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Naval aviation did the thing right when "personality oriented” maintenance management ended in March 1964. At that time, 40 experienced officers and chiefs met at the Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia. They had been called from both fleets, the bureaus, and the Pentagon to "create a new standardized and effective system of maintenance management.” This surprised the group. After all, aircraft had been maintained since 1911. World War II and Korea had earned a great reputation for naval aviation. The squadron maintenance officer, along with his hard-nosed chief, had given a character and personality to programs. Why the rush toward change?
For one reason, the Air Force maintenance management system was about to be introduced into the Navy by top DoD officials who disliked naval aviation’s fragmented organization and lack of standardization. There were other reasons. The new family of aircraft in the budget required a fresh look at maintenance management disciplines. The maintenance organization would have to change. New manuals would need to be written. Data processing systems were required. The entire classic loop of plan, program, monitor and control processes had to be molded into a management system that would meet a growing challenge.
The response of the conference members was less than enthusiastic. Each had his own idea of what a maintenance management system ought to be. Each had been permitted to use his own system. The systems had evolved over some 53 years and included the experience of three wars. Thus, with some misgivings, the dialogue began. It has not yet ceased.
The first challenge involved the definition of maintenance management as a total concept. Elements of the concept, i.e., material readiness, conservation of resources, collection and analysis of data, and stand
ardization in both organization and procedure, were all relatively easy to discuss. The hard task was to bring all the pieces together into a coherent pattern that resulted in a standard system which could be understandable to both the raw recruit and the admiral.
Certain classic definitions of maintenance management were already available. A DoD instruction defined it as the process of projecting workload, organizing, staffing, directing, and controlling the engineering, industrial, and other resources required to achieve the objective. But the experienced conference members knew that maintenance management is simply complete and proper control of assigned resources.
Out of that conference came the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP). Today, a "bible” describes completely the how, what, and where of naval aviation’s program for maintenance. The latest refinement was published in July 1970 as OpNavInst 4790.2. The publication contains four volumes, 35 chapters, 23 appendices, and a glossary that covers 1,056 entries. It is complete, effective, and is under continuous revision in consonance with changing patterns in maintenance responsibilities. The instruction sets the structure of the system into three levels of responsibility for working the entire naval aircraft inventory. They are:
► Organization Level. This is the squadron or unit level. Work includes servicing the aircraft, conducting daily and periodic preventive maintenance inspections, replacement of parts, and the collection of raw data. A typical squadron owns 12 aircraft and guides the effort of about 250 maintenance personnel.
► Intermediate Level. This is the supporting Naval Air Station (NAS) or Aircraft Carrier (CVA) organization. Work includes the repair, test, and modification of components (e.g., engines, fuel controls, radios), technical assistance to squadron, manufacture of parts, and collection/analysis of data. A typical large NAS supports 250-300 aircraft and guides the effort of some 700 maintenance personnel.
► Depot Level. This is the "shipyard” of aviation. The
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No one need stress the value of aircraft maintenance management to this pilot, seen examining his S-2 Tracker before a routine sortie.
seven Naval Aviation Repair Facilities (NARFs) are responsible for major repair and overhaul of aircraft. Additionally, these industrial sites calibrate tools and test equipment, modify and repair component parts, provide "teams” of technical experts for major problems and conduct a higher level of data collection and analysis systems. A typical NARF specializes in certain aircraft models (e.g., A-6, F-4, P-3) and guides the effort of some 3,500 civilian personnel.
This tri-level structure was introduced in 1965 and is the single most important milestone in the history of maintenance management programs. At long last a standard system was possible, with clean and clear organizational responsibilities.
The thing, then, was done right. But the burden of doing the right thing still remains. Another new family of aircraft is now in the wings. Again, naval aviation stands on the threshold of a new era. The time is ripe for a highly intensive thrust to revitalize the NAMP. It is a major thesis of this article that the necessary top level action has not met the challenge.
And the decade of the 1970s—-demanding more and more in resources to sustain a viable maintenance program-will begin to tarnish the magnificent history of naval aviation unless the new challenge is met. Since history had led many to the conclusion that this has already begun, it is proper to trace the pattern from the beginning.
In the age of wire, fabric, and outriggers, every pilot was his own mechanic. "Standard” pre-flight consisted of, (1) pour in the gas, (2) kick the tires, and (3) push the throttle. Today, upwards of 30 maintenance man-hours per flight hour is expended on aircraft. Billions are invested in maintenance facilities, tools, and spare parts. The modern vehicle itself, with supporting equipment, is worth more than its weight in gold.
flag officer who could ever rightfully be called "Mr. Maintenance Manager,” despite the fact that a maintenance management system ought to have had at least one full-time advocate and champion.
The reasons for the snail-like evolutionary pace of maintenance management are many and varied—some were evident from the very beginning.
1911 to 1940. The NavAir publication, United States Naval Aviation 1910-1970, contains some 400 pages devoted to events of significance. Only four dates are
Unlike the history of naval aviation in the air, the evolution of practice and procedure of the maintenance organization on the ground is largely undocumented. Naval aviation was more than 50 years in being before aviation maintenance management was standardized. More than 55 years elapsed before a maintenance officer’s career program was established. There is not one
The Right Thing for Naval Aviation 29
devoted to aircraft maintenance management. Obviously, a Naval Air Maintenance Program excited no one. The action was in the air, not on the ground.
Any attempt to identify original ground maintenance personnel in naval aviation is an exercise in futility. But one publication, Jackrabbits to Jets narrates the history of naval aviation at North Island. That publication cites Electrician’s Mate 1st Class Dale Seig- ler as the original ground maintenance man. Other hearsay evidence has it that "Bill” McTute, Machinist Mate 2nd Class, was hired on the main street of Newport, Rhode Island, by Lieutenant Jack Towers when McTute helped Towers, who was undergoing flight training at Hammondsport, Long Island, to start a stalled automobile.
Prior to World War II, the senior aviation chief machinist mate ran every aspect of the squadron maintenance program. His program was largely self-developed or handed down by his predecessor. He answered to the skipper directly. He ran his own supply bins. Success or failure depended on his program. And that program was documented only in a black book in his hip pocket. During this period, aircraft squadrons were practically self-supporting, both in home port and deployed. As late as 1938, the Secretary of the Navy limited aircraft maintenance aboard carriers and tenders to upkeep and minor repair. This policy, never officially rescinded, died during World War II. In that crisis, every level of maintenance that talent and equipment permitted was performed in carriers and tenders. The concept of a fully integrated and capable maintenance organization for independent operation at sea was born.
1940 to 1945. At the start of World War II, those squadrons not already embarked moved aboard their respective carriers, bag and baggage. It soon became apparent that the rigors of combat flying greatly limited the air crews’ efficiency in handling ground maintenance responsibilities. It was also apparent that rotation of all air group personnel and equipment, for the sole purpose of preventing combat fatigue, was extremely inefficient.
In response to these observations, the Carrier Air Support Unit (CASU) concept was developed. The concept separated ground maintenance from squadron mission. Squadron complements were reduced to flying personnel^, plus a nucleus of ground support technicians whose primary function was inspection and liaison. A typical "streamlined” F-6F Hellcat squadron contained 45 aircraft, 54 pilots and about 19 enlisted personnel, all with orders to be prepared to go anywhere in four hours. The CASUs provided maintenance and servicing ashore while Carrier Air Support Detachments (CASD), an integral part of a carrier’s air detachment, provided services afloat. During World War II, every carrier was
commissioned under the CASD concept. Even though it can be argued that the CASU/CASD concept played a major role in winning the carrier war in the Pacific, this separation of aircraft maintenance responsibilities from squadron command control caused heated objections on the part of squadron commanders.
1945 to 1960. At the close of World War II, it was obvious that retention of large CASDs aboard each carrier would be impracticable when much air group time would be spent ashore. Additionally, strong arguments were presented for the return of control of on-aircraft maintenance to squadron commanders. In an effort to ensure economical personnel utilization, increase component repair in the field, return control of work to squadron commanders, and retain an aircraft service activity in the field, the Fleet Air Service Squadron (FASron) was established. In the carrier, an aircraft maintenance division was formed. Under this system, the complements of the service activities (FASron and V-2 division) were greatly reduced and squadron complements increased.
There were serious deficiencies in the FASron concept. An important goal of increased component repair at the lowest level, to preclude the expensive and time- consuming pipeline to repair facilities, was never fully achieved. In theory, squadron personnel were to repair components within their capability. In practice, FASron personnel, were assigned component repair which was beyond squadron capability. A procedural deficiency existed in that both squadrons and FASrons could return defective components to supply officers who in turn transferred the parts to a depot facility. There was little or no monitoring system in effect. The concept and the organization began its decline as an effective part of the maintenance management program.
As noted, during all these years, there was no Navywide standard maintenance program. Each major fleet commander, assigned as controlling custodian (owner) of assigned aircraft, issued his own directives on aircraft maintenance policy and procedures. It was not until 1955 that a comprehensive standard maintenance program began struggling toward birth in the Maintenance Division of the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer). The proposed BuAer program was never implemented due to nonacceptance by major fleet commanders. However, a number of maintenance managers now began to speak of an urgent requirement for centralized direction of the Naval Aircraft Maintenance Program. In 1959, CNO directed BuAer to develop a maintenance plan which would include disestablishment of FASrons. These units were to be replaced by aircraft maintenance departments under station commanding officers. This step was critical in that naval air stations were owned and operated by BuAer at that time. Thus, a standardized approach
and a central direction finally became possible.
1960 to 1972. Development of the Naval Aircraft Maintenance Program could be termed "evolutionary” until the late 1950s; during the 1960s, the term "revolutionary” is more appropriate. Implementation of three levels of maintenance, development of the 3-M (data collection) system, creation of an aircraft maintenance and material branch under DCNO (Air), establishment of a career Aviation Maintenance Duty Officer (AMDO) program, new career enlisted rates for support equipment and maintenance administration, and a marked increase in component repair at the intermediate level of maintenance all came to pass during this ten-year period. During the period BuAer correspondence continually emphasized the growing requirement for an increased level of component repair in the field.
Two major events relative to the NAMP occurred along parallel lines during 1962-1963. One was the DoD order that Navy evaluate the Air Force Maintenance Program, referred to as AFM 66-1. Although the AFM 66-1 system contained many sound features, the major objection to the Air Force method from the Navy standpoint concerned the basic philosophical and organizational differences related to maintenance responsibilities. The Navy concept that aircraft maintenance is a responsibility of command had evolved over a period of many years, and was tested in a wartime environment, from completely self-supported squadrons through completely supported squadrons.
At first glance, the Air Force method of concentrating aircraft and maintenance personnel under one commanding officer, and operations employing the aircraft under another commanding officer appeared to offer the most effective utilization of personnel and equipment. If continental naval air stations were the true operational base for combat units, this organization might have sufficed for Navy missions. However, the Navy maintenance organization structure was developed to ensure effective operations from aircraft carriers and advance bases. There always has been a fundamental requirement to move combat units on short notice to any location, even in peacetime operations. In addition, the Korean experience had shown that sustained operations could be conducted without reverting to the streamlined squadron and full support
In maintenance management, there still exists at the "nuts-and-bolts” level—typified by the carrier hangar deck environment—a distressing array of problems that must be brought under control.
from a separate maintenance activity. Subsequently, the Navy’s response to emergency deployment of squadrons during the Cuban alert further confirmed that the naval aviation tactical organization was basically sound. Maintenance management was in fact an integral part of command.
The second important accomplishment was the separation of organizational and intermediate level functions. This was a major stumbling block under the previously confused responsibilities wherein squadrons and FASrons were both responsible for component repair to their maximum capability. In practice, relatively little component repair was accomplished, outside of avionics, until implementation of the three levels of maintenance. In 1962, Navy-wide, approximately 35$ of components removed from operating aircraft were made Ready-for-Issue (RFI) at the NAS or CVA level- Component repair in the field now exceeds 70% of a much larger number of component removals. Because of ever-growing aircraft sophistication, component removals have increased almost four-fold since 1962, while operating aircraft have declined. Currently, more than 1.6 million components are removed from Navy aircraft each year. The surging cost of these components and material pipelines required to sustain such a volume of component repair makes it increasingly clear that component repair management demands top priority in naval aviation.
With growing evidence that naval aviation was approaching an improved and standardized management system, two other shortcomings of the NAMP, long recognized, increased in importance. One was the requirement for centralized OpNav direction. The other was the now obvious need for a career Maintenance
The Right Thing for Naval Aviation 31
Management Officer’s Program. The argument for centralized control, initiated in 1964, resulted in the establishment, in 1965, of an aircraft maintenance and material branch on the staff of DCNO (Air). This was an important milestone, but it fell short of attaining the goal of direct flag officer participation.
It was at this point that the new posture in naval aviation maintenance management faced the greatest challenge of all—the Vietnam operations. And, once again, a highly successful response was generated. Given the pressure patterns of sustained effort over an eight- year period, it is a chapter of history in which the managers responsible for daily maintenance/material support can be justly proud. But these managers relearned, during those eight years, that there are important milestones still to be achieved. The organization at the top is not yet stabilized and properly concerned. Many critical programs, desperately needed in the near future, are not adequately supported. Even though the intensity of effort associated with the Vietnam operations are easing now, there still remains a future challenge perhaps greater than any naval aviation has ever faced.
The creation, in 1968, of the Aeronautical Maintenance Duty Officer (AMDO) program offers great hope for improvement. For the first time in the history of naval aviation a community of officers is dedicated to maintenance management. The community is in its infancy, struggling to identify talent and experience to fill the currently assigned 503 billets. Only 308 of these billets are now filled with qualified AMDO (1520) officers. There are two major difficulties associated with the growth of this community:
► Senior officers are not available. The Bureau of Naval Personnel has estimated it will take another seven years to fill the 24 captain billets with AMDO qualified officers. At present there are just five available. Of the 84 commander billets, only 38 are filled. The percentages are better in the lower ranks. This is a typical pattern in the establishment of a new community. But one official decision was atypical and amounted to a crushing defeat in terms of accelerating development of the 1520 community. That decision was that a naval aviator must sacrifice his flight pay to join the AMDO organization. The decision is difficult to understand since the AEEJO (Aeronautical Engineering Duty Officer) (1510 community) is permitted to continue in flight status. Both must relinquish opportunity for succession to command at sea when changing to the restricted line officer status, but only the AMDO must accept economic sacrifice as well. Thus, this decision choked the entry of highly qualified captain, commander and lieutenant commander ranks into the 1520 effort.
► Flag officers are not available. If any one flag officer
billet at the Washington level is "Mr. Maintenance Manager” today, it would have to be the billet occupied by Air-o4. This billet, Assistant Commander for Logistics/Fleet Support in the Naval Air Systems Command, is one of several commands under the Chief of Naval Material. The charter for Air-o4 covers almost everything involved in management of maintenance/ material policy and procedure for support of the fleet. But five different officers have passed through this billet in the past five years. It must be conceded that stability of top level direction in maintenance management programs has not been achieved.
At the Chief of Naval Operations level, specific sponsorship has been lacking in terms of flag officer responsibility. An office, with a captain in charge, was established in 1965 as a result of critical fleet arguments for a "big daddy” in OpNav. But it is very difficult to convince higher authority that maintenance management programs warrant the full time attention of a flag officer in the Office of DCNO (Air). This lack of specific sponsorship diminishes the promise of a bright future for the young AMDO (1520) officer. By way of contrast, the AEDO (1510) community, with 110 fewer billets, has eight flag officers carrying the torch.
But despite slowdowns, there is a solid reason for predicting good results from decisions already made. There is a 1520 community. It is filling with high quality personnel. They are developing a fine reputation. And hopefully, as they progress through a succession of operating billets to senior grade, everyone will be convinced that their collective efforts will result in a major contribution to the readiness of naval aviation.
There is no question but that this contribution will be required. There still exists at the "nuts and bolts” level, in maintenance management disciplines, a distressing array of problems that must be brought under control. A brief tabulation will suffice to highlight the areas of effort within which new energy and leadership must be brought to bear:
(a) About 20% of all components removed from aircraft and delivered to shops for replacement or repair have nothing wrong with them. This nagging statistic lays bare the problems of training, trouble-shooting techniques, and leadership.
(b) The Naval Safety Center reports for FY 1971 indicate that maintenance-induced accidents/incidents were responsible for the destruction of 22 aircraft, substantial damage to 34 other aircraft, the death of three people and major injury to 37 others. The cost of this dramatic and tragic experience is estimated at $55.4 million. It is further indicated that 1,306 specific maintenance errors were reported. Most maintenance managers working today are aware that 80-90% of maintenance errors do not find their way into the record
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Aircraft in various stages of overhaul fill this hangar at the Naval Air Rework Facility at Quonset Point Naval Station.
books. Placed in proper perspective, these statistics are not unusual when one considers the overall hazards commonly associated with high-intensity flight operations. But our attack on these problems must be relentless and effective.
(c) A recent survey of personnel engaged in maintenance activities throughout the fleet, conducted by personal questionnaire, established several key problems. Among them were: (1) Inept or inadequate training programs. (2) Migration of officers assigned to positions of management. In too many cases, officers are assigned on a "collateral” basis, and rapidly rotate through the job. (3) Lack of or inadequate technical publications designed to assist in trouble-shooting or repair. (4) Inadequate shipboard facilities and spares. (5) Improper use of personnel.
All of this is well known to the 1520 community. These officers live with the problems every day. And it is apparent that the difficulties will increase in the future because of high-level decisions being made now as emphasis and resources shift in consonance with new roles and missions in the Navy. CNO has articulated the need for change and set the pattern. He has moved vigorously and quickly to guarantee that the benefits of airborne systems are spread across all naval missions. These innovative thrusts generate an explosive demand for maintenance management programs not yet developed. The CV concept (provision of flexible carrier response to emphasize either ASW or attack missions) is one example of new demand. The Light Attack Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS) helicopter program, which provides air capability in augmentation of combatant ship ASW roles, is another example which calls for major expansion of maintenance support sites.[1] Still another is the DH concept (Sea Control Ship) which will employ the advantages of airpower.f All of this, in addition to the introduction of a new family of hard core carrier aircraft (F.A-6B, E2-C, A-6E, S-3A, F-14) and missiles, sets the stage for another revolutionary charge into the next decade.
The Naval Air Systems Command (NASC), now assigned primary responsibility, is hard at work preparing for the new maintenance environment. There are four specific efforts currently under way by NASC
that can make or break the readiness posture in the next ten years:
► NAILSC—The Naval Air Integrated Logistics Support Center, located at the Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Maryland, functions as a maintenance/material management consultant over the full spectrum of NASC responsibilities. This center is under the direct control of Air-04. The work of this 250-man team is critically important to the policy/procedure demand of the future. Unfortunately, personnel resources have been severely limited. The original plan for NAILSC has not been achieved. There is great need to expand the organization and exploit the advantages of what should be the maintenance management support center for naval aviation.
► MSDO—The Management Systems Development Office, located at the Naval Air Station, North Island, California, functions as the consulting and operations group for ADP application to maintenance/material management programs. This 124-man team effort has proved its worth as an important element in the ability to make data gathering a meaningful contribution. As a happy spin-off of these efforts, ADP programs implemented to date have established a one to 6.4 cost/ benefit ratio in annual savings. This office is under the direct control of NAILSC.
► CAMSI— The Carrier Aircraft Maintenance Support Improvement program, located at NASC headquarters in Washington, functions as a project coordination center to collect and give emphasis to specific efforts required to improve maintenance support. This program was established in the fall of 1970 in response to a detailed survey of operating carriers. The small staff assigned has been very active over the past year in ferreting out new problems and confirming long-standing deficiencies.
► VAST—The Versatile Avionics Shop Test program, located at NASC headquarters in Washington, has been established since 1968 as a major project. VAST amounts to a new computerized approach to the testing of
The Right Thing for Naval Aviation 33
avionic components in aircraft such as the E-2C, S-3A and F-14. VAST development has obviated the requirement to engineer and purchase massive suites of specialized test equipment for each type of aircraft. Upwards of $400 million in procurement funds are scheduled through the years ahead to provide for this support in carriers and shore stations. But the anticipated benefits, in terms of cost avoidance, are truly enormous. VAST is an extraordinary response to an extraordinary problem of avionics readiness. Sustained high level support is critically important to the future of the VAST concept. Reasonable alternatives to the VAST program are practically non-existent.
Our circle is complete, naval aviation now stands on the threshold of a new era, not unlike the environment faced by those 40 officers and chiefs at Norfolk in 1964. But, if these same people were together again, it would be necessary for them to re-express some of the same recommendations made then, namely:
(1)Accelerate the development of the 1520 (AMDO) community of officers, especially at senior levels. The decision to remove from flight status (and pay) any 1310 officer who desires to enter the maintenance management specialty is a punishing restriction and should be corrected forthwith. Naval aviation cannot tolerate a lengthy "grow your own” philosophy. The situation now demands a new study be undertaken to revitalize the whole approach to the growth and stability of this group of specialists.
(2)Guarantee a straightaway career path to flag selection for the 1520 officer. There are no flag billets now allowed. Yet the expanded NAILSC organization and effort would seem to be the perfect billet for the first 1520 flag officer selected. With this selection and assignment, many fragmented maintenance management "monitoring” staff elements could be pulled together into a truly effective management center at Patuxent River. This event would trigger the establishment of a strong, viable base for future improvements. The fact that most weapon systems enter the fleet inventory via the Patuxent River Test Center strengthens the recommendation.
(3)Establish a division under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) solely dedicated to direction and control of the NAMP. This recommendation has been advanced since 1964, yet the voice of OpNav still sounds only from branch level. Assignment of responsibility at the division level would provide a flag officer with full time responsibility "sponsoring” all aspects of maintenance management. His spectrum of effort would range from support of budgets with a much higher "pecking order” than now exists, to the design and implementation of "model” facilities aboard naval
air stations and carriers. It logically follows that eventually such a division in DCNO (Air Warfare) would be headed by the second 1520 flag officer.
The recommendations above are cited to emphasize that a hard requirement still exists for recognition of just what is needed for a viable aviation maintenance management posture for the 1970s. Dedication and perseverence of the personnel now engaged in these pursuits will permit achievement of interim goals during the evaluation of new initiatives. But complete exploitation of talent, time, and resources cannot be expected without sustained top management attention.
There is no need at present to convene an effort similar to the Norfolk conference in 1964. The 1520 community is now at work. Rapid growth in expertise and reputation will be achieved. These officers are fully convinced that over the past ten years naval aviation has done the thing right. But the nagging question still remains—will we do the right thing?
Little doubt exists that a great debate will continue. Recommendations will certainly call for high level emphasis and support. All are anticipating that the necessary attention will be forthcoming in the same spirit that the quietly determined group at Norfolk expressed in their effort: a spirit that held steadfast to the axiom that in our work there are really no problems—only opportunities.
Captain Schroeder enlisted in the V5 program in 1942. Completing flight training as a fighter pilot in January 1943, he served with VF-1 in the USS Yorktown (CV-10) and VF-32 in the USS Cabot (CVL-28). Subsequent to World War II, Captain Schroeder served as a flight instructor in Corpus Christi and fighter pilot in VF-31. In 1950 he was at Tulane University studying under the five-semester Holloway Plan. Service in Korea followed as Executive Officer of VF-191 in the USS Princeton (CV-37). Thereafter, tours in Air Development Squadron 5 as a project pilot, NavCadProcurement duty at NAS New Orleans (where he completed his political science degree at Tulane) and the Naval War College led to command of VA-86 in 1957. Assignments in the USS Eon Homme Richard (CVA-31) as Air Officer, to the Master’s Program in Management Sciences at Monterey, California and as Commanding Officer of VX-5 followed in quick succession. In 1963, he served on the staff of ComNavAirLant where he was responsible for implementation of the New Naval Air Maintenance Program. From 1965 to 1968 he served as Comptroller for the DCNO(Air). Selected for major command, he served as Commanding Officer at NAS Oceana until he was assigned as Special Assistant for Financial Matters at the Naval Air Systems Command in October 1970. He retired in July 1972.
[1]See M. R. Bonsignore, "A Look at Our Lamps,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1971, pp. 26-31.
f See "The Sea Control Ship System,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1972, pp. 113-115.
Captain Lemmon enlisted in the Navy as seaman apprentice in 1940. At the close of World War II, he was serving as Leading Chief of Bombing Squadron TEN in the USS Intrepid. Subsequently he served in CASUs, FASRONs and as Flight Deck Chief on a CVE. He was commissioned as an ensign in 1953, while attached to the Flag Administrative Unit, ComNavAirPac. His commissioned service includes duty as Catapult Officer in the USS Antietam (CVS-36), Arresting Gear Test at Lakchurst, N.J., Air Group Maintenance Officer in the USS Forrestal (CVA-59) and AIMD Officer in the USS John F. Kennedy (CVA-67) and at NAS Oceana. He is currently serving as Aircraft Programs and Maintenance Management Officer on the Staff, ComNavAirLant.