement than the Boadicea, which was the first vessel of the class. She will differ from all the other vessels in having a ram bow below and an Aberdeen bow above water, whereas the others have the ram below, but are practically vertical above water. Some of the scouts have bows constructed on these lines, but that of the new ship will differ from them, because the upper part of her bow above water will extend beyond the foremost part on the ram, but does not do so in the scouts.—Naval and Military Record.
The Moniteur de la Flotte says the fifth and sixth of the Boadicea class are to be named Active and Amphion instead of Barossa and Barracuta.
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND’S GIFT SHIPS LAID DOWN.—The building of the two Dreadnought cruisers for New Zealand and Australia respectively has been commenced. The Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, Govan, have laid the keel of the vessel for New Zealand, and Messrs. John Brown & Co., Clydebank, that of the Australian ship. A good deal of preliminary work has been done by both firms since the orders were placed in the middle of March, but now that the vessels are actually on the stocks progress will be more apparent. They are to be completed early in 1912. Each is to cost about £1,800,000, and the orders were placed by the Admiralty in accordance with arrangements with the Governments of New Zealand and Australia.—Naval and Military Record.
TWENTY BRITISH TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS ORDERED.—The Admiralty have now completed their prolonged negotiations with naval shipbuilders, and have placed the orders for the twenty torpedo-boat destroyers included in this year’s naval program. Three additional vessels are to be built for the Colonial fleets, but so far this work has not been arranged for. Fourteen of the twenty boats for the Imperial Navy are to be of the Acorn class, designed by Sir Philip Watts, and being similar, will afford in fleet maneuvers the tactical advantage which accrues from corresponding speed and turning circle, apart from the gain in the standardizing of the machinery. John Brown & Co., of Clydebank, will build three; two each will be built by J. S. White & Co., of Cowes; Cammell, Laird & Co., of Birkenhead, Hawthorn, Leslie & Co., of Newcastle-on-Tyne, and William Denny & Bros., of Dumbarton, while one is to be built by Vickers, Sons & Maxim, of Barrow-in-Furness, one by William Beardmore & Co., of Dalmuir, and one by Swan, Hunter and Wigham Richardson & Co., of Newcastle-on-Tyne, for which last-named the Wallsend Slipway and Engineering Co. will provide the machinery. These vessels are to be 240 feet long, 26 feet beam and of 770 tons displacement, the speed aimed at being 27 knots, which will require about 14,000 shaft horse-power. All of the vessels, excepting three to be built by Messrs. Brown, will have Parsons turbines. The three Clydebank vessels will be fitted with Curtis turbines, modified as a consequence of the extensive experiments carried out by Messrs. Brown’s staff. A notable feature of all the ships is that they will carry two 4-inch guns, as well as a number of 12-pounders. In the case of the other six vessels, the contractors have been allowed a larger measure of latitude in the design of ship and machinery, although the speed and armament are the same. The contract for these vessels has been placed, for two each, with the Parsons Marine Steam-Turbine Company, of Wall-send-on-Tyne, J. I. Thornycroft & Co., of Southampton, and Yarrow & Co., of cotstoun. The last-named all will be glad to recognize as again among the Admiralty contractors after an absence of several years. A feature in connection with these six vessels is the machinery. In all three pairs the contractors will fit machinery differing from that of the others and from that in any existing British destroyer; but it is desired that the actual details should not be disclosed because of the significance of the change. It may be added that the hull and boilers of the two vessels to be built by the Parsons Company will be constructed by Messrs. Denny, of Dumbarton.—Engineering.
The six destroyers of special type will doubtless afford some very instructive data upon their trials. It is understood that in each of the three pairs an important difference in the machinery will be made. It is stated that these experimental boats are to be propelled by twin-screws, driven in the case of Messrs. Yarrow’s two by Brown-Curtis turbines; in the case of the Parsons Company’s two by geared turbines of the Parsons type; while the remaining two will have another arrangement of Parsons turbines.
It is understood that in future all destroyers, while under construction, will be under the superintendence of a special captain-superintendent. The officer is to take over his new duties gradually. The trials and turning over of the vessels of the Beagle class are to be arranged by the existing superintendents, the new captain-superintendent being responsible only for the supervision of the fittings. Concurrently with this change the duty of supervising the construction at Barrow of vessels other than destroyers is to be transferred from the Admiralty Superintendent of the Clyde District to the Captain-Superintendent of the Tyne and Thames Districts.—Page’s Weekly.
With the 27-knot torpedo-boat destroyers now under trial or being completed for service the following mean speed have been attained on the four-hour official trial:
Beagle John Brown & Co. Apr. 2 27.044
Harpy J. S. White & Co. Apr. 15 27.7
Scourge Hawthorn, Leslie May 25 27.03
Renard Cammell, Laird June 17 27.4
Wilverine Cammell, Laird June 18 27.2
The other vessels of the class are all well forward, the Savage and Grasshopper being prepared for commission at Harwich.
COST OF ENGLAND’S NAVY.—The First Lord of the Admiralty, Reginald McKenna, gave the House of Commons some interesting figures about the navy the other day. He gave the following figures showing the tonnage of the effective fighting ships of the navies of Great Britain, Germany and the United States at different periods:
Great Britain. Germany. United States.
1880 664,388 145,500 Not known
1890 1,119,095 165,064 120,125
1900 1,889,614 293,461 209,300
1906 1,891,307 441,656 476,276
1907 1,885,966 447,820 547,222
1908 1,934,368 538,714 629,747
1909 2,046,126 544.073 706,107
From 1906 onward, second and third-class battleships, coast-defence ships and sloops, gunboats and subsidiary vessels have been omitted as not being effective fighting ships in the British list.
Mr. Clough, M. P., asked Mr. McKenna to state the total capital cost of construction and armament equipment of the Indomitable, Invincible, Inflexible, St. Vincent, Collingwood, Vanguard, Indefatigable, Neptune, Colossus, Hercules, Orion, Lion, Princess Royal, Conqueror, Monarch and Thunderer; what is the annual cost of maintenance and ammunition of each of these battleships, and what is the annual cost of maintenance and pay of officers and men of each of these battleships in full commission.
Mr. McKenna said that of the ships named the first six have been completed, and the following figures give the information required in regard to them:
Indomitable.—Total cost of construction, £1,662,940; total cost of armament, £90,000; annual cost of maintenance and ammunition, £58,200; annual cost of maintenance and pay of officers and men, £70,700.
Indexible.—Construction, £1,630,740; armament, £90,000; maintenance, £58,200; officers and men, £70,200.
Invincible.—Construction, £1,676,250; armament, £90,000; maintenance, £58,200; officers and men, £70,950.
St. Vincent.—Construction, £1,581,735; armament, £142,400; maintenance, £58,100; officers and men, £68,450.
Collingwood.—Construction, £1,539,355; armament, £142,400; maintenance, £58,100; officers and men, £67,950.
Vanguard.—Construction, £1,462,270; armament, £142,400; maintenance, £58,100; officers and men, £67,950.
The cost of construction in the case of the St. Vincent and the Collingwood is liable to revision. As regards the remaining ships only estimated figures could be given, and it was not considered desirable in the public interest to give such an estimate at present.—New York Sun.
It is reported that one at least, and probably two, of the six “ special ” torpedo-boat destroyers being built under this year’s program are to be fitted with geared turbines and twin screws. This will be an experiment of peculiar interest if carried into effect, because both speeds and powers are entirely out of the ordinary run, and the details of design of gearing for such conditions introduce some very difficult mechanical features.—The Engineer.
NAVAL TRAINING. HOW MIDSHIPMEN ARE TO BE INSTRUCTED.—Combination of Two Methods.—The Admiralty having had under consideration reports from ships carrying new scheme midshipmen, have decided to issue more precise instructions to supplement those contained in the Admiralty Letter of May 1, 1908. In that letter the general lines were indicated on which the training of midshipmen under the new scheme should proceed. It was pointed out that the training of midshipmen should be wholly of a professional character, and that they should receive instruction from the executive officer of their ship in the general duties of a naval officer and in seamanship, and also instruction in gunnery, torpedo, navigation and engineering from the several officers who are specialists in these subjects. For the purpose of their training it was laid down that midshipmen were to work with the executive, gunnery, torpedo, navigation and engineer officers for continuous periods. The detailed appropriation of time was left, subject to certain provisos, with the commanding officer until experience should have been obtained. Midshipmen of the new scheme have now been at sea since May, 1908. Reports from the ships in which they are serving indicate that they are making satisfactory progress in acquiring professional knowledge, and this is borne out by the results of the examination held in November last. There is, however, as was to be expected, considerable diversity in the manner in which the midshipmen’s instruction is carried out in different ships, and the Admiralty consider it desirable, in the light of the experience now acquired, to lay down more precisely the lines which should be followed, with a view to securing greater general uniformity. It should at the same time be understood that as regards details, the commanding officer is expected to exercise his discretion in directing the work of midshipmen, the object being to secure that when their sea service is completed they will be fit, without further instruction, to perform satisfactorily all the duties which may be required at sea of a sub-lieutenant or lieutenant, having a competent practical knowledge not only of seamanship and the general duties of an officer, but also of gunnery, torpedo, navigation and engineering. To this end, a combination of two methods should be employed in the training of midshipmen. They are to learn their work (a) by being attached to the several officers of the ship for definite periods, during which they will observe and take part in what the officers do in the performance of their several duties; (b) by means of systematic instruction in the several subjects in which the professional knowledge has to be acquired. This instruction is to be given partly by lectures or less formal tuition, and partly by making them carry out practical work which need not necessarily be part of the usual routine, but may be designed to serve an instructional purpose.
The Habit of Responsibility.—For the purpose of carrying out their instruction, midshipmen are to be divided into groups so that each of the specialist officers will have one or more acting under his direction for an assigned period; and each of the officers concerned is to be responsible for seeing that midshipmen so attached are usefully employed during that period in acquiring knowledge of his branch. Care is to be taken that the midshipmen engaged under any specialist officer in this manner not only see and take part in what he is doing, but understand the intention and character of the work on hand, the officer giving such explanations as may be necessary. It is highly important that they should learn early to assume the habit of responsibility, which is essential to the formation of their character as naval officers. Officers in charge are accordingly to endeavor to test their fitness for responsibility, and should not hesitate to delegate responsible duties whenever possible, at the same time watching the manner in which the midshipman acquits himself. Even if mistakes are occasionally made, this will be better than that officers should shrink from giving responsibility to the midshipmen. When they are first appointed to a ship on leaving the training cruiser, it is desirable that they should, in the first place, make a general acquaintance with the various departments of the ship before settling down to learn the work of the department in more detail. Accordingly, a first short period is to be spent in each department, and after this is over they will enter on a routine in which a considerably longer time is spent continuously in each.
Three Periods.—The Admiralty are of opinion that it is to the advantage of midshipmen not to spend the whole of their time in large ships. On first going to sea they will serve in large ships in which there are senior midshipmen and in which a naval instructor is borne. In his second year each midshipman is to be transferred to another ship not carrying a naval instructor. The number borne in the latter ship will be comparatively small. Towards the end of his second year the midshipman will return for the third and final period to a ship with a naval instructor. These ships will be termed A and B respectively. The whole of the service will accordingly be divided into three periods, the exact length of which may be somewhat elastic, being subject to the discretion of the commander-in chief of the fleet in which the midshipman is serving. The commander-in chief is to arrange for their transfers from A ships to B ships, and also their return to A ships, where they will spend their final year preceding the examination. The number of midshipmen nominally borne by each A ship will, when the scheme comes fully into operation, be about 24, of whom about eight will be lent to ships of the B class, leaving, say, 16 actually under training in the A ship at any one time. These will be of two seniorities, about half being in their first and half in their third year.
Those actually borne are to be divided into three sections for training in rotation in the three branches: 1, seamanship and general deck duties; 2, gunnery, torpedo and navigation; 3, engineering. When midshipmen first join an A ship from the training cruiser they will spend two weeks in each of the three branches in order quickly to make a general acquaintance with each. After this the period spent in each branch will be two months, each midshipman completing the cycle of the three branches in six months. Each section should have had two months of actual instruction in each branch before passing on to the next. After this cycle is completed, it is to be repeated, but with the period shortened from two months to one and a half months, or as much as may be necessary to secure that the cycle will be complete within the year. This is in order that midshipmen may have a second period of instruction in each branch before they leave the ship. In general, each of the three sections should include both senior and junior midshipmen, and as far as practicable seniors and juniors are to work together.
Attendance at Lectures.—Midshipmen will be required to attend the lectures on professional subjects in the several sections unless specially excused. This rule applies not only to lectures given by the executive and engineer officers, but also to lessons in navigation or other professional subjects given by the naval instructor. They may be excused from the naval instructor’s lessons in navigation when they have, in his opinion, reached a sufficiently high standard and may be more usefully employed in other work. Lectures or lessons on the voluntary subjects of the syllabus are to be arranged for as far as may be practicable, but the attendance of midshipmen at such lessons will be voluntary. Midshipmen should be encouraged to select voluntary subjects of study, and should have whatever assistance can be given. In B ships a suitable place is to be reserved for study when the size of the ship admits of this being done.
Seamanship.—The commander is to be responsible for the work of Section I, and the following duties and subjects of instructions are included: Watch-keeping at sea and in harbor, boat-work, general evolutions, watch evolutions, divisional work under officers of divisions, watch, station and quarter bills, coaling ship and taking sights at sea. The instructions include rigging derricks, sheers, tackle, strains for wire and hemp, splicing wire, practical fitting of gear, maneuvering, general duties of the officer of the watch, organization including internal economy, berthing, messing, disposition of stores, summary punishments, etc.
Gunnery, Torpedo, Navigation.—Section II will include gunnery, torpedo and navigation, the gunnery, torpedo and navigating officers respectively being responsible. As a rule, there will be five or six midshipmen in the section, who should be divided into sub-groups to work with these officers, changing over at such intervals as will secure a more or less equal division of time. The officers responsible for the instruction of the midshipmen in the several subjects are to arrange for such lectures or other formal lessons as may be necessary to give the midshipmen an opportunity of understanding the matter specified in the syllabus.
No attempt should be made to regard any part of the syllabus as matter to be crammed up for examination, but care should be taken that they have such a general comprehension of the various professional subjects as is required for the due discharge of their duty as naval officers, regard being had to the fact that they will be expected to qualify for the rank of lieutenant as a result of their sea service, without shore courses, and also to the fact that those who may afterwards be selected for specialization, will then have opportunities of acquirng further knowledge in the special branch. They are to work out the reckoning and take daily observations when the ship is at sea.
Engineering Duties.—Section III is for engineering, and midshipmen are to be regarded as members of the engine-room staff for the time being, and are not to be required to undertake extraneous duties. Their training will proceed chiefly by their taking part in the daily engineering work of the ship under the engineer officers, who are to arrange for supplementing this routine by such lectures as may be necessary. At sea the midshipmen of the engineering section will keep regular watch. They should begin by taking part in the routine, blowing down boilers, taking densities, making entries in the register, handling engines, taking indicator diagrams, to be worked out when off watch, looking after bearings, evaporators and auxiliary machinery. They should do the duty of stoker petty officer in the engine-room and stokehold, learning to take charge. They are to supervise the attends, attend to the cleanliness of the department, see valves worked and engines started and running, take notes of the work going on and make sketches of pipe leads and details of machinery. They are also to have an opportunity of obtaining insight into the adjustment of main and auxiliary engines.
It is not expected that midshipmen can at once undertake the supervision of engine-room artificers’ work, but they should have as much opportunity as possible of gaining insight into it, so that with further sea experience they will be fitted to direct ordinary repair operations.—Naval and Military Record.
THE CANADIAN NAVY.—The plans for the creation of the new Canadian Navy are being completed without delay, and since we last referred to the matter Admiral Kingsmill has had an important conference with the home authorities in regard to details concerning the transfer of the Niobe and Rainbow, the lending of officers and men for instructional purposes, and the construction of the cruisers and destroyers which will join the Canadian unit. The Niobe will cross the Atlantic in September, and will be used for training purposes in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, with headquarters at Halifax. When she has served her period of usefulness in this capacity, it is intended that she shall become parent ship of the destroyers, six in number, whose construction from Admiralty designs will be begun in about a year’s time, when it is expected that the necessary plant will have been provided. The destroyer force will remain at first concentrated in the Atlantic, but the four cruisers to be built will be divided between the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards. On the latter the Rainbow will be stationed for training purposes and for fishery protection duties. This vessel, which completed satisfactory gun and steam trials after refit at Portsmouth in June, is to leave for Esquimalt this month. As soon as the Niobe and Rainbow arrive on their stations recruiting will begin; in the meantime the Admiralty have agreed to lend the Canadian Government the necessary officers and men for the safe conduct of the ships. Halifax will also be the venue of the naval college, which will open in temporary quarters in October with a class of thirty cadets, although over 200 applications for admission to the college have been received. A competitive examination under the Civil Service Commission will be held, adapted for boys of about fifteen years of age, and the successful candidates will undergo a two years’ course in the college costing them about £100. They will then spend a similar period at sea as midshipmen, receiving pay at the rate of two dollars a day, out of which they must provide their uniforms and mess. They will then receive commissions as sub-lieutenants, with three dollars a day. In regard to shipyards and docks, Mr. Albert Vickers has visited the Dominion on behalf of his firm to consult with the Minister of Marine in connection with the establishment of dry docks and other equipment, and it is reported that the first yards will be constructed at Montreal, with docks at Quebec. Writing on June 29, the Times Toronto correspondent wrote that “ plans have been approved for dry docks at Sault-Sainte-Marie, Ontario, and Vancouver, B. C.” The former place would be convenient for vessels on either of the Great Lakes, but it is 900 miles further inland than Montreal.—Army and Navy Gazette.
THE “GLASGOW.”—The first of the cruisers of the Town class has completed her trials, and the results are very satisfactory. The first vessel tried was the Glasgow, built by the Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company (Limited), Glasgow. She developed 22,500 S. H. P., and the speed on the measured mile averaged 25.8 knots, a speed which was maintained practically for the whole of the eight hours’ full-power trial. On this test the boilers, which work under the closed stokehold system of forced draft, were using oil and coal, and the rate of consumption was equivalent to 1.6 pounds per shaft horse-power per hour—a good average result. The other steam trial was a thirty hours’ run, divided into two parts—an eight hours’ test at about eight-tenths the full power, and a 22 hours’ run at about two-thirds the full power. The mean power developed on the former was 18,220 shaft horse-power, and the speed realized 24.9 knots, and on the latter 14,055 shaft horse-power, the speed being 23.7 knots.
The coal consumption on these trials was at the rate of 1.57 pounds and 1.61 pounds respectively per shaft horse-power per hour. These rates of consumption are very favorable, especially the latter—a point of interest, since these vessels are the first cruisers without separate cruising turbines. Instead there is introduced an extension at the high pressure end of the turbines for use only at low cruising speeds. The turbines, of course, are of the Parsons type, manufactured at Fairfield, and there are two high-pressure and two low-pressure ahead turbines, one on each of the four shafts, and the same arrangement of astern turbines.
The Glasgow has also passed through her gun trials. The ordnance includes a bow and stern 6-inch gun, five 4-inch guns on each broadside, two Maxim guns on the bridge, with two submerged tubes for firing torpedoes. An interesting feature of the class is that two are being fitted with Curtis turbines by Messrs. John Brown & Co. (Limited), of Clydebank, and the comparison of results, when these vessels are tried, will be specially interesting.—Naval and Military Record.
THE “LIVERPOOL.”—The trials of the protected cruiser Liverpool, built by Messrs. Vickers, Sons & Maxim, have proved entirely satisfactory, the vessel exceeding her contract speed of 25 knots by 1.17 knots. Her coal consumption ranged from 1.57 pounds to 1.65 pounds per shaft horsepower per hour. On a 22 hours’ run at about two-thirds of the full power the mean speed of the vessel on the Skelmorlie measured mile was 23.88 knots, the shaft horse-power of the turbines being 14,100. The coal consumption was 1.57 pounds per shaft horse-power per hour on an eight hours’ trial. At about 80 per cent of the full power measured on the six runs on the mile the speed was 25.10 knots, the power being 18,824 shaft horse-power. The full power trial of eight hours’ duration was run at a speed of 26.17 knots, the power developed being 24,178 shaft horse-power. The vessel has been completed within 16 months from the date of the laying of the keel.
The Liverpool, as the name suggests, belongs to the new Town class, of which nine are being built, five of these, ordered early last year, are likely to complete their trials before the end of July. The vessels are of the light, protective-deck type, with high speed, moderate armament and great maneuvering power. They are 430 feet long between perpendiculars, 47 feet broad and at 15 feet 3 inches draft have a displacement of 4800 tons. The armament includes two 6-inch breech-loading guns—one on the forecastle and the other on the upper deck aft; ten 4-inch breech-loading guns—five on each broadside on the upper deck amidships; and two Maxim guns on the navigating bridge. There are also two submerged tubes for firing 18-inch torpedoes. Although the ships are unarmored, more than usually extensive arrangements have been made for ensuring the buoyancy of the ship in the event of the hull being perforated, by extensive subdivision of the interior; and there is extending right fore and aft a nickel-steel armored deck, sloping at the sides to well below the water-line. Under this deck there are extensive longitudinal and transverse bulkheads, the machinery, for instance, being distributed over five compartments, while the boilers are arranged in three compartments. The machinery is of the Parsons type, with four lines of shafts. A high-pressure ahead turbine and the separate high-pressure astern turbine are arranged on one shaft in each wing compartment, while one low-pressure ahead turbine, in which is embodied the low-pressure astern turbine, is mounted on each of the inside shafts in one central compartment, which also contains the maneuvering-gear for all the turbines. There is no separate cruising turbine, the principle being adopted of arranging for the admission of steam at several stages in the high-pressure turbine, according to the power desired. The economy obtained in the Liverpool would seem to indicate that this is a satisfactory arrangement. There are four propellers—one on each shaft. The auxiliary machinery and condensers are accommodated in two separate compartments abaft the main engine-room.—Engineering.
THE “ GLOUCESTER.”—H. M. S. Gloucester, the fourth of the second-class protected cruisers ordered under the program of 1908-1909, has just completed her trials, and Messrs. William Beardmore & Co., who built and engined the vessel at their naval construction works, Dalmuir, are to be congratulated upon the results, alike as regards the speed and machinery efficiency. The speed attained on the full-power trial was the best so far recorded for any ship of the class—namely, 26.296 knots, when the turbines were developing a collective power of 24.335 shaft horse-power, while the consumption of fuel was 1.14 pounds of coal and 0.42 pound of oil.
THE “NEWCASTLE.”—The unarmored cruiser Newcastle has completed her steam, gunnery and maneuvering trials, with results which equal, and in some respects are superior, to those of the vessels of the type already tried. On her full power trial she made six runs over the measured course at St. Abbs Head, during the progress of the eight hours’ test, and the speed averaged just over 26¼ knots, as compared with 25 knots anticipated in the design, the power developed by the Parsons turbine machinery being 24,669 shaft horse-power—2669 horse-power in excess of the designed power. The coal consumption trials, which gave equally favorable results, were specially interesting, as the Nawcastle was the first cruiser tried without separate cruising turbines, the weight and space thus saved being utilized to add to the ordinary high-pressure turbines, at the high-pressure end, a series of stages to be used only at low powers. This change has justified the prescience of the engineer-in-chief, Sir Henry Oram, as on a 22-hours’ run at 14,038 shaft horse-power and on the eight hours’ run at 18,742 shaft horse-power, the coal consumption was about 1¾ pounds per horse-power per hour. Six runs on the measured mile on the former trial showed the speed to be 23.24 knots for a mean power of 14,051 shaft horse-power, and on the latter trial 24.84 knots for 19,116 shaft horse-power. These speeds are in excess of those anticipated. The Newcastle proved an easily maneuvered ship, and the trials of the two 6-inch and ten 4-inch q. f. and five smaller guns gave satisfactory results. The Newcastlc is 430 feet in length, 47 feet in breadth and at 15 feet 3 inches draft displaces 4800 tons. She is practically ready for commission.—United Service Gazette.
THE TRAINING OF NAVAL OFFICERS.—On the report stage of the navy votes being taken in the House of Commons, an opoortunity was afforded of ventilating the views of those who are hostile to the new educational scheme. Mr. Barnes objected that the scheme was undemocratic. It used to be possible for a boy of humble parentage to get into the engineering branch of the service. Smart boys from the dockyards had been able to do it. Now the cost for a boy intended for service in the navy would be £100 per annum. He suggested that the Admiralty might do something to lessen the cost. Mr. Lee claimed that the scheme had the support of the great bulk of professional opinion. He agreed that boys of any class should be able to enter the navy as officers, and that £100 a year was beyond the reach of a large section of the community. He suggested that, as in the case of schools, a scholarship system might be instituted whereby every boy should have the opportunity of competing for a scholarship which would enable him to get his training and enter the navy without his parents having to provide a substantial sum. No great expense to the Exchequer would be involved. With regard to the stokers, in his view it was right that a body of men doing vital work and getting very little glory should have avenues of promotion opened to them such as the scheme provided.
IN REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF SPECIALIZATION IN THE NAVY.—Mr. McKenna thought the confusion which existed as to whether an officer who was an engineer specialist might become a gunnery specialist, and afterwards be ordered to resume his former duties, was on account of the word “ interchangeability ” having been introduced in the discussion. There was no such thing as interchangeability as between the different branches in the ordinary sense. The Admiralty had always disowned the word. Once an officer had specialized, whether as a gunnery, torpedo, navigating or engineer specialist, he would be a specialist in that particular class of work. Nothing he might do hereafter would disqualify him as a specialist, but engineer specialists would be in future, like the gunnery or torpedo specialists, executive officers. Just as a gunnery specialist was qualified to become a commander, a captain and an admiral, so a torpedo or engineer specialist would be equally qualified. The engineer officer would become an executive officer, with all the rank and right to promotion that any other executive specialist now enjoyed. There would not be any interchangeability between a gunnery lieutenant and an engineer lieutenant. The officer who had specially qualified as an engineer would, no doubt, be appointed to executive engineer duties, just as the gunnery officer was appointed to executive gunnery duties. There was a specialization of functions in the engineering class exactly as existed now with regard to gunnery and torpedo specialization.—Page’s Weekly.
MIDSHIPMEN’S TRAINING. NAVAL HISTORY EXAMINATION.—The Admiralty have decided, in reference to naval history in the voluntary part of the examination for the rank of lieutenant, that in lieu of a written examination of the ordinary kind, midshipmen who select naval history as one of their voluntary subjects are to write an essay dealing broadly with the prescribed period. This essay, which is to be written during a midshipman’s service at sea, should comprise, in the candidate’s own language, a general survey of the period under review, but may, in addition, deal with any special aspect on which the candidate wishes to lay emphasis. Candidates should understand that they may use books of reference in preparing their essays, but copying from, or close following of, any writer is to be avoided. The essay will form the basis for marking, but it will be open to the examiner to submit candidates to a vivâ-voce examination if it is considered desirable, especially with the object of testing that the essay is in each case the candidate’s genuine work. There will be no written examination. The essays are to be sent to the Director of Naval Education one month before the date of the candidate’s examination for lieutenant.—Naval and Military Record.
An Order in Council has sanctioned the following: The payment of a special allowance of 6s. a day, as from January 1 last, to captains of the Royal Navy serving on the staff of the Royal Naval War College; a similar allowance at the discretion of the Admiralty to majors or captains of marines of five years’ seniority who have passed the Staff College; and power to the Admiralty to grant the temporary rank of major to a captain of marines of five years’ seniority when selected for the staff of the War College.
ADMIRALTY SURVEY WORK.—The report of the Hydrographer of the Navy for 1909 is a fine record of strenuous work performed both in home and distant waters by the surveying branch of the navy. In home waters the Research and Triton were engaged as usual, with the addition of a hired vessel, the Argo, and a steam launch, while abroad surveys were made by six naval small craft and one hired vessel. The whole force under the control of the Hydrographer comprised 83 officers and 825 petty officers and men, and of the former 58 were qualified surveyors. Some slight idea of the amount of work performed may be gained by examining the Parliamentary Blue-book, but this document does not state that the petty officers and men engaged in this important and strenuous work are not allowed one penny beyond their ordinary rates of pay. The officers qualified as marine surveyors are, of course, able to earn extra pay, and are believed to be satisfied with the scale. Many of the men do, it is true, volunteer for a commission in a surveying ship, but they have to work very hard on the surveying ground, and deserve extra pay. The officers and men of this branch surveyed during the year 932 miles of coast-line and sounded over an area of 13,938 square miles. This is an achievement highly creditable to the whole branch, and still more work would have been done but for an exceptional amount of foul weather in most quarters of the globe. In home waters Captain C. H. Simpson and his crew were largely engaged on the east coast of England and on the west coast of Scotland, while Captain W. P. Dawson and his staff were employed off the Orkneys and east coast. Captain B. T. Somerville, in the hired yacht Argo was also employed on the west coasts of Scotland and Ireland. In colonial waters, too, a vast amount of surveying work was accomplished that cannot be adequately noticed here, but we may mention that the Egeria’s crew (Captain J. F. Parry) discovered, after an eight days’ search, a pinnacle rock very dangerous to shipping, which had eluded all efforts in the previous year. This “ Brodie Rock ” consists of a very small pinnacle covered by 5 feet of water, and invisible to the navigator. It lies off Gabriola Beacon (British Columbia), and now appears on the Admiralty chart. Many useful plans and sketch surveys have again been sent to the Hydrographic office by navigating officers of the general service.—Naval and Military Record.
KEYHAM COLLEGE.—On July 31 the Royal Naval Engineering College at Keyham was closed as a training establishment for engineer officers of the old system of entry and education. At the prize distribution to the last batch of engineer cadets Sir Wilmot Fawkes distributed the awards. Reviewing its history, the admiral said that the college had had a comparatively short life of only thirty years, and yet what movements there had been in that time! In 1880, when it was opened, there were 770 engineer officers in the fleet, controlling an indicated horse-power of 600,000. At the present time there were 964 engineer officers in the navy, controlling an indicated horse-power of 6,000,000. He hoped those walls would in the future look down on good work well done, but that could never efface the work that had been done there in the past. The future use to which the college will be put is still uncertain. It will not be until April, 1913, that the first entries under the Osborne scheme will specialize in gunnery, torpedo, navigation, engineering or the marine branch. Assuming that, as seems to be generally expected, the new engineer officers will then take their advanced courses at Keyham, there remains an interval of more than two and a half-years, and, as we suggested last week, the plan of selecting a certain number of petty and warrant officers for higher courses of training with a view to their promotion to commissioned rank might be tried here during that time, if only on a small scale. It will certainly be a pity if no use is found for the college and its equipment until 1913, while the proposal we refer to might have results of the utmost value to the navy and the nation.—Army and Navy Gazette.
THE GREAT NAVAL MOBILIZATION.—Now that practically all the effective units in the home fleet are placed on a war footing as the result of the mobilization, it is opportune to consider the “ striking ” power and armored strength of the forces which will be engaged in the forthcoming maneuvers. Amongst the individual fleets the first division of the home fleet is naturally rar and away the strongest. Reckoning the Lord Nelson and Agamemnon as Dreadnoughts, it consists entirely of vessels of this type, the aggregate tonnage being 164,450, and the armaments totalling seventy-eight 12-inch and twenty 9.2-inch. The second battle division is, of course, entirely homogeneous, and comprises the eight King Edwards, displacing 130,800 tons, and carrying thirty-two 12-inch, the same number of 9.2’s and eighty 6-inch. The Atlantic fleet battle squadron is another force claiming the advantages of homogeneity, the six units being all of the Formidable class, totalling 90,000 tons displacement, and twenty-four 12-inch and seventy-two 6-inch in armament. The Mediterranean is not so fortunate, as four Duncans are associated with the two Triumphs, giving 79,600 tons of displacement, and an aggregate armament of sixteen 12-inch, eight 10-inch, forty-eight 6-inch, and twenty-eight 7.5-inch. The third and fourth divisions of the home fleet contribute the nine Majesties, four Oceans and the Bulwark, totalling 200,900 tons with fifty-six 12-inch and one hundred and sixty-eight 6-inch guns.
The armored cruisers also make a formidable array. None of the squadrons are homogeneous and to save a lengthy description the following table will be useful as a summary of their force:
Armament.
Squadron. 12-in. 9.2-in. 7.5-in. 6-in.
First 3 Invincibles 24
1 Defence 4 10
Second 1 Shannon 4 10
4 Warriors 24 16
Third 5 Antrims 20 36
3 Cressys 6 36
1 Drake 2 16
Fifth 2 Black Princes 12 24
1 Drake 2 16
Sixth 2 Cressys 4 24
2 Kents 24
Total 24 58 56 176
Adding together the armaments of battleships and armored cruisers, the following striking totals are reached:
12-inch 230 970 (230 heavy, 348 above 9-inch)
10-inch 8
9.2-inch 110
7.5-inch 84
6-inch 538
Such figures as these, however, are of little value unless we have something with which to compare them. Let us, therefore, see what sort of comparison they make with the German Navy. The completed strength of the latter in sea-going battleships and armored cruisers is now thirty-seven—28 battleships and nine cruisers. That at once is an inferiority of thirty-one ships compared with our maneuvering fleet. The aggregate tonnage of the German fleet in armored ships is 448,903—354,829 for battleships and 94,074 for armored cruisers. The total tonnage of the maneuvering fleet will be no less than 989,800—665,750 in battleships and 324,050 in armored cruisers; or, from another point of view, 684,800 tons permanently in full commission and 305,000 tons brought up to full complement from the reserve. These figures have an interesting corollary. If the German Navy as it stands to-day were doubled—if its displacement increased from 448,903 tons to 897,806 tons—this would still be below the tonnage of the armored ships assembling for the forthcoming maneuvers. And here is another striking fact. The total gun power of the maneuvers fleets has already been given. Here is a similar analysis for the German Navy—all completed armored sea-going ships:
11-inch 112 632 (112 heavy; 158 above 9-inch).
9.4-inch 46
8.2-inch 44
6.7-inch 140
5.9-inch 290-
In conclusion, attention may be drawn to the following age analysis of the armored ships engaged in the maneuvers: Ships completed in 1910, number, three; in 1909, three; in 1908, nine; in 1907, three; in 1906, six; in 1905, nine; in 1904, nine; in 1903, four; in 1902, eight; in 1001, four; in 1900, one; in 1898, one; in 1897, five; in 1896, one; in 1895, two.—Naval and Military Record.
In addition to the foregoing vessels (of which seven battleships and three armored cruisers are Dreadnoughts), there will also be a very large number of small cruisers, auxiliaries, depot ships, destroyers, torpedo-boats and, probably, submarines. To each of the first and second divisions of the home fleet is attached a flotilla of destroyers, twenty-five strong, and with each flotilla there are two scouts, a depot cruiser, and a fast vessel of the Boadicea type, carrying the senior officer. Each division has also a repair-ship, properly equipped for carrying out such repairs at sea as are not of a serious character; the first division has also a hospital ship, which will, of course, be at the disposal of the whole fleet. Its use will obviously be necessary, seeing that altogether between 60,000 and 70,000 men will be engaged in taking part in the maneuvers. The third (nucleus crew) division contains, besides the ships specified above, five protected cruisers, six torpedo-gunboats and four mine-layers, as well as three powerful flotillas of torpedo-craft. To the third division of the home fleet are also affiliated the principal flotillas of submarines—those at Portsmouth, Devonport, Dover, Harwich and Dundee. It is just possible that most, if not all, of these flotillas will be included in the scheme of the maneuvers.
Two points specially will be noticed in connection with these maneuvers. The chief one is that for the first time for several years the exercises are to be held in the Atlantic, where there will be no risk of any hostile feelings being engendered abroad; the other point is, that the Mediterranean fleet for the second year in succession is being brought away from its station for the maneuvers. At the same time the lessons to be gained in the Atlantic are not likely to be of as much advantage as those that would accrue from maneuvering in the North Sea. Away there the fleets can practice all sorts of things undisturbed, with never an onlooker to distract or be indiscreet. Then, again, if the North Sea is to be the scene of the naval Armageddon, it is absolutely necessary for our men to get used to the coasts they will have to defend and the weather in which they will have to fight. North Sea training is, therefore, both convenient and necessary, but it is by no means pleasant, for of all the waters in which our sailors have to render service, those of the German Ocean are the coldest and least inviting, the rough seas and biting winds making of it a kind of naval purgatory.—United Service Gazette.
In the naval maneuvers which are about to commence over a million tons of armored ships alone will take part, and the conflicting fleets will present the most powerful force that has ever yet been assembled at one time under the White Ensign. The Atlantic fleet, under Vice-Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg, will leave Gibraltar in company with the Mediterranean fleet, commanded by Admiral Sir Edmund Poë. The two fleets will make for the Lizard, where they will be met by the home fleet, and the maneuvers will then commence in earnest. Admiral Sir William May, commander-in-chief of the home fleet, will have supreme command of this great force, the total monetary value of which will be close upon one hundred millions sterling.
The main strength of a fleet lies always in its armored ships, and the following list shows the number and tonnage of the armored vessels which will be contributed to the maneuvers by the various fleets taking part:
Home fleet, first division—
9 Battleships 164,450 tons
4 Armored cruisers 66,350 “
Home fleet, second division—
8 Battleships 130,800 “
5 Armored Cruisers 68,800 “
Home fleet, third division—
10 Battleships 149,100 “
9 Armored cruisers 104,200 “
Home fleet, fourth division—
6 Battleships 78,750 “
Atlantic fleet—
6 Battleships 90,000 “
3 Armored Cruisers 41,300 “
Mediterranean fleet—
6 Battleshios 79,600 “
4 Armored cruisers 43,600 “
Total: 45 battleships and 25 armored cruisers. Aggregate displacement: 1,016,950 tons.
The great naval mobilization of 1910 bids fair to be the most important ever carried out in the history of the navy. It has been the custom for some years past, as the naval maneuvers come round, to herald them with the statement that a “record” number of ships will be employed; but in this case we have perhaps reached the limit of our powers, the enormous number of 401 vessels being engaged in combined exercises, as against 374 last year. There is, save for the absence of live shell, little of make-believe about these periodical exercises of the fleet, and the work that is this year being carried out will be performed with that grim earnestness which is happily distinctive of the British Navy, when there is business of importance on hand. The real significance of this year’s demonstration lies in the fact that it stands as a guarantee for the efficiency of the nucleus-crew system, which has been so adversely attacked by the critics. So long as the machinery of mobilization is maintained at such a standard of effectiveness as has been shown, the complete success of this organization is assured.
Strangely enough, the mobilizing of this huge fleet, which makes that of any one of the great naval powers insignificant, and outnumbers and out-weighs any possible combination of two of them at the present time, synchronizes with the fatuous appeal for a cool hundred million pounds to be spent in defensive work. Even were it practicable to raise such a sum, the nation generally would utterly deny the necessity. Indeed, with this great fleet before it, the people would rub their eyes and wonder what all the outcry is about. In the days of old, no one doubted that one Englishman was equal to two foreigners, and Sir Francis Drake had no hesitation in pitting his cockle boats against the great Spanish galleons. It looks now as if Britons have become so chicken-hearted that it requires two to stand up before one foreigner. In no other way can all the outcry be explained. And the worst of it is that such an expenditure would be utterly useless for the purpose. The suggested outlay on our part would be followed by similar expenditure by other nations, and so the insensate arming would go on until the burden would precipitate that war which it was intended to prevent. Timid people, whose minds are being unhinged by the bare possibility of an invasion, may find some consolation in the knowledge that even if the present German fleet were doubled, it would still have 70,000 tons less displacement than the British fleet now engaged in maneuvers.
For the first time the plan of operations, concerning which the most rigorous secrecy prevails, has been drawn up by the staff of the Naval Mobilization Department, a department at the Admiralty which was created in the autumn of last year. The circumstance, moreover, that these are the first grand maneuvers on a large scale to be held since Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson became First Sea Lord, could not but add to the interest with which they would be followed, were the secrecy removed. It has often been contended that it is a mistake to keep the public practically in the dark as to the work carried out during naval maneuvers, but it is considered that the exigencies of the situation demand the adootion of this course, and it must be admitted that the responsible authorities are the best judges as to what should be done in the matter. In these circumstances, it would be a mistake to place confidence in the reports that may come to hand during the progress of the maneuvers, though the discretion of the accredited journalist is surely as greatly to be relied upon as that of some of the eminent officers who have recently been airing their opinions, and bringing themselves into prominence in a manner that would do credit to a smart advertising agent.
The great value of these maneuvers lies in the fact that they are the culmination of the year’s work in the divisional squadrons and fleets as regards war training. When ships are thus brought together a number of tactical exercises are held on the conclusion of the big strategical maneuvers, and evolutionary drills are carried out in competition. This produces a healthy spirit of emulation between the different ships’ companies. With the officers, opportunity is taken to discuss points of professional interest, and those of one fleet interchange ideas with another. The flag officers and captains also obtain experience in the handling of large numbers of ships, which it is not possible for them to have at other times. Most important of all, the Admiralty authorities are given the opportunity of testing their war ; Ians, and herein lies the key to the necessary secrecy which now obtains in regard to the scheme of operations. Sir Arthur Wilson is understood to believe in a system of strategy which is based on the widest possible sphere of action, and relies on large combinations in the open sea for its strength, so that we may assume that the practice which was followed while Lord Charles Beresford commanded in home waters of exercising in the North Sea and in Danish and Norwegian waters, is now discontinued.—United Service Gazette.
ITALY.
VESSELS BUILDING.
Name. Displacement. Where Building:. Remarks.
Battleships.
Dante Alighieri 19,000 Gov’t Yard, Castellamare. Launched Aug. 20, 1910.
Cavour 22,000 “ “ Spezia. Building.
Giulio Cesare 22,000 Ansaldo-Armstrong. “
Leonardo da Vinci 22,000 Genoa (Odero). “
Armored Cruisers.
San Giorgio 9,800 Gov’t Yard, Castellamare. Under trial.
San Marco 9,800 “ “ “ “
Georgios Averof 9,800 Leghorn (Orlando). Launched Mar. 12, 1910.
Scouts.
Quarto 3,600 Venice. Ordered.
Marsala 3,600 Castellamare. “
Nino Bixio 3,600 “ “
Four “ Dreadnoughts ” Building.—The Naval Committee of the Budget has published an interesting report on the present condition of the Italian Navy, says the Rome correspondent of The Globe.
As regards the new Dreadnoughts, the committee states that all four of the vessels of this type ordered are now under construction. The first, the Dante Alighieri, will be commissioned in 1912, the Giulio Cesare and the Leonardo da Vinci in 1913 and the Conte di Cavour in 1914. All the other vessels under construction will be ready for service by December, 1912.
The report states that in August next the Mediterranean squadron will be composed of four divisions, made up as follows:
First division.—Regina Margherita, Benedette Brin, Saint-Bon, Partenope.
Second division.—Regina Elena, Vittorio Emanuele, Napoli, Coatit.
Third division.—Pisa, Roma, Amalfi, Agordat.
Fourth division.—Garibaldi, Ferruccio, Varese, Tripoli.
The appended diagrams showing the battery arrangements of the new battleships are taken from Mitteilungen aus dem Gebiete des Seewesens. The Dante Alighieri will be the first three-gun turret ship afloat.
The latest rumor about the new Italian triple-turret ships is that the three guns will not be in line abreast, but that one gun will be above the remaining pair, so that the three form a species of triangle.
JAPAN.
VESSELS BUILDING.
Name. Displacement. Where Building. Remarks.
Battleships.
Satsuma 19,200 Yokosuka. Under trial.
Aki 19,800 Kure. Launched Apr. 15, 1907.
Kawachi 20,800 “ Building.
Settsu 20,800 Yokosuka. “
Armored Cruisers
Kurama 14,600 Yokosuka. Launched Oct. 21, 1907.
Protected Cruisers.
Shikuma 5,000 Sasebo. Ordered.
Yahagi 5,000 Nagasaki. “
Hirado 5,000 Kobe. “
The new year book gives the following as the existing number of officers in the various corps and grades of the navy:
Line. Engineer. Medical. Commissary.
Admirals 5 0 0 0
Vice-Admirals 23 0 0 0
Rear-Admirals 33 9 4 4
Captains 90 26 12 19
Commanders 182 49 39 42
Lieut.-Comdrs 229 63 56 56
Lieutenants 552 206 111 70
Ensigns, 1st class 472 109 67 61
Ensigns, 2d class 328 114 29 25
Midshipmen 1914 576 318 277
82 0 2 5
Total 1996 576 320 282
The ages of the admirals are from 57 to 67; of the vice-admirals from 41 to 56: of the rear-admirals from 42 to 53; and of the captains from 39 to 50.—Le Yacht.
The keel was laid at Nagasaki on Aoril 25 of a Japanese destroyer of 1500 tons and 32 knots. The machinery is already nearly complete, and the vessel is to be ready for sea by April, 1911.—United Service Magazine.
RUSSIA.
VESSELS BUILDING.
Name. Displacement. Where Building:. Remarks.
Battleships.
Emperor Paul 1 16,900 St. Petersburg. Launched Sept. 7, 1907.
Andrei Pervozvannui 16,900 “ “ Oct. 20, 1906.
Evstafi 12,500 Nicolaiev. “ Oct. 1906.
Ivan Zlatoust 12,500 Sevastopol. “ May 13, 1906.
Sevastopol 23,000 St. Petersburg (Baltic Wks.). Building.
Petropavlovsk 23,000 “ “ “
Poltava 23,000 “ (Admiralty Yd.). “
Gangoot 23,000 “ “ “
Armored Cruisers.
Bayan 7,800 St. Petersburg. Launched Aug. 15, 1907.
Pallada 7,800 “ Under trial.
Protected Cruiser.
Outchakoff 6,750 Sevastopol. Building.
THE NEW RUSSIAN BATTLESHIPS.—We have received from a correspondent in St. Petersburg the elevation, section and plans of the four battleships recently laid down—the Sevastopol and the Petropavlovsk, at the Baltic works; and the Gangut and Poltava, at the Obukoff works. The designs for these ships were prepared at St. Petersburg, where there is considerable discussion in official circles as to their merits and demerits. The drawings which we reproduce show the disposition and emplacement of all the guns of the main and auxiliary armament, and the system of armored protection.
The principal dimensions of the vessels are as follows: Length, 590 feet; breadth, 89 feet; mean draft, 27 feet 3 inches; displacement in tons, 23,000; shaft horse-power, 42,000; speed in knots, 23.
The outcome of the Russian experience in the war, and the examination of all the designs submitted in the competition of two years ago, together with the endless discussions which took place among the Russian naval authorities as to the type of ship best suited to meet all the conditions of modern warfare, has obviously resulted in a hybrid design, which discloses many serious inefficiencies from the fighting point of view. Taking first the arrangement of the guns, it will be seen that the main armament consists of twelve 12-inch triple-mounted guns, all on the center line of the ship, having arcs of training on both broadsides. Such concentration of fire within limited area has ever been regarded by experts as involving risks which can only be justified by indisputable advantages, which do not exist here.
As to the auxiliary armament of the vessels—sixteen 4.7-inch guns—the arrangement of these guns is such as to split them up into eight groups, each pair of groups being in close proximity to one of the main barbettes. When the 12-inch guns are being used in action, it will be impossible to use the 4.7-inch guns, over which the 12-inch guns may be firing, as the blast from three 12-inch guns will in all probability render the 4.7-inch casemates uninhabitable.
Coming next to the armored protection of the ships, it will be seen that the main belt armor protecting the machinery and the magazines is only 8.8 inches in thickness, which is not at all calculated to withstand the fire of the large-caliber guns being fitted to war vessels now building, and the still larger guns projected for vessels about to be laid down for navies to which the Russian ships would be likely to be opposed in combat. It would seem that the idea was to protect every part of the above-water portion of the vessel with armor, irrespective of its thickness, so long as it could be termed armor, and thus the armored side is carried right up to the weather-deck forward. At the time the vessel was designed, it was intended to carry out the same arrangement aft, but our correspondent states that it was found that conditions of weight and the limit fixed for the displacement tonnage made this impossible, a fact which accounts for the after end—abaft the after barbette—being unarmored above the height of the main deck.
In the design, there is a complete departure from the idea adopted in Russian ships for many years—viz., that of submarine longitudinal explosion bulkheads against torpedo or mine explosions. There is in the new design only one longitudinal wing bulkhead on each side; it is of ordinary mild steel, and is dangerously near to the sides of the vessel.
There are fitted longitudinal armored bulkheads above the protective deck at a distance of about 11 feet in from the sides of the vessel, running from the forward barbette to the after barbette. These bulkheads are from 3 inches to 4 inches in thickness; the idea being to keep out any projectile from the interior after it has pierced the outside armor. The space between these upper armored bulkheads and the outside armor on each side of the ship is subdivided into water-tight compartments, the idea being that with such arrangement the vessel could always maintain her water-line area practically intact. Would the weight put into these bulkheads not have been much more effective if used for thickening the outside armor?
The arrangement of the rudders is notable. Each vessel is provided with two rudders, one placed immediately forward of the other in the center line. If the rudders had been arranged to carry out the idea for which they were first proposed—viz., to be placed so far away from each other that an explosion which would destroy one of them would be likely to leave the other intact—the arrangement would have been a good one. As a matter of fact, however, the crowding out of the internal space by magazines, machinery, etc., has resulted in the rudders being brought so close together that any explosion powerful enough to destroy one of them would probably at the same time render the other useless.
Another novel innovation is the ice-breaker stem, but it is of questionable utility. The shape is there, but no special strengthening for ice-breaking purposes has been made. The fitting of this stem has added considerably to the resistance of the vessel, on account of the virtual shortening of length, necessitating that the lines forward cannot in any possible circumstances be made as good for propulsive purposes as if the ordinary stem had been adhered to.
The designs for the guns and barbettes are purely Russian; and whilst giving no greater efficiency in any direction than in similar barbettes being constructed for other navies at the present time, the weight of each turret is close on 200 tons greater than in other types.
In order to keep the weight of hull and fittings as small as possible, it was decided by the Russian authorities that high-tensile steel should be used, it being apparently considered that on account of the greater tensile strength of this material it would be possible to reduce the scantlings throughout. This is an error, because, in many parts of the structure, stiffness has to be obtained where longitudinal strength does not enter very much into the question. The idea of weakness is borne out by the fact that in order to get the necessary longitudinal strength the beams of the upper deck have been placed longitudinally, so as to be taken into the strength calculation.
Having thus designed their battleships for 23,000 tons displacement, and having arranged for four such ships to be built, carrying triple barbettes whose weight was out of proportion to their efficiency, and having at the same time cut down on paper the hull weight to a dangerous figure, by assuming the use of high-tensile steel throughout, the keels were duly laid down in two of the shipbuilding yards in Russia, and the work begun. At the very commencement it was found—as is usual in Russian naval construction—that there was a very serious hitch; so serious, indeed, that whilst these four vessels are supposed to have been building now for nearly two years, comparatively little work has been done on the hulls, except the laying of the keel-plates. The fact is that, according to the Russian laws, no material for these vessels, or for any other Russian warships, can be purchased outside of Russia, and Russian steel-makers were found to be unable, and without experience, to deal with the manufacture of high-tensile steel of the quality required. Thus the first quantities received in the various yards from the steel manufacturers were found to be incapable of meeting the tests demanded.
Coming to the question of machinery, the mechanical department of the Marine Technical Committee in St. Petersburg were desirous of having water-tube boilers of the large-tube type for the vessels, but on account of the necessity of keeping the weight of the machinery installation as small as possible, the advice of these experts was over-ridden, with the result that it was decided to fit water-tube boilers of the small-tube type. Further to this, discussion raged for many months over a proposal to fit Diesel oil-motors for cruising speeds in place of the ordinary turbines. Thus delay has occurred at every stage of the work on account of the wide differences of opinion as to the salient points to be embodied in the design, both in the hull, machinery and armament sections.
The Russian naval authorities were very sanguine at the outset that their four new battleships would all be delivered within three years, but knowledge of the conditions in Russia, as compared with those in England, where every detail is settled and all discussions as to the features of the ship concluded before the keel-plate is laid, justifies the view that the vessels in question cannot possibly be delivered for several years, and that their cost will greatly exceed the estimate. In support of this one has only to point to the battleship now being built in St. Petersburg, the Andrei Pervozvannyi, which has already been eight years under construction, and which has exceeded her estimated cost by over £1,000,000. When dealing with the question of cost, it should not be forgotten that the paper cost of a Russian battleship is always below the actual cost, because in the Armor-Plate and Gun-Manufacturing works, the charges of the works come under another and distinct vote to that for shipbuilding, consequently to the paper cost given for each ship there should be added the enormous working charges against those establishments.
To sum up the matter, it may be stated that the four Russian battleships now being constructed to the present designs promise to be of such doubtful efficiency as to suggest that their construction will be a waste of the country’s capital. Strength of hull has been sacrificed to carry excessive weight of armament, so disposed as to risk a large proportion of it being rendered hors de combat under conditions easily realizable in warfare, while for the purpose of having machinery to give the ships the unnecessarily high speed of 23 knots, the boiler installation decided upon is, in its main features, contrary to general practice. The armor seems to have been arranged upon no sound scientific basis. The vessels are devoid of torpedo-tubes. Whether, for a purely theoretical advantage to her industries, Russia is wise in insisting that all her warships should be built in Russia, by Russian workmen, with Russian material, it is, of course, for Russia herself to say. The Russian industries and Russian workmen would, we are certain, benefit to a far greater extent than under present conditions if a design were accepted from any of the big warship-building countries, arranged, of course, to meet Russian conditions, but evolved from experience in naval construction, strategy and tactics, begotten by the building of the large and heavy vessels to meet modern requirements.—Engineering.
SPAIN.
The Spanish Government has entrusted the work of reconstructing its navy to the Sociedad Espanola de Construccion Naval, a Spanish corporation organized for this special work, and having the great advantage of the technical guarantees of three of the most important naval construction companies in this country, and, therefore, in the world. These, in alphabetical order, are Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., John Brown & Co. and Vickers, Sons and Maxim. No three firms in any country have greater experience of the design and construction of modern war material.
This decision was arrived at as the result of international competition. The invitation to the warship builders of the world to tender for the reconstruction of the Spanish Navy appeared in the Diario Oficial, of Madrid, on April 23, 1908, in the form of a Royal Decree. It was there announced that the scheme should comprise not only the building of the ships, but the modernization of the existing arsenals at Ferrol and Cartagena.
At Ferrol, in addition to the new manufacturing establishments required, it was considered necessary to dredge the harbor, and to provide a new dry dock. The following amounts were estimated by the Government for this work, and were published in the invitation to tender:
Ferrol— £
Three battleships of about 15,000 tons 4,620,000
Dredging of harbor 53,000
New dry dock 250,000
Other civil engineering work, building and machine plant 94,000
Total 5,017,000
Cartagena—
Four gunboats of 800 tons 214,000
Three destroyers of 350 tons 224,000
Twenty-four torpedo-boats of 180 tons 1,000,000
Total 1,438,000
Grand total 6,455,000
It is most creditable that the firm to whom the contract was awarded was able to more than fulfil the first requirements of the Spanish Government on the sum named; the small margin provided for contingencies enabled the builders to include a few improvements in the types of ships specified. The whole scheme was admirably thought out with a view of developing the resources of the dock yards, and at the same time fostering the industries of the country.
All the steel which is being worked into the hulls of the battleships building at Ferrol, for instance, has been obtained from Bilbao, and the same applies to the ships building at Cartagena, with the exception of a few cases where steel of special quality has had to be purchased abroad. Since the firm took over the works a large turbine-shop has been completely equipped for the manufacture of turbine machinery, and with two 50-ton overhead cranes, which, with the new machine-tools, are electrically driven. The workshops generally have been overhauled and brought up-to-date, and the foundry plant has been augmented by the addition of a new cupola of six tons per hour capacity. While the work on the new contract has been proceeding the fitting out and equipping of the Reina Regente, a new cruiser, has been accomplished, the vessel being now practically ready for trials. There has also been a large amount of repairs carried out, principally on the battleship Carlos V. Indeed, the only important parts of the ships’ structure being purchased are the guns of large caliber, with their mountings, and the armor for the battleships.
The battleships are to be named España, Alfonso XIII and Jaime I. They are 435 feet long between perpendiculars, of 78 feet 9 inches beam and 15,450 tons displacement on a draft of 25 feet 6 inches. Their speed is to be 19.5 knots and their radius of action 7500 knots. In referring in greater detail to their main features, as shown on the accompanying plans, the armament may take first place. The eight 12-inch guns, 50 calibers in length, have been so disposed as to get the maximum amount of training consistent with isolation of the magazines, and other desirable features. The mountings are all controlled by hydraulic power, and will be of the latest design, embodying the large experience of the builders. The auxiliary armament consists of twenty 4-inch guns, all mounted on the main deck behind the 3-inch battery armor. There are several smaller guns, but no torpedo-tubes.
The fire of the battleships’ main and auxiliary guns will be controlled electrically from a central station placed below the water-line, the range being transmitted from the conning positions to this station, and from thence to the several guns engaged. Although the secondary armament is placed upon the main deck, the average height of these guns is over 13 feet above the water-line.
The disposition of the armor is clearly shown in Figs. 1, 3 and 4. Special attention may be directed to the under-water protection, consisting of a bulkhead, 1½ inches thick, completely protecting the machinery and magazine.
The machinery is of the Parsons turbine type, supplied with steam from Yarrow boilers. The turbines, however, are arranged somewhat differently from earlier practice, the turbines of all four shafts being in series. There are one high-pressure turbine, one intermediate and two low-pressure turbines, the last mentioned being on the wing shafts. The high-pressure turbine on the port inboard shaft exhausts into the intermediate-pressure turbine on the starboard inboard shaft, and the steam passes from the latter to the two low-pressure turbines. The inboard shafts have also high-pressures astern turbines, exhausting respectively into a low-pressure astern turbine within the same casing as the low-pressure ahead turbine on the wing shafts. The arrangement of the ahead turbines, it is anticipated, will largely reduce the steam consumption at all powers, without in any way affecting the simplicity of maneuvering gear.
The first ship, España, will be delivered in about three years’ time, the second in four and a half years and the third in six years; but developments in warship construction were anticipated and embodied in the designs, and for their size the ships will rank with the best ships of other navies when they are delivered. There is every reason to believe that the dates above mentioned will be easily met, and perhaps anticipated.
The contract was signed at the end of July, 1909. Land had to be levelled, the ship berths made and piled, while contemporaneously new workshops were being erected and fitted with machine-tools and cranes. The keel of the first ship was laid on December 5, 1909, and that of the second ship on February 23, 1910.—Engineering.
UNITED STATES.
VESSELS BUILDING.
No. Name. Speed. Where Building. % of Completion Aug.1
Battleships. Knots.
30 Florida 20¾ Navy Yard, New York. 71.0
31 Utah 20¾ New York Shlpbl’g Co. 83.2
32 Wyoming 20½ Wm. Cramp & Sons. 32.3
33 Arkansas 20½ N. Y. Shipbuilding Co. 39.5
COMPARISON OF THE ARGENTINE BATTLESHIPS, “ RIVADAVIA ” AND “MORENO,” WITH THE “WYOMING” AND “ARKANSAS.”—Navy, June, 1910, gives a description of the Argentine battleships, translated from La Nacion, with data revised and corrected to June 2, 1910, and a tabular comparison between these ships and the Wyoming class, on which it comments editorially, stating that “ the superiority of the Argentine ships appears to extend to practically every detail.” The comparison is incorrect in many respects and the comment shows prejudice as well as ignorance.
The following are the points of superiority cited:
(a) Shorter time of construction.
(b) Greater all-round volume of fire.
(c) Better protection.
(d) Two knots more speed.
(e) Substantially greater radius of action.
(f) Better fire control.
(g) Less cost.
Taking the items in order—
(a) Shorter time of construction:
Argentine battleships were contracted to be delivered in 24 and 27 months, respectively, against 32 months guaranteed in United States contracts.
Progress reports on the Utah (a 32-month contract) show that she will probably be completed six months ahead of her contract time. From signing of contract to delivery Delaware took 30.3 months; North Dakota, 32.2. From laying of keel to official trial in either case was 23 months.
(b) Greater all-round volume of fire:
This is the question of end-on vs. broadside fire and of center-line vs. echelon waist turrets.
The batteries of the vessels compare as follows:
Main Battery.—Argentine battleships, twelve 12-inch 50 caliber guns; United States battleships, twelve 12-inch 50 caliber guns.
Secondary Battery.—Argentine battleships, twelve 6-inch and twelve 4-inch R. F. G.; United States battleships, twenty-one 5-inch R. F. G.
Torpedo Tubes.—Argentine battleships, two 21-inch submerged; United States battleships, two 21-inch submerged.
The echelon arrangement of turrets has always appealed on paper, but the angles of fire on the off-side are generally disappointing; the gain in head-fire is always less than diagrams show, and it is worthy of note that the most confirmed exponent of echelon arrangement (England) has in her latest ships come to the center-line grouping.
In this connection, as affecting the handling of the battery, a comparison of the gun-heights and of the freeboards of the ships is pertinent. In the comparison given in the Navy, the freeboards and gun-heights are measured in each case from the trial load water-line, which is misleading, as the trial displacement of the Argentine battleships contemplates a smaller proportion of the total fuel, ammunition and stores, than in the case of the United States battleships. The change in draft of the Argentine ships from normal to full load is about 30 inches, and of the United States vessels 13½ inches. Referring the gun-heights and freeboards to the full load mean drafts as a more accurate basis of comparison, the figures become as follows:
Freeboards. Argentine. United States.
Forecastle 23′ 0″ 23′ 10″
Midships 20′ 2″ 19′ 2″
Aft 14′ 7″ 16′ 3″
Turret No. 1 29′ 2″ 28′ 3″
Turret No. 2. 37′ 2″ 36′ 3″
Turret No. 3 29′ 2″ 32′ 11″
Turret No. 4 29′ 2″ 24′ 11″
Turret No. 5 29′ 2″ 31′ 3″
Turret No. 6 19′ 11″ 23′ 3″
(c) Better protection:
In this statement the Navy is in error, as the following comparison will show:
Main Belt.—Argentine battleships: 8′ 1″ wide, 12 inches thick at top, tapered in about 2 feet to 5 inches at the bottom, reaching 3′ 4″ below normal water-line, extending over the machinery spaces and waist turrets and magazines, (about) 240 feet; beyond these at each end, reduced to 10 inches, tapered to 5 inches at bottom, (about) 76′ aft and 84′ forward in way of the forward and after magazines; at ends, 5 inches thick forward and 4 inches thick aft. The Navy states this 5-inch armor as 6-inch armor, but the above is according to our own information. United States battleships: 7′ 11½″ wide, thickness 11 inches at top, tapered to 9 inches at bottom, covers all turrets and magazines, 416 feet; aft, 5 inches thick, reaching 6 feet below normal water-line.
Upper Belt.—Argentine battleships: Thickness 9 inches at lower edge, tapering to 8 inches at the top, approximately same height as United States gun-deck, extending full length of heavy part of main belt, i. e., about 400 feet. United States battleships: 11 inches at bottom, tapering to 9 inches at the gun-deck, extending full length of heavy main belt.
Casemate.—Argentine battleships, 6 inches thick; U. S. battleships, 6½ inches thick, backed up by splinter bulkhead on each side 1½ inches thick.
Smoke Stacks.—Argentine battleships, 1½-inch nickel-steel; United States battleships are protected up to main deck by 6½-inch armor and 1½-inch splinter bulkheads.
Protective Decks.—Argentine battleships: Two—upper, 1½ inches; lower, 3 inches. United States battleships: Two—over magazines; one elsewhere. Thickness not available.
Turrets.—Argentine battleships: Front 12 inches; sides, 9 inches; back, 11 inches; top, 3 inches. United States battleships: Thickness not available, but substantially identical with Argentine.
Barbettes.—Argentine battleships, 9 inches; United States battleships, 11 inches.
Under-water Protection.—Argentine battleships: 1-inch nickel-steel bulkhead extending throughout the magazine and machinery spaces, and ¾-inch nickel-steel flats beneath the magazine and machinery spaces. United States battleships: 1⅜ inches longitudinal special treatment steel bulkhead in way of magazines. There is, in addition, a watertight longitudinal bulkhead covering the extent of the magazines and machinery spaces which does not exist on the Argentine ships.
Conning Towers.—Argentine battleships: Two—forward, 12 inches; aft, 9 inches. United States battleships: One, substantially identical in thickness.
It will be seen that the main belt armor on the Argentine ships is thicker than that on the United States battleships only for about 240 feet amidships and only above and slightly below the normal water-line, while the upper belt and casemate armor is thicker on the United States vessels. The turrets are substantially identical, and the United States barbettes are 2 inches thicker than the Argentine.
(d) More speed:
Argentine battleships are to be 22½ knots on trial. United States battleships are to be 20½ knots, but the speed of the former when fully loaded will be reduced to a greater extent than that of the latter, owing to the greater change in displacement between normal and full-load condition.
The Argentine ships, although drawing a foot less in normal condition than the United States vessels, draw about 4½ inches more when fully loaded.
(e) Greater radius of action:
The cruising radius of the Argentine battleships is to be 10,100 knots, at 11 knots speed on coal only, while that of the United States battleships is to be over 8000 knots on coal and oil, at a speed of 10 knots. This difference is obtained by the coal capacity of 4000 tons on the former as against 2500 tons on the latter, and an oil capacity of 660 tons as against 400 tons. The coal on the Argentine ships, however, is so stowed that the greater portion of this coal is difficult of access from the fire-rooms. It is doubtful whether there is actually as much coal readily available for use as in the case of the United States battleships.
(f) Fire control:
This is a matter of opinion. As a matter of fact, the arrangements on the United States ships were designed to suit the needs of the service as expressed by the sea-going officers, and it is to be assumed fulfill the requirements of the case.
(g) Cost:
Argentine battleships, complete, fully equipped for delivery, $10,665,300. United States battleships: The figure given in the Navy is $11,500,000 estimated. On this figure their criticism is based. This cost is evidently taken from a figure of $11,556,220 which was given in the testimony of the Secretary of the Navy before Congress. This figure was based on the estimated limit of cost for hull and machinery of $6,000,000. Taking the actual contract price for hull and machinery for the Wyoming, $4,450,000, and for the Arkansas, $4,675,000; this total cost would reduce to $10,006,220 for the Wyoming, or $10,231,220 for the Arkansas, as compared with the figure given for the Argentine ships.
In brief, reducing both ships to their full-load displacements, as these are directly comparable.
We find the Wyoming class to be 27,243 tons and the Argentine ships to be 30,200 tons. On this basis, we see that the United States ships, on 2957 tons less displacement and at less cost, have better protection, equal battery, equal or greater freeboard, less speed on trial, less radius of action. In other words, for greater displacement and cost, the Argentines obtain somewhat greater speed and greater radius of action, somewhat less protection and other qualities equal, which is about as it should be if the greater qualities obtained were the ones for which they wished to pay a greater price.
The “Florida” and “Utah.”—The battleship Florida was successfully launched from the Brooklyn navy yard May 12. She is a sister ship of the Utah, which was launched from the yards of the New York Shipbuilding Company on December 23, 1909.
The keel of the Florida was laid in March, 1909, and the construction has progressed without delay in a most satisfactory manner until at the time of her launching she was about 69 per cent completed. Her over all dimensions are 521 feet 6 inches length and 88 feet 3 inches breadth, with a mean draft of 28 feet 6 inches when carrying a full supply of ammunition and a two-thirds supply of fuel and stores. On this draft her displacement is 21,825 tons. She carries 2500 tons of coal and 400 of oil fuel at full load. The outward appearance of the Florida will resemble greatly that of the North Dakota, with two smokestacks, two lattice observation masts and five turrets, each with two 12-inch 45-caliber guns, mounted on the center-line of the ship.
The machinery installation of the Florida will consist of steam turbines and water-tube boilers, together with the usual auxiliary machinery. The turbine machinery will be of Parsons type, and will consist of ten turbine unite, on four shafts, and will be arranged in such a way that one high-pressure ahead turbine and one backing turbine (both independent of one another) will be placed on the outboard shafts, and the low-pressure ahead and backing turbines (in one casing), together with the high-pressure cruising turbine on the port side and the intermediate pressure-cruising turbine and a low-pressure ahead and backing turbine on the starboard side, will drive the inboard shafts. As in most of Parsons four-shaft arrangements the outboard turbines turn inboard and the inboard turbines turn outboard. The engine-room has a central fore-and-aft bulkhead dividing the engine power in two completely independent sections, each with complete sets of auxiliary machinery. The twelve Babcock & Wilcox boilers will be placed in three watertight independent compartments, each with a double fire-room.
The steam pressure at the boilers will be about 200 pounds, and 175 pounds at the throttle valve of the high-pressure turbines. As Parsons turbines do not operate advantageously with superheated steam, the boilers are not provided with superheaters.
When running full speed the revolutions per minute of the turbines will be about 330, and the horse-power developed about 28,000. It is understood the trial requirements of the Utah and Florida are to be similar to those laid down in the case of the North Dakota and Delaware, which had one 4-hour full-speed trial, one 24-hour endurance and coal consumption trial at 19 knots, and one 24-hour endurance and coal consumption trial at 12 knots. The maximum speed required of the Florida is 20¾ knots in a run of 4 hours.
Like the North Dakota and Delaware, the Utah and Florida carry ten 12-inch guns mounted in pairs in balanced turrets. The foremost pair of guns has an elevation of about 33 feet above the normal water-line. The second pair has a command of about 40 feet. The guns of turret number three have a command of about 32 feet, and those in numbers four and five of about 25 feet. All of the guns being mounted on the center-line, they can all be trained on either broadside. Dead ahead the Utah can fire four 12-inch guns, and the same number dead astern. This center-line disposition is probably the most effective that can be adopted.
The secondary battery consists of sixteen 50-caliber 5-inch guns. Eight of these are carried on the gun-deck within a central battery; four aft on the same deck; two in sponsons upon the main deck just abaft of the bridge, and another pair on the same deck well forward toward the bow. This gives a broadside of eight 5-inch and an end-on fire of four 5-inch ahead and astern.
The protection of the hull, both below and above water, and of the guns is exceptionally well worked out in these vessels, being in this respect an improvement even on the North Dakota herself, one of the best protected ships ever built. In the first place, with a view to limiting the destructive effects of a torpedo blow, particular attention has been paid to the question of cellular and compartmental subdivision. Even in the event of most serious underwater injury, such as might be done by a floating mine, the ship is able to concentrate on any compartment or set of compartments such a great capacity of pumps, that she would be able, by the aid of these alone, greatly to mitigate the effects of such a blow.
The armor plan of the Utah is probably the most complete and effective yet put upon any ship. The main belt, over 8 feet wide, has an average thickness amidship of 11 inches. Above this is a second belt 8 feet wide of an average thickness of 9 inches. The lower water-line belt is continuous from stem to stern, and the upper belt extends from the wake of the forward to the wake of the aftermost turret. The turrets of the 12-inch guns have from 12 to 8 inches of protection. The 5-inch secondary battery amidships is protected by 6½ inches of armor, and a similar thickness protects the casemates of the six guns at the bow and stern. Between each pair of 5-inch guns is a splinter bulkhead of 2-inch armor and back of each battery is a longitudinal wall of 3-inch armor, which closes in each 5-inch gun. To reach the base of the smokestacks any shell would have to pass through 9½ inches of armor—a superb protection.
The ship is provided with two of the new lattice-work fire-control masts. The handling of the boats is done by two boat cranes olaced abreast of each other, one on either side of the after smokestack. In this ship, as in all United States Dreadnoughts, the officers are berthed on the main deck forward below the forecastle deck, the crew accommodation being aft. This places the officers near the bridge and conveniently to their post of duty.—Royal United Service Institution.
“Wyoming” and “Arkansas.”—The plans and specifications for battleships, No. 32, Wyoming, and No. 33, Arkansas, authorized by act of Congress, approved March 3, 1909, were completed and circular signed by the Secretary of the Navy, June 14, 1909, and issued to the bidders upon request thereafter.
The general dimensions and features of each vessel are as follows: Length on load water-line, 554 feet; breadth, extreme, at load water-line, 93 feet 2⅝ inches; mean trial displacement, 26,000 tons; mean draft to bottom of keel at trial displacement (about), 28 feet 6 inches; total coal bunker capacity (about), 2500 tons; coal and fuel oil carried on trial,1993 tons; feed water carried on trial, 187 tons; speed on trial, not less than 20½ knots. Armament: main battery, twelve 12-inch 50-caliber breech loading rifles, two submerged torpedo-tubes; second battery, twenty-one 5-inch rapid-fire guns, four 3-pounder saluting guns, two 1-pounder semiautomatic guns for boats; two 3-inch field pieces, two machine guns, 30 caliber.
Bids for the construction of the above vessels were opened at the department, August 18, 1909, and the contracts awarded on September 13, 1909, the Wyoming to the Wm. Cramp & Sons Ship and Engine Building Company, of Philadelphia, Pa., at a price of $4,450,000, and the Arkansas to the New York Ship Building Company, of Camden, N. J., at a price of $4,675,000, both to have the department’s design of machinery installed.
The vessels are to be completed on or before the expiration of thirty-two months from the date of signing the contract. The contract for the Wyoming was signed October 14, 1909, and for the Arkansas September 25, 1909.
The percentage of degree of completion of the hull on August 1, 1910, was 32.3 per cent for the Wyoming and 39.5 per cent for the Aransas.—Army and Navy Register.
ORDNANCE AND GUNNERY. TORPEDOES.
British Battle Practice, 1909.—The result of the battle practice of the fleet in 1909 has been issued as a Parliamentary Paper (Cd. 5089). The Admiralty have issued the same document from the Gunnery Branch (No. 470). In a prefatory note the Admiralty state that the conditions of practice differed little from those of 1908, and that it is satisfactory to note the improvements in the results obtained. The following is an abstract of the results:
Fleet. Ships. Guns. Average Points. First ship. Score.
China 5 70 348.68 King Alfred. 510.4
1st Division Home Fleet and 1st Cruiser Squadron 13 154 293.63 Boadicea 541.66
Mediterranean and 6th Cruiser Squadron 13 181 195.56 Conopus 459.82
3d Division Home Fleet 13 174 187.5 Sutlej 443.75
2d Division Home Fleet and 2d Cruiser Squadron 14 212 176.76 Warrior 320.31
Atlantic and 5th Cruiser Squadron 10 145 142.17 Argyll 401.78
Ships inside range 4 47 289.41
Total, 1909 72 983 216.78
Total, 1908 63 890 203.44
British Gunlayers’ Test, 1909.—The Admiralty recently issued the result of the test of gunlayers with heavy guns in the fleet during 1909. (Admiralty Gunnery Branch, No. 467.)
Their lordships in a note to the document express their satisfaction that the standard of shooting which was attained in 1908, and which was in advance of that of former years, has been maintained, with the result that the usual tabular statement is given showing the general improvement in marksmanship since the year 1900, and bringing out the circumstance that in 1905 an excess of hits over misses was first recorded with the old pattern target. An excess of misses over hits was registered in 1907 when the new target came into use but hits outnumbered misses in the following year, and the excess of hits was larger again in 1909.
1900. 1901. 1902. 1903. 1904. 1905. 1906. 1907. 1908. 1909.
Number of ships that fired 121 127 139 134 108 100 89 121 117 116
Number of guns or turrets 1,031 1,137 1,241 1,296 1,171 1,096 1,073 1,365 1,277 1,312
Number of hits 1906 target— 2,732 3,562 4,789 5,996 5,748 4,374 5,733 7,447 …. ….
1907 “ …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. 4,073 4,826 5,108
Number of misses. 1906 “ … 5,709 6,244 6,883 7,028 7,664 3,357 2,328 1,991 …. ….
1907 “ …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. 5,465 4,183 4,330
Excess of hits over misses 1906 “ …. Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 1,017 3,405 5,556 …. ….
1907 “ …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. Nil 643 778
Excess of misses over hits 1906 “ …. 2,977 2,682 2,074 1,032 1,916 Nil Nil Nil …. ….
1907 “ …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. 1,392 Nil Nil
Percentage of hits to rounds fired 1906 “ …. 32.3 36.3 41.1 46.04 42.86 56.58 71.12 79.13 …. ….
1907 “ …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. 42.70 53.57 54.12
Hits per gun per minute:
12-inch and 10 inch 1906 target— .30 .33 .38 .53 .47 .58 .81 .61 …. ….
1907 “ …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. .40 .56 .63
9.2-inch 1900 “ …. .22 .31 .35 .70 .73 1.40 2.84 3.25 …. ….
1907 “ …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. 2.01 2.20 1.94
7.5-inch 1906 “ …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. 3.48 …. …
1907 “ …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. 1.58 2.51 2.47
6-inch B. L. and Q. F. 1906 “ …. 1.51 1.81 2.41 2.63 2.63 4.14 5.68 5.93 …. ….
1907 “ …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. 3.32 3.98 4.03
4.7-inch Q. F..and 4-inch B. L. and Q. F 1906 “ …. 1.60 1.93 2.02 2.47 2.28 3.73 4.96 5.73 …. ….
1907 “ …. …. …. …. …. …. …. …. 2.38 3.32 4.06
Number of ships from whom no returns were received 29 47 19 30 43 Nil Nil 3 8 10
ABSTRACT, 1909.
Order of Merit. Fleet or Squadron. No. of Ships. No. of Men Firing. Points per Gun or Turret. First Ship in Fleet. Scores.
1 China 5 64 68.691 King Alfred 79.21
2 Home Fleet, Third Division and Third Cruiser Squadron 26 291 49.872 Illustrious 04.27
3 Home Fleet, Second Division and Second Cruiser Squadron 15 208 48.613 NATAL 89.44
4 Atlantic Fleet and Fifth Cruiser Squadron 12 170 47.182 Albemarle 65.36
5 Mediterranean Fleet and Sixth Cruiser Squadron 14 186 43.810 Medea 61.34
6 Cape of Good Hope 3 29 41.984 Hermes 48.65
7 Australia 7 72 40.912 Encounter 62.06
8 Special Service. Tenders, etc 13 63 40.702 Bramble 62.37
9 Home Fleet, First Division and First Cruiser Squadron 16 186 37.188 Superb 71.21
Temeraire
10 Fourth Cruiser Squadron 3 24 33.554 Scylla 38.72
11 East Indies 2 19 31.720 Hyacinth 44.48
Total, 1909 Test 116 1,312 46.098
Total, 1908 Test 117 1,277 45.775
Note.—The 4-inch guns of the Bellcrophon and Invincible classes are not included in this abstract.
LIGHT QUICK-FIRING GUN TEST.—The result of the test of the gunlayers with light quick-firing guns is prefaced by an abstract of the firing for five years, from which it is seen that the percentage of hits to rounds fired was: in 1906, 34.53; in 1907, 42.08; in 1908, 47.28; and last year, 50.13, thus showing satisfactory progress. The rate of accurate firing also shows improvement with all calibers of guns.
1905. 1906. 1907. 1908. 1909.
Number of Ships that fired 86 89 122 111 104
Number of Guns 1,118 1,421 1,898 1,384 1,407
Number of Hits 1,228 4,666 7,462 6,120 7,157
Number of Misses 8,291 8,845 10,272 6,823 4,119
Percentage of Hits to Rounds fired 21.63 34.53 42.08 47.28 50.13
Hits per gun per Minute :
12-pounders 2.12 3.417 4.471 5.319 6.005
6-and 3- pounders (except Vickers) 1.97 3.358 3.640 4.507 4.191
3-pounders, Vickers …. 8.144 6.140 6.069 7.810
12-POUNDER GUNS.
Abstract, 1909.
Order of Merit. Fleet or Squadron. No.of Ships. No. of Men Firing. Hits per Minute. Best Ship in Fleet. Hits per Minute.
1 CHINA 4 36 9.182 Kent 11.32
2 Home Fleet, Third Division and Third Cruiser Squadron 12 132 7.485 SENTINEL 13.73
3 Home Fleet, First Division and First Cruiser Squadron 11 161 6.513 Minotaur 10.43
4 Home Fleet, Second Division and Second Cruiser Squadron 11 136 6.225 Forward 8.65
5 Mediterranean and Sixth Cruiser Squadron 12 137 5.152 Exmouth 7.53
6 Special Service, Tenders, etc. 6 38 4.995 Britomart 6.55
7 Atlantic and Fifth Cruiser Squadron 7 84 4.468 Arrogant 6.44
8 Australia 3 31 4.293 Encounter 6.55
9 Cape of Good Hope 1 8 3.409 Hermes 3.41
10 East Indies 1 8 2.455 Hyacinth 2.45
Total, 1909 68 771 6.005
Total, 1908 76 863 4.471
6- AND 3-POUNDER GUNS (EXCEPT 3-POUNDER Q. F. VICKERS).
1 Home Fleet, Third Division and Third Cruiser Squadron 18 96 5.069 HECLA 12.00
2 China 5 22 5.008 Bedford 8.36
3 Mediterranean Fleet and Sixth Cruiser Squadron 12 58 4.834 Duncan 7.27
4 Detached duty 1 10 4.691 Flora 4.69
5 Atlantic Fleet and Fifth Cruiser Squadron 8 63 4.519 Argyll 7.12
6 Home Fleet, Second Division and Second Cruiser Squadron 2 16 4.437 Sapphire 4.50
7 Australia 5 44 4.116 Challenger 6.91
8 Home Fleet, First Division and First Cruiser Squadron 6 40 3.900 Bulwark 6.18
9 Special Service, Tenders,etc. 8 30 3.164 Clio 6.00
10 Fourth Cruiser Squadron 2 18 1.879 Indefatigable 2.06
11 Cape of Good Hope 1 9 1.576 Forte 1.58
12 East Indies 2 8 1.558 Proserpine 2.18
Total, 1909 70 414 4.193
Total, 1908 86 521 4.507
NOTE.—Ships IN capitals fired under special conditions for nucleus crew vessels.
Light Quick-Firing Gun Test and Destroyer Battle Practice.—The Admiralty issued recently two further returns in connection with the gunnery practices carried out in the fleet during 1909. One of these returns gives the result of the test of gunlayers with light quick-firing guns (Admiralty Gunnery Branch No. 468) ; the other the result of battle practice from torpedo-boat destroyers (Admiralty Gunnery Branch No. 469). To each document is appended a prefatory note, in which the Lords of the Admiralty express their satisfaction at the improvement in the results as compared with those obtained in former years.
Destroyer Battle Practice.—A tabular statement prefixed to this return shows that whereas 139 vessels fired 6972 rounds in 1908 and made 4066 hits, 149 vessels fired 7896 rounds in 1909 and made 5130 hits. The percentage of hits to rounds fired was thus raised from 58.32 in 1908 to 64.97 in 1909. In the abstract of firing, the home fleet third destroyer flotilla stands first in order of merit; the first destroyer flotilla of the same fleet second; and the Mediterranean destroyer flotilla third.
A new world’s record has been established by the marines’ turret’s crew of the Temeraire for 12-inch guns. During the gunlayers’ tests of the home fleet recently Y turret fired eight rounds and obtained seven hits in 1 minute 21 seconds. The target was 18 feet square, and the range more than 2000 yards. The result of the firing with the 12-inch guns for the five turrets was 37 rounds, 29.5 hits. Admiral Sir W. May (the commander-in-chief of the home fleet) had the ship’s company mustered on the quarter-deck, and congratulated the gunners on their remarkable shooting.—United Service Gazette.
The Question of Fire Control.—The question of fire control in British armored ships is one that continues to exercise the brains and test the ingenuity alike, of our naval constructors and gunnery experts. The Americans sought to solve the problem of keeping fire-control instruments, and the officers who use them, at the necessary altitude to give them a large field of view, by introducing trellis-work masts. These masts, they argued, could not be shot away by one shell, nor could the fire-control platform be destroyed by one projectile, as was the case in the Hero experiments a couple of years ago; as part of the trellis work could be destroyed without bringing the control platform down by the run. But trellis-work masts have been found in practice to cause such a vibration on the platform at their heads, that to control gun-fire by instruments in such a position is impracticable. What is required, and what is being steadily evolved by our own gunnery specialists, is a system of controlling gun-fire from behind the ordinary armor of the ship, so that nothing short of the sinking of the vessel will deprive the gun-layers of the assistance they derive, by prompting, when firing at long distances. At moderate distances the gunlayers can direct their own fire by means of their telescopes, since they can see exactly where their shots are pitching, or hitting. Considerable success has been achieved towards the end of establishing control towers in foreign ships; but these are exposed to hostile gun-fire as a special mark; and to go lower still is the aim of our own authorities.—United Serzice Gazette.
An interesting account of the recent quarterly gun practice of the First squadron of the French Navy appears in The Moniteur de la Flotte. Battle practice was carried out in the Bay of Hyères, three large targets of regulation size being moored end to end, while the ships of the squadron steamed past them and back again at ranges varying between 5000 and 7600 meters. The ships were disposed in pairs and fired broadsides alternately, the whole period occupied being six minutes. In all, five pairs of ships took part in the practice, and although the targets were fixed, the courses steered were not made known to the gunnery officers directing the fire. The pair that made the best shooting under these conditions were the battleships Democratie and Verité, securing 20 per cent of hits at the first broadside and 29 per cent at the second. At one period, it is stated, the two ships together secured 11 hits in 90 seconds, and at a range of 6000 meters. The Democratie, it may be remembered, beat all French records for shooting last year. Her captain and the captain of the Verité were congratulated by the Minister of Marine, who witnessed the practice. We learn, further, that practice with the smaller guns was carried out at night, the ships firing singly at two skeleton targets at ranges varying between 800 and 2000 meters, and the vessels steaming at 14 knots. The percentage of hits varied between 2 and 10 per cent, these poor results being attributed to the defective lighting of the targets.
No details are given as to the practice of the Second squadron, composed of older ships, except the statement that many of the shells burst prematurely. Since there were no accidents in this squadron it may be assumed that the fuzes were defective. In the First squadron serious defects developed in the guns and turrets of the Justice and Patrie, for we learn that five of the former’s 19-centimeter guns were “ more or less disabled,” and one turret of the Patrie was put out of action by defects in the sighting gear. The damage to the guns of the Justice took a week to repair. On board the Verité a gunnery quartermaster was injured by back-fire, but there were no other casualties. These details are valuable, and may be accepted as having been officially inspired. The daylight battle practice of the First squadron was remarkably accurate as regards the two best ships, but details are lacking concerning the shooting of the other four pairs.—Naval and Military Record.
THE BIG GUN.—There can be no possible doubt that at the present moment the gun is ahead of armor. There has been no marked advance in the manufacture of armor-plate for a good many years, while the perforating power of guns of large caliber has increased very sensibly. And, in the experiments with the Jéna in 1909, firings at real fighting ranges demonstrated the exactitude of the figures that had been deduced from short-range firings at proving grounds. It is even known that the results obtained on that occasion surpassed expectations.
These facts have naturally led most navies to increase the thickness of the armor-belts on the latest ships they have laid down, a movement directly opposite to that which manifested itself a few years ago. Thus in England, after the Lord Nelson with 12-inch belt, the Dreadnought with 10.75 inches and the Saint Vincent class with 10 inches, they have gone back to 10.75 inches for the Neptune class and to 12 inches for the Orion. The Germans, from 9 inches on the Braunschweigs, pass to 9.4 inches on the Deutschlands, to 11 inches on the Nassaus and to 12 inches on the Helgolands. The Americans put 9 inches on the ldahos, 10 inches on the Michigans, 10.6 inches on the Delaware class and 11 inches on the Wyoming and Arkansas. In Italy, in Japan, development, though perhaps less pronounced, is in the same direction. France has followed the same road by going to 10.6 inches on the Courbet and Jean Bart, as on the Patrie class, after the 10 inches of the Dantons.
But impressive as these figures are, to appreciate their true value we must consider the actual perforating power of our 12-inch gun, model 1902: with oblique impact (18° angle of incidence) the new heavy projectile (970 pounds) will go through 18.5 inches of steel at 4000 meters, 16.1 inches at 6000 meters and as much as 14.2 inches at 8000 meters.
And this, be it understood, armor of the best quality, of which the resistance to penetration is about the same whether it comes from Krupps, from Vickers, from Bethlehem or from French armor-maker’s works. So, too, the power of the guns of different nations is not sensibly different. And besides, it is to be remarked, the figures of perforation given above refer to a model of gun already outclassed, both in France and elsewhere—the Danton’s guns, and especially those of the Jean Bart, would be still more effective.
It would appear, therefore, that we are very far from being able to give complete protection against gun-fire to the water-lines of battleships, either by sufficiently increasing the thickness of their belts (which would require a great increase of size), or by improvements in the manufacture of armor (an improvement that would have to be immense to be really efficacious).
Yet it is at this moment when the superiority of the gun seems so well assured, and for a long time to come, that on all sides there is question of adopting for the batteries of future ships a caliber greater than 12 inches. A 13.5-inch gun is talked of in England, a 14-inch in the United States, and even a 16-inch in Italy. Germany, that has but just, and not without regrets, given up the 11-inch gun that till now has been her largest, already thinks of advancing a step further; and it is known that our Superior Council, at its last session, called for the study, by the technical services of the artillery, of a type gun of 13.5 inches, with a view to its use on ships to be laid down next year.
We will neglect other points of view and consider here only the effect upon the military value of an isolated ship of increasing the caliber of her main battery guns.
We have seen that the perforating power of the 12-inch shell is superabundant. That of a similar 13.5-inch shell would be, uselessly,’ greater still. But without increase of this quality a gain of explosive power could be realized by increase of the bursting charge. The effects produced behind armor would, therefore, be greater. That is true, and it is even doubtless one of the best arguments that can be made in favor of the larger caliber, yet it is worth noting, first, that this increase of explosive power could be obtained right now with the 12-inch projectile by slightly thinning its walls, while still keeping sufficient strength for perforation. But the necessity of this increase, or even its utility, are not demonstrated. In the experiments with the Jena, in fact, the careful observations made after each shot showed the importance of the damages caused by shell bursting behind the armor. And these results were obtained with shell with bursting charges not exceeding 3 per cent of their weight. There is, therefore, no apparent object in carrying more explosive through armor.
Would the chances of hitting be increased?
Purely from the ballistic point of view, these chances depend on the velocity of the projectile, and we may say at once that the initial velocity would not be increased. But on account of its greater weight, the larger projectile would retain its velocity better, and the danger space would consequently be increased. Therefore, the effect of an error in the range would be lessened, and in the approach of two adversaries there would be less frequent need of changing the sight elevation. This advantage would be especially appreciable at very great ranges, beyond 8000 meters, where the danger space might increase from 400 to 450 or perhaps 500 meters. Only, 8000 meters is a distance at which range-finders as they now exist, perfected though they have been in recent years, give but very uncertain results; the errors of measurement exceed not only the gain of danger space, but, if atmospheric conditions are not favorable, even the whole extent of this danger space. Perfect range-finders—which we may have some day, but which are not yet in sight—would be needed to give this advantage any practical value.
It may be said, it is true, that its importance might be increased by adopting higher initial velocities. But for that it would be necessary to accept an increase of the powder pressure and a lengthening of the bore. This would bring about, first, perhaps insurmountable difficulties of manufacture, and then risk of erosions that would sensibly diminish the lifetime of the guns. As a matter of fact, it seems likely that the principal object sought in England in adopting a 13.5-inch gun is precisely to diminish this erosion by keeping a charge of the same weight as that of the 12-inch, that is by diminishing the pressure. The Admiralty is disturbed, and not without reason, at the rapid wear caused by their nitro-glycerine powder. In France, where, alone of all navies, we have been able for three years past to use full charges in all our target practices, experience teaches us that there need be no fear on that score.
Compared with the doubtful advantages that we have just considered, the disadvantages of the greater caliber are numerous and evident.
The guns are heavier, the turrets must also be so, and likewise all the apparatus required to operate them. Whence, on a ship of given displacement, diminution of the number of guns (eight 14.5-inch, or ten 13.5-inch, in place of twelve 12-inch), or, if the same number of guns is kept, a considerable augmentation of size and cost. To say nothing of the very serious technical difficulties that will be encountered in the working out of double turrets for 13.5-inch or 14.5-inch guns and their installations.
The projectiles are heavier (970 pounds for the 12-inch, 1366 pounds for the 13.5-inch, 1763 pounds for the 14.5-inch). Whence, diminution of rapidity of fire and consequently inferiority to the 12-inch gun is so far as fire intensity is concerned; whence also greater difficulty of fire control on account of the less number of points of fall; whence, finally, probable impossibility of hand working the ammunition hoists in case of damage to the mechanical appliances.
None of these faults is to be despised. They doubtless are what makes the naval authorities of all countries hesitate. For in reality it appears that no nation has yet adopted for its new ships a caliber greater than twelve inches.*
If, however, one of them decides to do so, ought we follow suit? We do not think so.
In the actual state of the science, the 12-inch gun is more than a match for any resistance that can be opposed to it, and that too at the extreme ranges at which opening fire seems possible under favorable conditions. Even if the clearness of the atmosphere and the perfection of range-finders permit firing from still further off, at 11,000 or 12,000 meters for example, the advantages of the 13.5-inch gun, or a still bigger gun, do not appear to us sufficient to balance their disadvantages. For an equal number of guns, it does not seem to us that a battleship armed with 12-inch should be inferior to one armed with 13.5-inch guns, and it will cost less, which is a matter of importance. Let us hope that our navy will not initiate a change the benefits of which are more than doubtful, and that we shall even be able to resist the temptation of imitating what foreign nations may do in this direction.—Henri Bernay, in Le Yacht. (Translated by P. R. A.)
A New Howitzer Shell.—For several years past the artillery authorities of the French and German armies have been experimenting with a view to obtaining a “ universal ” artillery projectile, which shall be effective both as a shrapnel and a high explosive shell. The Germans have been the first to realize this ideal by the introduction of a universal shell for their 4.2-inch field howitzer equipment. This shell is of the type patented by Messrs. Ehrhardt, and is, in effect, a shrapnel with a high explosive burster of picric acid in the head. It has the ordinary arrangement of bullets and diaphragm, with a driving charge in the base, but the bullets are packed in trinitrotoluol instead of resin. When the shell is burst in air by the time fuse, the flash from the fuse is led through a channel containing perforated pellets of compressed powder. This channel passes round the high explosive burster, without communicating with it, and leads the flash to the central tube communicating with the black powder charge in the base of the shell. The bullets are then blown out in the ordinary manner, except that the trinitrotoluol among them takes fire and burns without exploding, producing a cloud of smoke which increases the visibility of the burst. The head with the high explosive charge is blown off, and flies forward, bursting on striking the ground.
When the fuse is set to burst the shell on percussion, then the percussion part of the fuse acts upon impact, and the flash from the cap passes to a primer of fulminate, which detonates an exploder of gun-cotton powder, which, in turn, detonates the main picric acid charge. The intention is that the detonation shall also be communicated to the trinitrotoluol among the bullets. But it would appear that this cannot be reckoned on with certainty unless the shell strikes on rock or hard ground. However, even if the picric acid alone detonates, the effect is to burst the shell violently, blowing the bullets and fragments in all directions, even to the rear, so as to take in reverse men behind gun-shields or parapets. When burst in this manner the shell explodes instantly on impact, producing only a small crater, and giving little breaching effect. When it is desired to attack casemates or to breach parapets, the fuse is set before firing to “ delay action.” By moving an index on the head of the fuse, the flash from the percussion part of the fuse is diverted to a channel in which a short column of compressed powder is interposed, so as to give a delay of a quarter of a second before the flash reaches the fulminate and detonates the burster. This enables the shell to bury itself before bursting; the man-killing effect is then insignificant, as the splinters remain in the hole, but the mine effect is very powerful.
The universal howitzer shell contains 38 per cent of bullets as against 50 per cent for ordinary shrapnel. It is thus less efficient when burst in air. It has, however, this advantage, that the trajectory can be corrected by observing the fall of the head, which explodes when it strikes the ground. But the great advantage of the new projectile is that it renders a greater number of shell available for any particular nature of fire, since it is efficient against any target, and especially against shielded guns.—The Engineer.
Race Between Gun and Armor.—We are once more reminded that finality is as far off as ever in the production of guns and armor, by the fact that scarcely have the praises of a new and more powerful gun for our battleships been sung, than we hear of a process for the further hardening and rendering more effective the armor plates that clothe the sides of these mammouth sea fabrics. Thus the eternal race between gun and armor continues as vigorously as ever. The 13.5-inch guns which have recently passed some very severe tests successfully, will in all probability be introduced into those of our battleships whose keels have just been laid as part of last year’s program. In passing, it may be mentioned that the Germans, who have stuck so tenaciously to the 11-inch gun as the primary weapon of their battleships, also have a 13.5-inch naval gun under trial at Essen, so that our rivals are treading close upon our heels in gun production. Happily the new process for further hardening armor plates is the discovery of a Britisher, and the Admiralty are said to have secured the patent and are arranging a series of severe tests for plates produced by the firm who hold the secret. The introduction of improved armor will have far-searching effect, but it can hardly be hoped, in view of the mad race for huge dimensions, that better armor will lessen the displacement of ships designed to fight in our first line.—United Service Gazette.
A Superbly Clothed Battleship.—In view of the discovery of a better process of hardening armor plates in this country, and the patent of which has been secured by the Admiralty, it is interesting to note that special attention is at the moment being paid to the protection of the sides and vitals of American warships of the latest design. Taking the armor plan of a battleship of the United States Navy which will shortly join the fighting line, we find that the Utah has a screen of armor which is probably one of the most complete and effective of any protection yet given to a warship the world over. There is, to begin with, a main belt of plates with an average thickness amidships of 11 inches, and which is over eight feet wide. Above this is a second belt eight feet wide, which has nine inches as an average thickness. The water-line belt extends from stem to stern, and the upper belt runs from the wake of the aftermost to the wake of the foremost 12-inch turrets. The turrets of the primary guns have a protection ranging from twelve inches to eight inches of the latest armor; while the battery containing a portion of the secondary armament of 5-inch guns is protected by armor plates six and a half inches thick, and similar plates protect the 5-inch guns at the bow and stern. The Utah also has a splinter screen of two inches of armor between her 5-inch guns in their batteries, and a longitudinal wall of 3-inch armor which closes in each 5-inch gun. There is thus nine and a half inches of armor to penetrate before a projectile could reach the base of her smokestacks.—United Service Gazette.
New Type of Siege Ordnance.—To destroy modern permanent fortifications it is necessary to use a heavy shell containing a large charge of high explosive. This is usually fired from a 7-inch or 8-inch howitzer weighing some 5 tons, with mounting, which requires a concrete platform taking a month to construct. Messrs. Krupp have recently brought out a siege howitzer weighing only 2 cwt. with bed, yet capable of firing a shell of 185 pounds. The shell is not loaded into the howitzer, but is placed on the muzzle and propelled by a rod which projects from the shell and passes down the bore. The howitzer itself presents no special points of interest; it is a muzzle-loader of 2.2-inch caliber mounted on a bed which can be transported on wheels. The novelty lies in the projectile, which is shown in the annexed illustration. This is a thin sphere of steel, 15 inches in diameter, filled with high explosive, and traversed by a central tube o, threaded in front to take the fuse b, and open in rear to take the propelling rod c. This is of hollow steel, with a shoulder abutting against the base of the shell. The front portion fits loosely in the central tube of the shell, and the rear portion is enlarged at d to fit the bore of the howitzer. The cast-iron cup e is a loose fit on the rod, and is recessed to fit over the muzzle of the howitzer. On discharge the whole projectile is propelled forward until the enlargement d meets the cup e; this checks the forward velocity of the rod, which drops out of the shell, leaving the latter to fly forward alone.
With a charge of 6 ounces smokeless powder the 185-pound shell carries 400 yards at 430 elevation. To reduce the range the howitzer is further elevated, the carriage permitting of elevation up to 80°. It is stated that very satisfactory accuracy is obtained, the howitzer projectile mean lateral error at 400 yards being only 9.35 yards, and the mean error in range 4.72 yards. The muzzle velocity is 197 foot-seconds.—The Engineer.
Aerial Torpedoes.—The Unge torpedo, intended for the destruction of balloons, has acquired an increased importance since Messrs. Krupp have bought up the patent rights. The new projectile is an improved version of Hal’s war rocket, once used in the British Army. Its special advantage for firing at balloons lies in the fact that its trajectory is clearly visible by night or by day, enabling the aim to be readily corrected. The inventor’s efforts have been directed towards the improvement of the accuracy of the rocket, which used to be a very variable quantity. The rocket is fired from a light-rifled gun, which gives it an initial rotation; this is maintained by the powder gases, produced by the burning of the composition, which escape through helical channels. The latter are connected to a central reservoir, the effect of which is to equalize the pressure of the gases. A tapering hole is made down the center of the composition, the diameter of which is so regulated that the composition near the base burns away first. The composition consists of different grades of powder inserted in successive layers, so that it burns faster as the rocket gathers speed, and as the air-pressure behind it is reduced. The head of the rocket is a high explosive shell, with a sensitive fuze designed to act on touching the envelope of a balloon. The whole torpedo weighs 40 pounds if made of the smallest size proposed, namely, 4 inches in diameter, and the gun from which it is fired weighs 140 pounds complete. A dirigible like the new German M III, can carry twelve of these torpedoes, with the gun, in addition to its crew, and this armament would render it a formidable antagonist to any other war balloon.—Army and Navy Gazette.
MISCELLANEOUS.
Admiralty Critics.—A very remarkable paper has been read before the National Defence Association by Rear-Admiral Bacon, which is included in the current issue of National Defence. The paper was entitled “ The Most Pressing Requirement of the Navy,” and the danger upon which Admiral Bacon dwelt was irresponsible criticism of the Board of Admiralty and the effects of such critcism upon naval efficiency. “ Do we really believe,” he writes, “ that any critics outside the Board of Admiralty can possibly have the same wide grasp of the requirements of the navy as that possessed by the departments at the Admiralty….. ” It might appear from this that Admiral Bacon sees danger in all criticism of the Board; but he adds, as though conscious of the futility of that attitude: “ Let us have criticism by all means, but let the critic remember that, although he may want more battleships than the Admiralty consider necessary, the Board can still be honest, and even perhaps he himself may be wrong….. ” Or, similarly, if the critic desires more destroyers or cruisers, he is invited to remember that the Admiralty are not traitors should they happen to hold other views as to the uses to which such vessels should be put. Or, again, those critics who want a naval war staff, modelled on German and military lines, may still be invited to consider that such an organization may be radically unsound and unsuited to “ the changes and chances of sea requirements.” The pitfalls to which the outside critic is liable are many, but perhaps, as Admiralt Bacon contends, the deepest of all is his liability to take a narrow instead of a broad view of any given case. The point is well put and worth quoting:
“ I could perfectly well advance to-night more than one indictment against the Admiralty. Without apparently departing from the truth, I could argue that the Admiralty has been guilty of indifference to the best interests of the service, and my statements might be difficult to explain away. But, knowing the whole truth of the case as I do, my statement would really be an untruth, and my argument wickedly false.”
Every officer who has held high responsibility in any branch of the public service will recognize the broad truth of the above dictum. The expert in a position of responsibility must of necessity know far more than any outside critic, and be able—if a man of intelligence—to take the broader view. We are all agreed as to the peril of dragging the navy and its organization into the party arena, and doubtless the average Englishman does try to avoid that evil. But the danger of criticism does not end there, for, as Admiral Bacon writes: “ The gratuitous assumption of incompetence, neglect and cowardice, and the attribution of personal motives conflicting with public duty—these are the evil insinuations which are at times scattered broadcast, and which tend to destroy confidence and shake discipline.” The critic who aspires to be useful instead of mischievous must thus avoid the pitfall of fixing upon some isolated detail without regard to to its perspective in the picture of the navy as a whole. A distinguished admiral once expressed his astonishment to Admiral Bacon at the fact that most officers who went to the Admiralty appeared to recant their previous convictions—even to relapse into unaccountable lethargy. This apparent tendency had also surprised Admiral Bacon until he served under the Board. He then discovered that the whole expanse of the navy had to be surveyed instead of isolated details….. “ and matters which from immature knowledge appeared so simple and obvious were found to be far more doubtful and complex when viewed in the light of ascertained facts.” It is here, of course, that irresponsible critics appear to take the Board at a disadvantage. Their knowledge is limited, their field of vision restricted; they do not perceive the complexities to which Admiral Bacon alludes. Thus, “ the critic may call loudly for the fires of heaven to descend on the Board for building four large ships instead of five; but does it ever enter his head how impossible it is to show that sixty-five large ships and not sixty-four are a vital necessity to the safety of the empire.” As to that example, it may be retorted that the Admiralty, in declining to ask for four big ships instead of five or six, are liable to be influenced by the parsimony of the Cabinet, whereas the critics and the press may possibly take the wider view. Admiral Bacon ignores the political pressure against which the Sea Lords have often had to contend. He ignores the adaption of building programs, manning requirements, etc., to political exigencies. So, it may happen that the critics can help the Board by calling public attention to this or that weakness in the provision for shipbuilding, manning or other matters.
As a result of excessive and irresponsible criticism, says Admiral Bacon, the country is mystified, and the opinion is formed by the public that our navy cannot safely fight unless it enjoys a two-to-one superiority, at least. No doubt many naval officers are thus influenced, but Admiral Bacon contends that the naval officer has only a right to demand that his force in action shall be equal to that of the enemy. The function of the Admiralty, we are told, is to ensure that these conditions of equality in action can be fulfilled—allowing a proper margin for unforeseen contingencies. Any strength beyond this, says Admiral Bacon, is a matter of national insurance which the country may insist upon if it so pleases. He tells us that Boards of Admiralty are generally very willing to build the surplus ships, and to maintain the surplus crews, when the country demands that form of insurance. On the other hand, it is unreasonable to expect any Board of Admiralty to press the Cabinet for such surpluses, and this form of unreasonableness is often displayed by the critics. Of this we had repeated examples during Lord Fisher’s last three years at Whitehall, many of the critics crying aloud for his expulsion from office, simply because Sir John and his colleagues were satisfied with the margin of our relative strength, judged from the strictly professional standpoint. The mischievous effects of those organized attacks upon Lord Fisher are a matter of common knowledge. The Administration of the navy is still being carried on upon the same broad principles now that Sir A. K. Wilson has replaced Lord Fisher as chief adviser to the First Lord, and it is highly significant that the screams and lamentations of the critics have died away, although there is no change of policy.
In the discussion following the reading of the paper under consideration, Sir Gerard Noel agreed that “ the one requirement of the navy was that it should be let alone, now that we had the right men at the Admiralty.” He also deprecated the reduction policy of 1904, which alone, in his view, had rendered the present ruinous German competition possible. Sir Gerard Noel is a distinguished officer, and entitled to his opinions, but he certainly missed the whole point of Admiral Bacon’s paper in saying that the navy could be let alone “ now that we had the right men at the Admiralty.” The real point of the paper we have endeavored to show is, that the country should at all times repose due confidence in the Board of Admiralty, and credit the members of the Board with a high sense of public duty and responsibility. “ What matters this or that detail of education or any other reform compared with the mighty strength which belief in the admiralty and the navy will inspire in the country in war-time? What matters one or two battleships, or any other craft, compared with discipline?” There is sound good sense here, although Admiral Bacon has underrated the value of really impartial criticism.—Naval and Military Record.
GETTING THE BEST RESULTS FROM MEN.—The Japanese have a saying, which, like many Japanese things, is doubtless of exceeding antiquity, that “ to get the best results from men, overlook little faults in them.”
Maxims such as this throw light on human nature, opening up a vast deal of matter well worth sober reflection. The complexities and the ever-differing phases it presents to us are bewildering. Most of our “big men ” will unreservedly admit that their success is attributable in great measure to an understanding of their fellow-men, especially of those whose behavior they control to a greater or less extent.
When we engage the services of a “ human machine,” we always have certain duties laid out which the newcomer is expected to undertake, and we try to get the best man for the place. Having engaged him, we set him to work and anxiously watch results. Has he ordinary or exceptional intelligence? Is he energetic, careful, calm under trying circumstances? In short, has he the right sort of stuff in him? If not, we look elsewhere.
Now, when we purchase a machine tool and find it slightly unfitted for requirements, we can usually make a change in construction, which will correct the difficulty. We do not find it necessary to “overlook little faults” in it. Why? Because the machine tool is never supersensitive; it is never obstinate, perverse, discouraged.
If the human machine could be controlled by the set rules that govern machine-tool operation, the world would be a much different place. Now, we must have our expensive Government, our expensive business organizations. All because we can’t tell this minute what half the people are going to do the next.
Of all costs, labor cost is usually greatest; moreover, the greater part of the running expenses of most businesses is the supervising expense. Good money is paid to some people to see that other people do their allotted tasks correctly. Consequently, the supervising expense should command gravest consideration when conducting a “ greater efficiency ” campaign, which brings us back again to the Japanese maxim.
There will be hardly a dissenting voice if we make the statement that “ to get the best results from men, offer inducements commensurate with the cost to them of maximum effort.”
To expect men to do their utmost by simply driving them machine-tool fashion, is contrary to human nature and pretty well understood to be so to-day. Admission of the fallacy of this driving method is not, however, sufficient to get the results all manufacturers want; the pendulum must swing to the other end of the arc—the force must be attraction instead of propulsion.
How, then, is the employer to do all this? How shall he plan and act that his employees will gladly, cheerfully exert themselves to the utmost for the enterprise in which their efforts are combined?
Whoever has witnessed an intercollegiate boat-race has noticed how at the finish the crew of one boat will collapse, while those in the other boat row on without one faltering stroke. Both crews may have done the same amount of work; nay, the winning crew may have done a shade more work than the losers; why, then, the marked difference in physical and mental condition? In business a great many of us row a race every day, and we know that our condition at the end of to-day’s race has a great deal to do with our speed in to-morrow’s race. Who, then, that employs men to “ race ” for him will deny that it is to his best interests to have his men feel that they have won at the end of each day’s race?
There are many ways of accomplishing this, as many ways as there are different men and women. Some of them are well-known ways; others, though understood by our Columbuses, our Hannibals, our Napoleons, remain enigmas to most of us still. Perhaps the best known and most frequently practiced means is the provision of inducements affecting the worker’s finances or ambitions; an ever-present knowledge of sure reward or promotion does more to bring the result sought for than anything else to be named.
Next in power comes, perhaps, the comfortable sense of satisfaction felt by a workman in knowing that his employer is worthy of his respect and his best effort. Then, too, there is the intimately sympathetic and cheerfully enthusiastic employer who, because he is what he is and because he has made his workmen his friends, calls out from them unasked the daily sweat of their faces.
To the healthy human being it is good to work and to work hard, when his work is made pleasant for him and when he is paid at least the market value for his efforts. Otherwise he becomes the unwilling horse, the oarsman with a broken oar and even an enemy in the camp.—Iron Age.
The Submarine Menace. Is the Battleship Doomed?—(By Periscope.)—Time is sometimes very rapid in working out its revenges. It is not many years since the British naval authorities were roundly abused by what has been described as the “ historical school ” for devoting so much money and attention to the creation of submarine flotillas. It was held that the submarine was the arm of the weaker power, desirous only of pursuing a purely defensive policy. On this assumption it was argued that Great Britain had no business to embark on the construction of submarines. During the recent agitation against Admiralty shipbuilding policy, the progress which has been made in the creation of submarine flotillas was persistently ignored in an effort to prove that Germany was making greater headway than this country in fleet expansion. The fact was, of course, that the Board of Admiralty, largely owing to Lord Fisher’s influence, persisted in laying down a large number of submarines each year—to some extent at the expense of the destroyer program. To the amateur critic this procedure did not appeal. He pointed to the fact that Germany was building a large number of destroyers, and was devoting practically no attention to submarines, and, therefore, ipso facto, the British Admiralty must be wrong, because Germany, in the eyes of these critics, is always right. Even a considerable number of naval officers regarded the expenditure upon submarines as little better than waste of money.
Germany’s attitude towards the submarine has undergone a dramatic change. This type of craft is no longer ignored on the other side of the North Sea, where submarines are being built rapidly. In the action which she is now taking Germany is following the lead of the British authorities, and it is no longer suggested that the submarine is the work of the weaker power, and possibly useful for purposes of coastal defence. Critics of Admiralty policy have suddenly swung round and recognize in the submarine an effective instrument for offensive purposes. They are already looking forward calmly, and with a certain gleam of satisfaction, to the day when Germany will possess large flotillas of submarines. Hardly a word of credit is given to the Board of Admiralty for its action in realizing the virtue of this new type of craft and pressing on with its construction year after year in the face of a large body of naval and public opinion. According to the Dilke Return, the present position in submarines built and building is as follows :
Built. Building. Total.
Great Britain 63 11 74
Germany 8 ..* ..*
France 56 23 79
Russia 30 3 33
Italy 7 .. 7
United States 18 10 28
Japan 9 3 12
* Number uncertain.
As the result of foresight in appreciating the real virtues of the submarine, Great Britain leads the whole world in this type of construction. She is even ahead of France, for a large number of the craft included in the French total are admittedly ineffective, whereas only the earliest, more or less experimental, boats in the British service are otherwise than thoroughly warworthy. Whereas, built or building, Germany possesses probably twelve or fifteen submarines. Great Britain, including the ships about to be laid down, has upwards of eighty. This is not the only advantage which has accrued from the action of the Admiralty. In the British service a vast deal of experience has been gained in the employment of these craft, and no navy in the world possesses so large a body of officers and men skilled in all the niceties of submarine navigation.
In the current number of Blackwood’s Magazine appears a most interesting article by Colonel a’Court Repington, C. M. G., on the menace of the submarine. This distinguished writer has suddenly become an exponent of Admiralty policy with reference to these craft in that he appreciates their value, and, indeed, goes considerably beyond the views held by the most enthusiastic pioneers of the British service who were faithful to the submarine at a time when it was regarded as little more than a toy. Like all converts, the writer has lost himself in his zeal. Colonel Repington not only believes in the future of the submarine, but he holds that it is the craft of almost exclusive importance in the present naval situation. He not only pins his faith to the submarine, but he believes that “ the great ships to which we devote so much money every year—though they have been, are, and may for a few years more be necessary—will within a limited period of time become useless for most operations of which the North Sea and the Channel will be the theater.” Colonel Repington, while refraining from criticism of the all-big-gun principle, sets out to show why “ neither Dreadnoughts, pre-Dreadnoughts nor super-Dreadnoughts will a few years hence have any place in a naval war waged in such narrow waters as those of the North Sea.”
The author of the Blackwood article has an exaggerated idea of the amount of money which is being invested in these ships, and speaks of the super-Dreadnought costing “ from two to two and a half millions sterling.” It is well to keep to sober facts. The latest British Dreadnought of which complete details are available is the battleship Neptune, and the Navy Estimates show that instead of costing two to two and a half millions sterling, the total outlay upon this vessel, including guns, is put at £1,728,440. So far no British battleship has been conceived which cost even two millions. Nor is Colonel Repington accurate in stating that a super-Dreadnought “ carries a thousand men,” and “ can be sunk by a torpedo fired from an invisible submarine, costing perhaps £60,000 or £80,000, at 7000 yards range.” Colonel Repington makes this statement as to the vulnerability of such a large ship without any attempt at proof, as though he were stating an axiom of general acceptance. The fact, however, is that it is impossible to say with absolute assurance what effect the explosion of a torpedo would have on vessels constructed as the British Dreadnoughts are. There is, however, a general opinion amongst naval constructors that while a torpedo might do serious injury to such a ship, it would not sink it.
This is one point that deserves to be noted. Another is that Colonel Repington in his enthusiasm for the submarine has omitted to attach due importance to the limitations inherent in these craft. The North Sea is not a small lake. It is spoken of as one of “ the narrow seas ” because in comparison with the large oceans its area is restricted; it is not, however, by any means a millpond. It contains, roughly, 150.000 square miles of water; it has a length of about 600 miles, and at one point from the Firth of Forth to Jutland its breadth is about 400 miles. Therefore, when Colonel Repington claims it as “ falling within the category of narrow waters,” it would be a mistake to regard the North Sea as something a little larger than a lake, to be readily dominated by a few submarine vessels.
On the other hand, no one can doubt that the writer has reached a correct conclusion regarding the submarine as an important offensive weapon which is likely to have a dramatic influence upon naval policy on the North Sea. This is apparently the reason which has led the Admiralty during the past few years to devote so large a proportion of the sum available for naval construction to the building of these craft.
Admitting that the submarine has come to stay, admitting that it is likely to prove an effective offensive arm and admitting that Germany may in the distant future possess a large number of these craft, are we necessarily driven to Colonel Repington’s conclusion that “ the North Sea in time of war will very soon be, if it is not now, no place for a sea-going ship.” The writer draws an alarming picture of the possibilities of naval warfare in these waters.
“ Swarms of destroyers and submarines, and every year more of the latter. will infest this sea, and the existence of every great ship venturing into the area controlled by these pests, which are almost unassailable by naval means, will be most precarious. Our great and costly battleships and cruisers must be stowed away safely in some distant, safe and secluded anchorage—Scapa Flow and Portsmouth to-day, Berehaven and Lough Swilly perhaps to-morrow. The North Sea in time of war will be a desert of waters, insecure on both sides, open to neither, commanded by none.”
This is an alarming picture and it encourages Colonel Repington to hold the view that, “ while we may make the North Sea a mare clausum in war, both to German sea-going fleets and to German merchant vessels,” by stationing our main fleets at its two exits, we cannot hope to employ our battle fleets directly against Germany. In his opinion our battle fleets will have to keep out of harm’s way, and leave the flotillas to carry on the war. Arguing on this basis, he arrives at the conclusion that it is possible that we may be able to give relative protection to the up-Channel trade bound for the port of London, but that even here Germany may succeed by harassing and attacking trade and diverting a portion of it to our southern and western English ports. Colonel Repington thus comes to the conclusion that along the rest of the east coast of England and Scotland trade by way of the sea will probably be almost suspended until the submarine menace is disposed of.
How far will experienced sailors agree with this writer’s conclusions? On this hypothesis, will they admit that the day of the battleship is over, and that the money which is being devoted to the construction of such vessels is largely wasted? No one doubts that the submarine is destined to influence powerfully the future of naval war, particularly in narrow waters, but experienced naval officers will certainly hesitate to go anything like the whole length with Colonel Repington.
It is only at the tail of Colonel Reoington’s article that we get at the motive which apparently had a great deal to do with his enthusiasm for the submarine. He believes that the battle fleets holding the exits of the North Sea may succeed in strangling German trade, but he is not satisfied that this would be a satisfactory conclusion, because he is nervous as to the outcome of the “ war of the flotillas.” Colonel Repington adds that:
“ If, for example, Germany discovers, or has discovered, the means for effectually attacking submarines, and if we have not, it is possible that Germany, when she has constructed the submarines upon which she seems resolutely bent, may dominate the North Sea by their means, and put us to the dilemma either of allowing her army of invasion to land, or of attacking it—may be a convoy of dummy transports—and of thus exposing our battle fleets to the blows of German submarines which we may have no certain means of destroying. It will not be altogether a satisfactory end to a war if we ruin, indeed, German seaborne trade, but end with the Pomeranian Grenadier in Palace Yard and the Altona Corps at Arthur’s Seat.”
This is surely the conception not of a practiced student of war, but rather of an alarmist who is anxious to prove the necessity for raising a conscript army. Colonel Repington seems to have concluded that Germany holds all the cards in the struggle between the flotillas, whereas the exact contrary is the fact. There is no purpose in arguing on such a basis, and the only real solid facts that we have to do with to-day are these:
(1) Great Britain possesses a notable lead in submarines.
(2) Great Britain has a great superiority in other types of torpedo-craft.
(3) The submarine and destroyer, which are a menace to battleship and cruiser, are also no less a menace to German transports loaded up with German soldiers to whom the menace of the torpedo will appeal powerfully.
(4) Germany has not yet invented an anti-submarine.
On examination all Colonel Repington’s fancies disappear, and we have the old naval truths left little affected. Naval supremacy can be maintained only by the big armored ship, supported by torpedo-craft of various descriptions. The various types will play roles, but neither the one nor the other is going to drive either class off the seas.—Naval and Military Record.
Submarines as Sea-Going Vessels.—We do not hesitate to say that the most important fact, to-day, in the development of naval material is the surprisingly rapid improvement of the submarine. A few enthusiasts have been struggling with the seemingly unconquerable difficulties of submarine navigation with such success that at last they have produced an engine of warfare, in the presence of whose latest performances even the most conservative among us must ask whether the supremacy of the big battleship is not most seriously threatened.
The submarine of to-day is a very different craft from its progenitor of ten or a dozen years ago. Particularly is this true of the type which has been developed for the United States Navy, the latest representatives of which are sea-going vessels possessing fair speed, a wide radius of action and great certainty of control both at the surface, in making the dive, and when running submerged. Furthermore, thanks to the bold initiative of the builders, the latest navy submarines, built at the Fall River Works and represented by the Salmon, have demonstrated by her ocean voyage of 1500 miles to Bermuda and back, that the time is coming when the submarine will be able to accompany a battleship fleet upon the high seas.
In fitting the Salmon for this cruise, no special navigating bridge was provided. The vessel was navigated by Mr. G. C. Davidson, late lieutenant-commander of the United States Navy. The underwriters required that a convoy should be taken, and the Salmon was, therefore, accompanied by the tug Underwriter, which rendered no assistance whatever to the submarine on the run to Bermuda.
The Salmon is 134½ feet long by 15 feet in diameter. When running at the surface she displaces 230 tons and in the submerged condition her displacement is 345 tons. On her official surface speed trials she made 13¼ knots and she averaged 12¼ knots on her 24-hour surface trial at sea. In diving, she first sinks to the submerged condition by admitting water to her ballast tanks, and then, with a reserve buoyancy of 1250 pounds, a slight depression of the diving rudder causes the boat to dive with remarkable steadiness at an angle of inclination of from one to two and a half degrees, until the required depth of 15 feet is reached, when the whole hull is submerged and nothing but the slender tubes containing the periscopes is visible. The Salmon has effected a quick dive, from a full speed of 13¼ knots on the surface under oil engines, with ballast tanks empty, to submerged running with the electric motors at 9 knots in 3 minutes, 22 seconds.
At the beginning of the run to Bermuda the Salmon carried her normal gasoline supply of 6000 gallons, besides 385 gallons of lubricating oil, 1085 gallons of fresh water and 700 pounds of rations for twenty-one men for seven days. She got under way at Provincetown, Mass., at 9 p. m., on July 6, and proceeded to Hamilton, Bermuda, at a speed of 10 knots. On the following day she ran into a strong southwest wind and rough sea, which lasted two days; and during this time she was navigated from the upper bridge, except from 1.30 p. m. until midnight on Friday, when she was navigated from inside the conning-tower. A defective cylinder-head gasket on the port engine necessitated running the craft from Thursday to Saturday under the starboard engine alone, at a speed of 7½ knots. Seasickness on the part of the green engineering force of landsmen necessitated delaying repairs until port was reached.
The distance run from Provincetown was 718 miles and the average speed maintained was 7.8 knots. The total distance of the trip from Quincy was 768 nautical miles; the consumption of gasoline was 3000 gallons, and of lubricating oil 95 gallons. While in Bermuda no repairs were made to the engine or other machinery, except the renewal of the gaskets in the cylinder heads.
The Salmon left Bermuda for Quincy, Mass., at 9.30 a. m. Wednesday, July 13, and reached Provincetown at 3.40 Saturday, the 16th. During the voyage back both engines functioned satisfactorily and an average speed of 9.7 knots was maintained. At I p. m., while off Cape Cod, the gasoline supply was exhausted and a tow was taken until 3.45 p. m., when the boat proceeded to Provincetown under her electrical motors. This tow was taken as a matter of convenience, since the storage batteries were fully charged and they are sufficient to drive the vessel 150 miles under the surface. On examination it was found that accidentally one-half of the gasoline supply had been blown overboard.
The total run of this record-breaking cruise (for no such voyage out into the Atlantic had ever been attempted before) was 1514 miles. The average speed for the whole cruise was 8.7 knots. The gasoline consumed shows a radius of 1536 miles under the adverse conditions of the outward trip, and a radius of about 1650 miles under the more favorable conditions of the return trip.
The habitability of the boat was thoroughly demonstrated. The ventilation of all parts of the boat, except the torpedo compartment, was satisfactory. The torpedo compartment has not, as in later boats, any means of supplying fresh air, and the ventilation, therefore, was poor, particularly in view of the fact, that the cooking was done in this compartment; an operation which in later boats is performed in the after battery compartment, which has perfect ventilation from the engines. While at sea the temperature of the air outside and in the body of the boat was about 80°. The engine-room temperature varied from 100 to 110°.
This Bermuda cruise disposes of the doubt that the submarine can ever be regarded as a sea-going craft. Hitherto it has been looked upon as a mere adjunct to the system of harbor defences; and its value has been set down as due mainly to its “ moral effect.” But to the naval man it is evident that an enlarged Salmon with its speed and radius greatly increased, will prove a formidable competitor of the battleship for the supremacy of the sea.—Scientific American.
An Oil-Motor Steamship.—Controversy waxes warm in German shipping circles as to what extent the oil-fuel steamer constructed at the yard of Messrs. Blohm & Voss for the Hamburg-Amerika Company for the petroleum trade will fulfil the. expectations formed of her. The two large motors to be employed are of the Diesel type, each generating 1500 horsepower, and one immediate advantage is the economy, amounting to 75 per cent, which will be effected in engine-room space, thus giving so much the more cargo accommodation. Another economy effected by the change is in the smallness of the engine-room staff, only three engineers and three oilers being required for both motors, in watches of eight hours each. For fuel, petroleum residues will be employed. In Germany it can be bought for £2 a ton, and in America, one of the terminals of the voyage, it is considerably cheaper. The whole cost is considered to be about 75 per cent less than coal. The vessel’s screws are somewhat smaller than those usually allotted to craft of 9000 tons, making about 150 revolutions a minute, but it is expected that a speed of about 12½ knots will be obtained. Whilst ordinary steamers can only convert about 16 per cent of the fuel consumed into energy, a motor-driven vessel converts 40 per cent. The new steamer, which will be completed in twelve or fourteen months, is intended for the Hamburg and New York and Philadelphia route.—Page’s Weekly.
Dock Yard Museums.—The first thing to engage the attention of King George when he landed to inspect the establishments at Portsmouth on his recent visit was the new dock yard museum. This is housed in the old fitting loft, which has proved to be well situated for the purpose, and the chief credit for the establishment and organization of the museum belongs to Mr. Frost, who for nearly eleven years has served as secretary to the Admiral-Superintendent at the Portsmouth yard. A similar museum was started at Chatham a few years ago, mainly on the initiative of Admiral Swinton Holland, and here among other objects of interest may be seen the quaint flag of the Commonwealth period, which for many years was preserved in an old chest in the Admiral-Superintendent’s house. The idea of such museums as these at the naval ports is an excellent one, and deserves encouragement in every way. It is not surprising that King George spent some time inspecting the exhibits at the new museum at Portsmouth, for his interest in nautical antiquities generally, and the archæology of the British naval service in particular, is well known.—Army and Navy Gazette.
Maritime Archeology.—The preliminary meeting on June 14 of the supporters of the project for establishing a society for the study of nautical archæology was most encouraging. Of one hundred persons who had expressed their willingness to join such a society, quite half the number attended the meeting. Among those present were naval officers, officers of the mercantile marine and yachtsmen; writers on naval history, strategy, tactics and the art of sea warfare; archæology, chronology and technology; architecture, administration, commerce, hygiene and international law, with other nautical subjects; painters, book illustrators and other artists; the representatives of societies connected with seamen and seafaring and many other students of the sea and its story. Mr. W. L. Wyllie, who presided, said that, speaking for marine painters, he was sure that they would as a body support the society. Sir John Laughton referred to the great assistance it could render the historian, and Mr. Douglas Owen pointed out the valuable influence it might exert in the direction of the improvement of our naval museums. So far, apparently, the theatrical profession is unrepresented, and yet all interested in dramatic art may derive benefit from the advice of such a society, for the stage has been responsible for some of the most atrocious caricatures of seamen and sea life. We may hope yet to see an actor-manager in the chair at the society’s meetings. Nor were there any writers on costume present, and from most of their works it would be impossible to learn that the English seaman has been recognizable by his attire for nearly 500 years, or that to he “ disguised as a sailor” was a common stage direction in Tudor times. Mr. Carr Laughton is to be congratulated on the satisfactory prospects of his public-spirited efforts towards the organization of the study of maritime archæology. Now that the society is fairly set a-going there should a large influx of members, and those who wish for information on the subject should write to him at 5, Ruvigny Mansions, Putney, S. W.—Army and Navy Gazette.
Professor Spenser Wilkinson’s Thoughts on the Navy.—To a meeting at the Royal Colonial Institute, Professor Spenser Wilkinson revealed some of his “ Thoughts on Imperial Defence.” For the most part, he has been thinking about a war between Germany and this country, and he does not appear to have found much consolation. The new German Navy, he feels, “ is the creation of men whose familiarity with land warfare gave them a perfect grasp of the necessity for tactical superiority which they have been seeking by intelligent study and practice for twenty years.” As a result, they have evolved, Professor Wilkinson says, the doctrine that there is no such thing as a strategical reserve. This means “that you should begin a war by employing for the first blow, as far as possible, the whole of the forces which you possess. Instead of letting one squadron after another engage with a part or the whole of the opponent’s fleet, you should collect for the first battle every ship or every man you possess, in order as far as possible to overpower him at the very beginning.” It seems to us that if Germany goes to work in this way it will simplify matters, and at least there can be no bolt from the blue, since before the German fleet can be mobilized the reserve must be called out, and if every ship is to be collected for the first battle, what becomes of the torpedo menace? It does not appear to have occurred to Professor Wilkinson that the familiarity with land warfare he speaks about may not be the inestimable advantage to sea commanders that he appears to think it is. So far as the British Navy is concerned, the professor is troubled by his belief in its neglect of tactical study and tactical practice. We feel sure that his belief is ill-founded; nor is it true, as he says, that “ the officers in the navy who are regarded as its best tacticians are at least doubtful whether the type of battleship and armored cruiser upon which many millions are being spent is designed in accordance with sound tactical principle.” Professor Wilkinson attempted to explain the conditions of success in naval war. The most important of them all, he said, was tactical superiority. He defined it this way:
“ One navy or one army has tactical superiority over another when a given fraction of the one finds that it can fight better and can beat a corresponding fraction of the other.”
This, he says, is the lesson of the whole history of war. We should like some further explanation of this definition. What is the corresponding fraction in one navy of any given fraction in another? Are these fractions to be understood in terms of classes of ships, or in terms of squadrons or divisions of fleets. Like Colonel Repington, Professor Wilkinson thinks that “ the battleship has found a new enemy in the torpedo, and in the next war the fighting will not be confined to the surface of the sea. but will be carried on in the waters under the surface and in the air above it.” But it has yet to be shown how the fractions in the air may exercise a tactical superiority when engaged with fractions on the surface or under the sea. You cannot have skill without practice, says Professor Wilkinson, and it only the skilled fighter, “ the man whose knowledge of what to do with the implements of war is so thorough as to be almost instinctive, who is the proper judge of the implements which he requires, and of the value for a fight of the different kind of weapons.” We agree, but it is only the Japanese who can be said to have recent knowledge of this description, and, so far as we are aware, there is no difference between the principles underlying their policy of shipbuilding and ours. We also agree with Professor Wilkinson that nothing is more important than that the Government should have a naval strategist to direct the movements of its fleets and to prepare the instructions for the admirals commanding them. The Professor would like, apparently, to appoint his own strategist, but we believe the navy would be quite content, should war come soon, to see its direction left to Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson. At no time in the history of navy has its strategical disposition or tactical training reached a higher standard than it has under the administration of these two officers.—Army and Navy Gazette.
British Naval Maneuvers and their Purpose.—An Historical Retrospect.—1887.—An inferior fleet under Sir Edmund Fremantle evaded a superior fleet under Sir William Hewett and threatened the Thames.
1888.—An attempt to blockade a hostile power in his ports by two British fleets slightly superior in numbers failed. The fleets under Tryon and FitzRoy broke the blockade of Baird and Rowley, and the hostile cruisers raided the British coasts and commerce.
1889.—An attempt by a superior British fleet, assisted by localized squadrons, to mask the enemy’s fleet failed. The enemy raided coasts and commerce, and was not brought to decisive action before the maneuvers ended.
1890.—A hostile fleet attempted to maintain itself upon an important trade route and interrupt traffic, avoiding a general engagement in face of a slightly superior British fleet. Owing to the faulty drafting of the instructions no definite result was obtained, but some useful experience was gained with torpedo-boats.
1891.—Two distinct sets of maneuvers were carried out by four separate squadrons. The operations of the two principal fleets were not strategical. The secondary maneuvers, which took place in the St. George Channel, were undertaken by two small squadrons opposed to one another, one supplied with torpedo-catchers and the other with torpedo-boats. Offensive action undertaken by a force of catchers was moderately successful.
1892.—An attempt by two divisions of a powerful fleet to effect a junction for the purpose of securing the command of the sea in a channel whose opposite sides were occupied by the two belligerents. The junction of the fleets was accomplished without much difficulty in spite of the efforts of the hostile fleet and its superiority in torpedo-craft.
1893.—The opposed fleets were subdivided, each consisting of two squadrons, the Red fleet being slightly stronger than the Blue, but one of the divisions of the Blue fleet was stronger than one of the Red. The Blue side was assisted by a flotilla of torpedo-boats. The Red commander attempted to drive his opponent out of disputed waters, but the result was indecisive.
1894.—Two fleets attempted to effect a junction in waters in which was a force superior to either of them, but inferior to them when combined. This force consisted in part of a small division at some distance, and a superiority of torpedo-vessels. The fleets, in attempting to make their junction, were beaten in detail. Destroyers were first introduced in these maneuvers, but the torpedo craft did little owing to the fact that only one night was sufficiently dark to give them an opportunity for attack.
1895.—Two fleets were to leave their respective ports on a certain day, and each to proceed to a rendezvous unknown to the other. From these positions they were to take the necessary measures by means of their scouts and cruisers for finding each other and effecting a junction. The junction took place within about 17 hours after the two fleets began their search. The torpedo flotilla operated independently for the purpose of testing the use and value of destroyers.
1896.—The problem concerned the possibility of a fleet leaving port without the knowledge of the look-out cruisers of a superior and masking fleet, and effecting a junction in another port at a distance with a friendly force. The fleets were, as previously subdivided, but the two portions of the blockaded fleet evaded the watching cruisers and effected a junction. They also evaded the enemy’s fleet, which had united for the purpose of bringing on an action, and got safely into the port, where they were supposed to meet their friends.
1897.—The curve of search. The Channel and Reserve fleets were subdivided, and one division of each set to search for the other, but owing to a misconception of the instructions the operations were not altogether successful.
1899.—Wireless was used for the first time on this occasion. A British convoy of slow ships was ordered to wait at a certain rendezvous for the arrival of a protecting squadron. A hostile fleet put to sea to intercept and capture the convoy before it could be met by its protectors. In spite of the excellent arrangements made by the enemy for searching the area in which the convoy was placed, these failed, mainly owing to the fog, and the convoy was taken safely into harbor by its protecting squadron. The success was said to have been at least in part due to the wireless installation in some of the cruisers, and by which means news was transmitted between two ships over a distance of 60 miles apart.
1900.—To obtain information relative to the working of a fleet composed of all classes and fighting for the command of the sea. The subdivisions of the fleets succeeded in uniting at a pre-arranged rendezvous, but the maneuvers ended indecisively, owing to neither having a well-marked superiority over the other.
In 1901 two fleets known as X and B, and commanded by Vice-Admiral A. K. Wilson and Rear-Admiral Sir Gerard Noel, fought for the command of the English Channel, the ultimate aim of X being to stop the trade and of B to cover it. The umpires decided that B fleet had been beaten.
1902.—No maneuvers took place in home waters, but after the Coronation Review the Channel and Cruiser squadrons proceeded to the Mediterranean. No representatives of the press were present, and guests were excluded from the ships engaged. A narrative of the exercises was issued afterwards. The special object of the scheme was to ascertain what risks were involved in keeping such a close watch on a fleet in a defended port as to ensure bringing it to action if it issued therefrom. The blockaders were not successful in their main object. They failed to prevent the escape of the blockaded fleet.
1903.—The whole of the Mediterranean, Home and Channel fleets took part in operations, together with the Cruiser squadron and 16 additional cruisers. Eight flag officers were present. A much larger area was assigned to the exercises than had been usual, and it was entirely in the Atlantic. The fleets engaged were known as X and B. Interest centered in a fleet action between the contending forces, and the verdict of the umpires was that the command of sea remained with X.
1904.—Naval maneuvers were carried out in August. Those in which the Channel and home fleets participated were secret, but the torpedo maneuvers in the Irish Channel were attended by newspaper correspondents. The object on the one side was to keep the sea secure between Land’s End and the Mull of Galway. The other side had to attempt the destruction of this, but was unsuccessful, owing in the main to the large number of destroyers with which their opponents were provided, although before the operations ended most of these were destroyed.
1905.—Combined battle exercises were carried out by the Mediterranean and Atlantic fleets in May and in August, but they were not reported. The reserve divisions also engaged in maneuvers in July with squadrons selected from the Channel fleet, cruiser squadrons and destroyer flotillas, but no report was issued.
1906.—The general idea of the maneuvers was based upon the assumption of a war between a strong naval power, Red, and a weak naval power, Blue. Blue attempted an attack on the Red trade in order to cause the dispersion of the Red fleet. All the available ships of the navy took part, and the co-operation of the mercantile marine was invited. The press was represented. In the Admiralty Remarks issued on the conclusion of the operations, the umpires stated that the success of Blue was only achieved at the expense of the complete disorganization of his fighting forces, and that had hostilities continued “ it is practically certain that the commencement of the third week of the war would have seen all commerce-destroying ships either captured or blockaded in their defended ports.” It was also remarked that “ the summary of Red and Blue losses will show the cost of a guerre de course against a superior naval power, and proves that though a temporary commercial crisis might possibly be caused in London by this form of attack, the complete defeat of the aggressor could not be long delayed, with the result that public confidence would be quickly reestablished and the security of British trade assured.”
Since 1906 the strategical exercises which have taken place have been conducted in secret, and no official reports have been made upon them. In 1907 there were no grand maneuvers, but divisional exercises took place in February and October, off Lagos and in the North Sea respectively. Only fully commissioned ships took part.
In 1908, in addition to similar divisional exercises, grand maneuvers took place in July under the direction of Lord Charles Beresford in the North Sea. The number of vessels engaged was 314. Two fleets, A and B, succeeded in effecting a junction in face of third fleet, C, stronger than either of them separately, but weaker than they when united.
In 1909, in addition to the divisional exercises, grand maneuvers took place in July off the west coasts of Ireland and Scotland, under the direction of Sir William May. The number of vessels engaged was 374. Two fleets, A and B, attempted to effect a junction in face of a third fleet separated into three parts, C, D and E. The strongest force was A, but C, D and E, when united, were stronger than A and B together. A and B succeeded in effecting a junction, but were at once brought to an action by the enemy in overwhelming force.—Army and Navy Gazelle.
CONTRABAND OF WAR.—“ Absolute” and “Conditional.”—One of the most important decisions come to by the International Naval Conference was the determination of the specific items which will be held to constitute contraband of war. The decision arrived at was that the following articles may, without notice, be treated as contraband of war, under the name of absolute contraband:
1. Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their distinctive component parts.
2. Projectiles, charges and cartridges of all knds, and their distinctive component parts.
3. Powder and explosives specially prepared for use in war.
4. Gun mountings, limber boxes, military wagons, field forges and their component parts.
5. Clothing and equipment of a distinctly military character.
6. All kinds of harness of a distinctly military character.
7. Saddle, draft and pack animals suitable for use in war.
8. Articles of camp equipment, and their distinctive component parts.
9. Armor plates.
10. Warships, including boats, and their distinctive component parts of such a nature that they can only be used on vessels of war.
11. Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of munitions of war, for the manufacture or repair of arms or war material for use on land or sea.
In addition to determining what should constitute absolute contraband, it was decided that the following articles, susceptible of use in war as well as for purpose of peace, may without notice, be treated as contraband of war, under the name of conditional contraband :
1. Foodstuff’s.
2. Forage and grain, suitable for feeding animals.
3. Clothing, fabrics for clothing and boots and shoes, suitable for use in war.
4. Gold and silver in coin or bullion, paper money.
5. Vehicles of all kinds available for use in war, and their component parts.
6. Vessels, craft and boats of all kinds, floating docks, parts of docks and their component parts.
7. Railway material, both fixed and rolling stock and material for telegraphs, wireless telegraphs and telephones.
8. Balloons and flying machines and their distinctive parts, together with accessories and articles recognizable as intended for use in connection with balloons and flying machines.
9. Lubricants, fuel.
10. Powder and explosives not specially prepared for use in war.
11. Barbed wire and implements for fixing and cutting the same.
12. Horseshoes and shoeing materials.
13. Harness and saddlery.
14. Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers and all kinds of nautical instruments.
Under no circumstances will the following be considered contraband of war:
1. Raw cotton, wool, silk, jute, flax, hemp and other raw materials of the textile industries, and yarns of the same.
2. Oil seeds and nuts, copra.
3. Rubber, resins, gums and lacs, hops.
4. Raw hides and horns, bones and ivory.
5. Natural and artificial manures, including nitrates and phosphates for agricultural purposes.
6. Metallic ores.
7. Earths, clays, lime, chalk, stone, including marble, bricks, slates and tiles.
8. Chinaware and glass.
9. Paper and paper-making materials.
10. Soap, paint and colors, including articles, exclusively used in their manufacture, and varnish.
11. Bleaching powder, soda ash, caustic soda, salt cake, ammonia, sulphate of copper.
12. Agricultural, mining, textile and printing machinery.
13. Precious and semi-precious stones, pearls, mother of pearls and coral.
14. Clocks and watches, other than chronometers.
15. Fashion and fancy goods.
16. Feathers of all kinds, hairs and bristles.
17. Articles of household furniture and decorations, office furniture and requisites.
Likewise the following may not be treated as contraband of war:
1. Articles serving exclusively to aid the sick and wounded. They can, however, in case of urgent military necessity and subject to the payment of compensation, be requisitioned, if their destination is territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy or the armed forces of the enemy.
2. Articles intended for the use of the vessel in which they are found, as well as those intended for the use of her crew and passengers, during the voyage.
To sum up the situation as it has existed prior to the Declaration of Paris and the Declaration now under notice, it has been free for a belligerent power to make her own rules as to what she would consider contraband of war, to such an extent as she considered it safe to go, having in view the disposition of the neutral powers concerned. It was open to her to even interdict all supplies if she could pursue such a course with safety and had the means of enforcing it.
The conditions in regard to maritime capture have changed so completely during the century in which this country has been at peace since the French wars, the last naval warfare of any dimensions in which the British were engaged, that every possible consideration should be given to the views of those critics who fear that any further restrictions will invalidate or weaken the nation’s naval superiority, on which she depends in the absence of being a first-class military power.
Prior to the Declaration of Paris in 1856, the British insisted on the right of capturing all enemy’s private property at sea under neutral flags as well as under the enemy’s flag. This procedure was plain, direct and simple, and, when the former right was foregone, some alarm was excited, as is now again occurring in connection with the recent conference detailing the conditions under which neutral trade shall in future be conducted, it appearing to those who look at it from some points of view as a curtailment of the privileges of naval superiority.
It must, however, be remembered that the economic position of Great Britain has totally changed during the past century. Her inhabitants have unfortunately largely become aggregated in large towns and cities, where they rely on the import trade, for not only the materials for the industries in which they are engaged, but for their daily food. It by no means necessarily follows that the fleet will not be able to retain free passage of the seas for the nation’s mercantile shipping and for the adequate supply of the materials and food they require, or that there will be any necessity to transfer national shipping to neutral flags to obviate capture or to ensure the safety of such cargoes, but the mere restriction of the rights of capture of supplies coming to a country so dependent on them should have a beneficent effect, and would in fact be a safeguard. The case presented, however, by the critics of the conference is that we need not consider such safeguards which restrict so greatly the power of our fleet to punish an enemy’s trade and to bring her to her knees, as the fleet should be able to ensure the non-interruption of national supplies under our own flag, and that even in protracted operations the country is so situated that in a war, especially with a country like Germany, our western ports and extent of coastline are so extensive as to make a complete stoppage of sea-borne trade an impossibility, and a blockade of the whole coast out of the question.
To return to the details of what is considered contraband, “ condition ” contraband and non-contraband. It will be seen that the articles considered as absolute contraband are practically all munitions of war in regard to which there can hardly be any question. Any particular power reserves the right to add by declaration to the list of “ absolute contraband,” but only has the power to do so in regard to articles exclusively used for war. Such notification has to be addressed to the Governments of other powers or their representatives accredited to the power making the Declaration. There will now be an International Court of Appeal at The Hague, to which any neutral may appeal from a decision in the national courts, where such cases will be decided in conformity with the principles which have recently been arrived at. Undoubtedly a belligerent has the right of interfering with any assistance being rendered to the enemy, the damage to her interests being infinitely more than that to the neutral concerned. Hitherto the decision has resided in the national courts, the only redress for any injustice being for a nation seriously aggrieved to consider any glaring case an act of war.
Absolute contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined to any territory belonging to, or occupied by, the enemy, or to the armed forces of the enemy. It it immaterial whether the carriage of the goods is direct or entails transshipment or a subsequent transport by land. Proof of the destination will be complete:
1. When the goods are documented for discharge in an enemy port or for delivery to the armed forces of the enemy.
2. When the vessel is to call at enemy ports only, or when she is to touch at an enemy port or meet the armed forces of the enemy before reaching the neutral port for which the goods in question are documented.
Where a vessel is carrying absolute contraband her papers will be conclusive proof as to the voyage on which she is engaged, unless she is found out of the course indicated by her papers and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such deviation.
The English, by right of naval predominance, have hitherto always held a policy of extending the making contraband of war or articles which might prove of the least assistance to the enemy, but this view has never been supported by Continental nations, and would be an extremely dangerous one to enforce to any marked degree in a modern war. Its day has undoubtedly gone under more modern conditions, however much it may be regretted.
When the items of conditional contraband are considered one comes to more debatable ground. The first item alone, viz., foodstuffs, provides an object on which volumes might be written. It must be remembered, however, that these items are “ conditional ” contraband only, that is to say, they are only contraband and liable to capture if they are shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces or of a Government department of the enemy State. It will, therefore, be seen that foodstuffs and many other important items may continue to come freely, for general, as distinct from military, use in neutral bottoms, irrespective of that carried, subject to capture, by our own ships, and also that raw materials for industries will not be considered contraband under any circumstances, thus providing against many miseries in the unfortunate event of the country being engaged in hostilities with any combination of powers.
To reiterate more clearly what has just been stated, conditional contraband is not liable to capture except when found on board a vessel bound for territory belonging to, or occupied by, the enemy, or for the armed forces of the enemy, and when it is not to be discharged at an intervening neutral port. The ship’s papers will be conclusive proof both as to the voyage on which the vessel is engaged and as to the port of discharge of the goods, unless she is found clearly out of the course indicated by her papers, and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such deviation.
Hitherto there has been no such thing as a list of what articles cannot under any circumstances be treated as contraband, and it is satisfactory that it has been possible to institute one. The tendency of the recent changes is decidedly to confine the hostilities as far as possible to the armed forces of the belligerents, and to spare misery to the home populations of the countries engaged, but whether they will attain that object, and whether it is altogether a desirable course to take from a national point of view, or subjugating an enemy, must be left to deeper discussion.—Naval and Military Record.
Professional Notes
Prepared by Professor Philip R. Alger, U. S. Navy